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Abstract
Digital signatures are one of the most significant achievements of public-key cryp-
tography and constitute a fundamental tool to ensure data authentication. However,
the public verifiability of digital signatures may have undesirable consequences when
manipulating sensitive and private information. Undeniable signatures, whose verifi-
cation requires the cooperation of the signer in an interactive way, were invented due
to such considerations. Whereafter, designated confirmer signatures (DCS) were intro-
duced as an improved cryptographic primitive when the signer becomes unavailable in
undeniable signatures.
This thesis is mainly devoted to the modelling, design and analysis of designated
confirmer signatures. By exploiting the existing security notions, we theoretically anal-
yse the relations among unimpersonation, invisibility, non-transferability and transcript-
simulatability. To this end, we develop formal proofs to demonstrate the implications
of those properties.
After providing the theoretical results related to the security model, we develop
both concrete and generic DCS constructions that adapts to a full verification setting.
On one hand, by supporting the signer’s ability to disavow, we can achieve an effi-
cient designated confirmer signatures by using bilinear maps, and such a construction
is secure in the random oracle model under a new computational assumption, called
Decisional Co-efficient Linear (D-co-L) assumption, whose intractability in pairing
settings is analysed in the generic group model. The proposed scheme is constructed
by encrypting Boneh, Lynn and Shacham’s pairing based short signatures with signed
ElGamal encryption. On the other hand, we build a generic transformation that is in-
spired by Gentry, Molnar, Ramzan’s DCS scheme. The new generic DCS scheme is
proved to be secure in the standard model, and can be implemented to obtain an ef-
ficient instantiation with a Persesen Commitment, a Camenisch and Shoup’s Paillier-
based encryption scheme and a Boneh, Lynn and Shacham’s short signature scheme.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is evident that information technology provides significant change to our daily life,
especially the way people communicate. Communication systems have evolved from
pigeons carrying messages to emails and instant messages that travel long distances
within seconds. With the rapid development in information technology, the security
issue in communication systems herewith get a great deal of attention. Fortunately,
encryption technique has long been used to protect the confidentiality of messages,
while digital signatures have been adopted to guarantee the authenticity and data in-
tegrity of messages in communication systems. The concept of digital signatures is
initially introduced by Diffie and Hellman in the remarkable work [28], and later has
been widely used in communication systems to significantly reduce the costs of con-
ducting business over the Internet. As one of the most fundamental tools of public-key
cryptography, digital signatures are generated by applying a mathematical formula or
an algorithm, to scramble the information into a string of digits. Only the holder of the
private key – the signer can produce such an “electronic autograph”, and the recipient
of the signature with the public key – the verifier can verify if the signature came from
that individual. For messages distributed through a non-secure channel, a properly im-
2plemented digital signature gives the receiver reason to believe the message being sent
by the claimed sender. In many scenarios, any change in the message after signature
will invalidate that signature, which ensures the integrity of the signed data against
tampering or corruption in the transmission.
As illuminated above, ordinary digital signatures are verifiable by anybody holding
the signer’s public key. Although the universal verifiability (or self-authentication) of
digital signatures is very convenient in most applications, however, in some scenarios,
the signer may hope the recipient of a signature would not be able to show its validity to
other parties. For instance, a signature binding parties to a confidential agreement or a
signature on documents carrying private or personal information, shall only be verified
by specific verifiers. In these cases limiting the ability of third parties to verify a
signature’s validity is an important goal. This motivates the introduction of undeniable
signatures. Chaum and van Antwerpen proposed the concept of undeniable signatures
[23] that such a signature can only be verified with the collaboration of the legitimate
signer. A distinctive feature of undeniable signatures is there exists a disavow protocol
that allows to prevent the signer from denying a valid signature.
Undeniable signatures have various applications in cryptography such as licensing
softwares, electronic voting and auctions. Considering a typical scenario in licens-
ing softwares, for instance, software vendors might want to sign on their products to
provide authenticity to their paying customers. Nevertheless, they strictly disallow dis-
honest users who have illegally duplicated their softwares to verify the validity of the
signatures. Undeniable signature scheme plays an important role here as it allows only
legitimate users to verify the validity of the signatures on the softwares.
However, for many practical applications, if the signer becomes unavailable, or
refuses to cooperate, the recipient cannot make use of the signature. Due to this reason,
designated confirmer signatures (DCS) are introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen
3[21] to solve this weakness, as an extension of undeniable signatures. In a designated
confirmer signature scheme, the signer is still able to interactively verify the signature
with the verifier. However, if the signer is unavailable, a semi-trusted third party called
the designated confirmer can also confirm the (in)validity of an alleged signature by
running some interactive protocols with the verifier. In general, such a verifier cannot
transfer the signature’s (in)validity to other parties by convincing them of the same fact.
Furthermore, the designated confirmer can convert a designated confirmer signature
into a standard signature when this is necessary, so that it becomes a publicly verifiable
signature.
Perhaps the most convincing example demonstrating that designated confirmer sig-
natures are better than undeniable signatures, is a job offer scenario. Alice is offered
a job by Bob and wishes to receive a formal signed offer at some point, but Bob does
not want Alice to show this offer to other potential employers. If Bob signs this offer
using an undeniable signature, he may suffer from an embarrassment that Alice wants
to expose this signed offer. In that case, Bob has no hope to deny that offer, and the
most he can do is to refuse to cooperate. To solve this problem, Carol comes to the res-
cue. Suppose Bob signs this offer with a designated confirmer signature by using his
own secret key and Carol’s public key. He could simply convince Alice that the signed
offer is legitimate, i.e., he proves to Alice he formed the signature in this way. Such
a DCS is special in that it can also be verified directly by Carol, and its distribution is
indistinguishable from a distribution that can be computed using only the public keys
of Carol and Bob. Bob can assume that nobody can forge a signature for his public key,
and that as long as Carol is honest no body learns that he signed an offer. Alice can
safely assume that Bob cannot fool her, and that if Bob denies having signed an offer
and Carol is honest, then Carol can prove to anybody that Bob is lying by convert that
designated confirmer signature into an ordinary signature of Bob that can be verified
4by anybody.
1.1 Motivations
Since the invention of designated confirmer signatures, a number of schemes with var-
ious properties and different underlying mathematical problems have been developed.
Although a considerable amount of work has been dedicated to the design of DCS
schemes, all of the previous DCS schemes fail to support signer to disavow any in-
valid signatures. Therefore, the current concept of DCS has not yet fully inherited
that functionality from undeniable signatures, as the latter does grant the signer the
ability of disavowal. As a result, one motivation of this thesis is concerned with the
design of designated confirmer signatures that fully support signer’s verifiability, or
more precisely, “DCS with full verification”. The formal definition of this notion will
be presented in Chapter 5.
Another motivation is the confusions of the security notions in the existing DCS
models. As far as we know, In a DCS scheme, the signer’s security only requires a se-
curity notion called unforgeability, which informally means no body except the signer
can produce a valid signature on any unsigned message. However, to achieve the con-
firmer’s security, several security notions were proposed in the literature, including
unimpersonation [45, 64], invisibility [18, 32], non-transferability [18] and transcript-
simulatability [38]. Intuitively, unimpersonation means no body can impersonate the
confirmer to verify a DCS by running the confirmer’s verification protocol; invisibil-
ity requires no body can see the validity of a DCS without the verification, in other
words, an adversary who receives a DCS has no advantage than a random guess to find
the signature is valid or not; non-transferability is relates to the verification protocols,
which means one cannot get more information out of the verification protocols than
5whether a signature is valid or not; transcript-simulatability guarantees the confirma-
tion or disavowal of a DCS should not be transferable, that is, any transcript of the
verification protocols is simulatable. Naturally, one may raise such a question: “can
a DCS cryptosystem achieves the confirmer’s security by satisfying only one or two of
them?” It is noticed that non-transferability and transcript-simulatability with different
definitions but capture the similar security requirement, and hence there may exist an
implication between these two notions. In addition, it seems also feasible to figure out
an equivalence between three security notions, that is, a DCS cryptosystem achieves
the security of transcript-simulatability, if and only if it achieves invisibility and non-
transferability. Since the relations between these security notions are not clear and have
never been formally discussed after their propositions, it is a fundamental question to
study the equivalences/implications among these security notions.
1.2 Contributions and Results
Based on the above two motivations, the key contributions of this thesis can be summed
up in two aspects. Firstly, from a modelling perspective, we prove that to achieve prov-
able security, a DCS cryptosystem only requires transcript-simulatability or alterna-
tively invisibility plus non-transferability. In other words, the security model proposed
by Camenisch and Michels [18] and the security model proposed by Gentry et al [38]
are equivalent under a proper assumption, that is if the verification protocols for DCS
schemes are based on zero knowledge proofs. However, we also prove that unimper-
sonation is implied by invisibility, which concludes that Goldwasser and Waisbard’s
security model [45] is weaker than Camenisch and Michels’ security model.
Then from the perspective of designing and analysing DCS schemes, we show that
it is feasible to construct a DCS scheme that supports the signer’s ability of disavowing
6invalid signatures. In more details, we provide the following contributions:
• Two existing DCS schemes, i.e., Zhang et al’s DCS scheme and Wei et al’s
society-oriented DCS scheme, are insecure, and attacks against invisibility can
be identified. In particular, we fix the security flaw in one of the two schemes,
i.e., Wei et al’s scheme [83].
• A concrete DCS scheme with full verification can be constructed by using bilin-
ear maps. Such a DCS scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model
under a newly introduced computational assumption. And the intractability of
this computational assumption in pairing settings is analyzed in generic group
model. Moreover, the proposed scheme can be further transformed into a unified
verification version, which allows the signer and the confirmer to run the same
verification protocols. We also propose a very efficient way that transforms our
verification protocols into concurrent zero knowledge protocols which is invul-
nerable to any adversary during the concurrent executions of verification proto-
cols.
• A generic DCS scheme with full verification can be constructed by extending
the constructions of the improved GMR scheme in [78]. The building blocks
of this generic DCS scheme are, a statistically hiding computationally binding
commitment scheme, an IND-CCA2 secure public key encryption scheme which
supports the use of “labels”, and an EUF-CMA digital signature scheme. In ad-
dition, we give a formal security analysis, and implement an instantiation of the
generic construction by using BLS short signatures [14], Pedersen commitments
[67] and CS-Paillier cryptosystem [19].
This thesis has resulted in two publications:
7• [86] Fubiao Xia, Guilin Wang, and Rui Xue. On the Invisibility of Designated
Confirmer Signatures. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Infor-
mation, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS’11), pp. 268-276,
ACM Press. March 22-24, 2011, Hong Kong, China.
• [80] Guilin Wang, Fubiao Xia, and Yunlei Zhao. Designated Confirmer Signa-
tures With Unified Verification. In Proceedings of the 13th IMA International
Conference on Cryptography and Coding (IMACC’11), LNCS 7089, pp. 469-
495, Springer-Verlag, 2011. December 12-15, 2011; University of Oxford, UK.
Also the following work is published during my PhD study on some topic which is not
related to designated confirmer signatures.
• [87] Qi Xie, Guilin Wang, Fubiao Xia, and Deren Chen. Provably Secure Self-
Certified Proxy Convertible Authenticated Encryption Scheme. In: Proc. of
the 4th International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collaborative
Systems (INCoS-2012), Bucharest, Romania, September 19-21, 2012.
1.3 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 aims at providing a brief overview of the cryptographic background re-
quired to understand the sequel of this work. After recalling the concept of “provable
security”, we discuss two commonly used idealisations of security models, namely, the
random oracle model and the generic model. Then we present a survey of interactive
proofs and zero-knowledge proofs, which are necessary in the verification protocols of
a designated confirmer signature scheme. We also introduce the pairing based cryp-
tography by recalling the definition of bilinear maps, which will be used as a building
block in the concrete DCS scheme in Chapter 5. The last section of this chapter is
8dedicated to a review of the definitions and security notions of several cryptographic
primitives, including public key encryptions, digital signatures and undeniable signa-
tures.
Chapter 3 is devoted to general aspects of designated confirmer signatures. First
of all, we present the context and motivations in an introduction to this cryptographic
primitive, and discuss some important works among the previous DCS schemes. The
subsequent section provides a formal definition of the security model. Next to this, we
introduce two existing concrete DCS schemes which is vulnerable to some consider-
able attacks.
Chapter 4 exposes the modelling aspect of designated confirmer signatures, namely
we clarified different security notions under proper assumptions, associated with both
intuitive discussions and formal security proofs. Firstly, comparing with the properties
introduced in the previous chapter, we recall two different security notions, namely,
unimpersonation (appears in [64, 45]) and transcript-simulatability (firstly intro-
duced in [38]), and we proved the property called unimpersonation, is naturally sat-
isfied if a stronger property called invisibility (initially introduced in [18]) is satis-
fied. Next, we analyse the relations between transcript-simulatability, invisibility, and
non-transferability (appears in [58, 18]) with formal proofs. Our result shows that
transcript-simulatability in Gentry et al.’s model [38] is also implicitly covered by Ca-
menisch and Michels’ [18] DCS model.
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the design and security analysis of a new concrete desig-
nated confirmer signature scheme with unified verification. We first put forward some
building blocks of our new scheme, including bilinear pairings, and BLS signatures
[14]. Next, we develop the transformation of concurrent zero knowledge (CZK) proofs
from honest verifier zero knowledge proofs, because CZK protocols are required since
an adversary in DCS schemes may act as arbitrary cheating verifiers during the con-
9current execution of verification protocols. Subsequently, we introduce the updated
model for DCS with unified (full) verification. Based on these results, we propose
a DCS scheme with unified verification by using BLS signature and signed ElGa-
mal encryption, and prove security results according to the definitions in the updated
security model. Furthermore, such a construction can be simply transformed into a
full-verification version.
Chapter 6 deals with the design and analysis of a generic designated confirmer
signature scheme with full verification. After presenting the context and motivation of
this work, we introduce two cryptographic primitives, that is, the commitment scheme
which is used as a “layer of indirection”, to achieve the efficient instantiations, as
well as the public key encryption scheme that supports the use of labels to enhance
the security. Next to this, we propose a generic transformation to convert any digital
signatures into designated confirmer signatures with full verification. A formal security
analysis of the proposed scheme is provided with regarding to the definitions in the
previous chapter. Subsequently, we show how to efficiently instantiate the generic
construction by properly choosing a digital signature scheme, a commitment scheme
and a public key encryption scheme.
Chapter 7 concludes this work and suggests some future research directions in
both theoretical and practical aspects concern with our results, which are worth to
investigate from our viewpoint.
10
Chapter 2
Preliminaries in Cryptography
2.1 General Definitions
To denote the set of different numbers, we use the “blackboard” font such as the set of
positive integers N, the integers Z, the real numbers R, the non-negative real numbers
R+. Throughout this thesis, λ ∈ N denotes the security parameter. The set {0, 1}∗
stands for the set of the bitstrings of arbitrary length. For any bitstring x ∈ {0, 1}∗, we
use the symbol |x| to denote its length, i.e., the number of bits it is composed of.
We consider only algorithms A which are probabilistic Turing machine that run in
time polynomial in λ unless indicated otherwise. If S is a set, then x ← S indicates
that x is chosen uniformly at random over S. We remark that, even if occasionally not
mentioned, all algorithms in this thesis receive the security parameter λ as an additional
input.
Definition 2.1. (A Negligible Function). we say that a function,  : N→ R+ is called
negligible if for every constant c ≥ 0, there exists an integer kc such that (k) ≤ k−c
for all k ≥ kc. We will denote by negl(·) any negligible function.
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2.2 Provable Security
After the first revolution in the 1970s, when the notion of public key cryptography is in-
vented by Diffie and Hellman [28], and made possible by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
[71], cryptography underwent another revolution in the 1980s, namely, the discovery
that one could provide formal definitions of security for cryptographic problems, and
such definitions were achievable under complexity assumptions.
The term “provable security” has been criticized since security is not being proved;
only a reduction from security to some other unproved assumptions. A significant
line of research has turned out to construct proofs in the framework of complexity
theory, also known as “reductionist security proofs” [3]: the proofs provide reductions
from a well-studied problem (RSA or the discrete logarithm) to an attack against a
cryptographic protocol.
The initial attempts of defining security notions were actually trying to minimize
the required assumptions on the primitives like one-way functions without consider-
ing practicality. Therefore, one just needs to design a scheme with some polynomial
algorithms, and to present a polynomial reductions from the basic assumption on the
primitive to an attack of the security notion, in an asymptotic way. However, those re-
sults may indeed have no practical impact on actual security, because of the tightness
of a reduction. More specifically, in a non-tight reduction, one may still construct an
adversarial algorithm that breaks the cryptographic protocol within a few hours, while
the reduction leads to an algorithm against the underlying problem that requires many
years.
For a few years, people have tried to provide both practical schemes, with practi-
cal reductions and exact complexity, which prove the security for realistic parameters,
under a well-defined assumption: exact reduction in the standard model (which means
in the complexity-theoretic framework). Unfortunately, practical or even just efficient
13
reductions in the standard model can rarely be conjugated with practical implementa-
tions. Therefore, one needs to make some hypotheses on the adversary, namely, the
attack is generic, independent of the actual implementation of some components:
1. hash functions, in the random oracle model;
2. symmetric block ciphers, in the ideal-cipher model;
3. algebraic groups, in the generic model.
we give more detailed explanations about random oracle model and generic model,
which are necessary background for the sequel of this thesis. In particular, both two
models are referred in the security proofs of our DCS constructions.
2.2.1 The Random Oracle Model
In the early attempts of designing cryptographic protocols with provable security, very
few practical schemes can be proved in this “standard model”, in which the adversary
is only limited by the amount of time and computational power. In 1993, Bellare
and Rogaway [5] proposed a trade-off to achieve some kind of security validation
for cryptographic protocols, by identifying some concrete crypto-objects with ideal
random ones. The most famous identification appeared in the so-called “random-oracle
model”.
Various cryptographic schemes have adopted a hash function H, such as MD5
[70] and SHA-1 [77]. This use of hash functions was originally motivated by the
wish to sign long messages with a single short signature. In order to achieve non-
repudiation, a minimal requirement on the hash function is the impossibility for the
signer to find two different messages providing the same hash value. This property is
called collision-resistance.
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Hash functions are found as an essential ingredient for the security of digital sig-
nature schemes, and even for the security of the most cryptographic schemes. In order
to obtain security arguments, while keeping the efficiency of the designs which use
hash functions. A few authors suggested using the hypothesis that “H behaves like a
random function”, to obtain security proofs (or more precisely “security arguments”),
while reserving the efficiency of the designs. Fiat and Shamir [31] applied the random
oracle heuristically to construct a signature scheme which is “as secure as” factoriza-
tion. Later, Bellare and Rogaway [6, 7] formalised this concept for digital signature
and public-key encryptions.
In the random-oracle model, the hash function can be formalised by an oracle that
outputs a truly random value for each new query. Certainly, identical answers are
received if the same query is asked twice. This is precisely the context of complexity
theory with “oracles”, and hence the name.
We give a formalised description as below.
Definition 2.2. The Random Oracle Model (ROM). Let G be a group of prime order
q with a generator g, a range M = {0, 1}∗ of messages, and let Zq denote the field
of integers modulo q. Let H be an ideal hash function with range Zq, modelled as an
oracle that given an input (query) inG×M , outputs a random number inZq . Formally,
H is a random function H: G ×M →Zq chosen at random over all functions of that
type with uniform probability distribution.
Canetti, Goldreich and Halevi hold a rather negative view on the ROM-based secu-
rity proofs [20]. They demonstrate that there exists signature and encryption schemes
which are provably secure under the ROM, but cannot reserve the security in the real
world implementations. Their basic idea is to devise nasty schemes. Such a scheme
usually behaves properly as a signature scheme or an encryption scheme. However,
upon holding of a certain condition such as non-randomness is sensed, the scheme
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becomes nasty and outputs the private signing key if it is a signature scheme, or the
plaintext message if it is an encryption scheme.
Another interesting view of ROM is given by Mao, the author of the book “Modern
Cryptography: Theory and Practice” [55]. He gives his argument in the subsection
15.2.7, under the fact revealed by the ROM-based security proof for the RSA-OAEP
(Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding is a padding scheme introduced by Bellare
and Rogaway [7], often used together with RSA encryption). That is, if the padding
scheme uses a truly random function, then the padding result output from OAEP is a
“plaintext” in an ideal world: it has a uniformly random distribution in the plaintext
space of the RSA function. Thus, his investigation on the strength of the RSA function
being used in the ideal world concludes that the easiest way to break the IND-CCA2
security is to solve the RSA problem first and then to do what the decryption algorithm
does. Furthermore, the ROM-based proof suggests that for a real world padding-based
encryption scheme which uses real world hash functions rather than ROs, the most
vulnerable point to mount an attack is the hash functions used in the scheme. From this
point of view, he considers that a ROM-based technique for a security proof manifests
its importance such that it suggests where to focus the attention for careful design. For
instance, in order to reach a high confidence about a padding based encryption scheme,
people should pay much attention on the design of hash function and its inputting
randomness.
Although there is an ongoing debate on whether the assumption of a random hash
function is realistic or too generous, this model has been strongly accepted by the
community, and is considered as a good one, in which security analysis give a good
taste of the actual security level. The problem is that random functions can in principle
not be implemented by public algorithms. However, even if it does not provide a
formal security proof, comparing with the proofs in the standard model without any
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ideal assumption), it is argued that proofs in this model guarantee the security of the
overall design of the scheme provided that the hash function has no weakness. On the
other hand, proofs in the random oracle model are still widely used today as they lead
to better reductions than any other proof technique.
This model can also be regarded as a restriction on the adversary’s capabilities. It
simply means that the attack is generic without considering any particular instantiation
of the hash functions. Therefore, an actual attack would necessarily use a weakness or a
specific feature of the hash function. The replacement of the hash function by another
one would rule out this attack. On the other hand, assuming the tamper-resistance
of some devices, such as smart cards, the random-oracle model is equivalent to the
standard model, which simply requires the existence of pseudo-random functions [40,
60]. As a consequence, almost all the designs of cryptographic protocols by now
require provably security, at least in the random oracle model.
2.2.2 The Generic Model
The generic model is also an idealised cryptographic model like the random oracle
model. Researchers use this model to analyse the computational hardness assumptions,
namely, to prove a lower bound on the complexity of computing the corresponding
intractable problems. Nechaev [62] proves that the discrete logarithm problem is hard
in such a model. The generic model of algorithms was further elaborated on by Shoup
[74].
In the generic model, it is assumed that the properties of the representation of
the elements of the algebraic structure (e.g. a group) under consideration cannot be
exploited. The adversary is only given access to a randomly chosen encoding of a
group, instead of efficient encodings, such as those used by the finite field or elliptic
curve groups used in practice.. In fact, for some problems like the discrete logarithm
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problem on general elliptic curves, exploiting the representation is not known to be
of any help, and hence generic algorithms are the best known, such an assumption is
reasonable from a practical point of view.
Generic Algorithms In order to motivate the later security proof to be introduced,
we briefly discuss generic algorithms in a cyclic group.
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of integers mod n, and let S be a set of bit
strings of cardinality at least n. An encoding function of G is an injective map ξ from
G into S.
A generic algorithm (adversary) A for G is a probabilistic algorithm that behaves
as follows. It takes an encoding list of the group elements as input. When the algo-
rithm executes, it may make up oracle queries from time to time. More precisely, it
specifies two exponents ρi and ρj , and a bit of operator into the encoding list. The
oracle computes ξ(ρi ± ρj), according to the operator bit, and this string is appended
to the encoding list.
Note that the algorithm A depends on S and n, but not on ξ; A can only retrieve
the information about ξ through the oracle. The term generic means that one cannot
exploit non-trivial properties of the representation of group elements, except for two
generic properties that any representation has. Firstly, one can have the equality test of
elements, and secondly one can impose a total order relation  on any representation.
2.3 Interactive Proofs
2.3.1 Interactive Proof Systems
This section introduces the notion of interactive proof systems, which is a fundamental
tool for designing cryptographic protocols. It is intended to recall some basic material
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and to restrict to the necessary background for the sequel of this work. Most of the sub-
sequent results are taken from the book of Goldreich [39] and the paper of Goldwasser
et al. [43].
The concept of interactive proof systems (or interactive proofs) was motivated by
the need of secure cryptographic protocols, such as identification protocols. In an in-
teractive proof system, a player, called the prover, needs to interactively prove the
validity of a given statement to another player, called the verifier. Formally, the prover
and the verifier are modelled by some interactive Turing machines. An interactive Tur-
ing machine (ITM) is a Turing machine equipped with a read-only input tape, a work
tape, a random tape, one read-only communication tape, and one write-only communi-
cation tape. The random tape contains an infinite sequence of random bits, and can be
scanned only from left to right. We say that an interactive machine flips a coin, mean-
ing that it reads the next bit in its own random tape. An interactive machine M expects
some input at the beginning of its execution, and from then on alternately sends and
receives messages. It may finally terminate with some output. Such a machine may be
probabilistic (i.e., use randomnesses).
Definition 2.3. We say an interactive Turing machine M polynomial time if there is
a polynomial p, such that the machine M runs at most p(|x|) steps upon input x, no
matter what and how many messages it receives.
Let R be an efficiently computable relation on pairs of bitstrings. We say that x is
a true statement and ω is a witness for x if (x, ω) ∈ R (or xRω). For instance, if we
want to prove a “big integer” is not prime, we would use the relation R with xR(p, q)
iff x = pq and p, q > 1. The witness ω corresponds to a proof that x is a true statement.
Let LR denote the language of all true statements, and we have, LR := {x :
∃ω.(x, ω) ∈ R}. We define the concept of interactive proof systems by using the
above notation.
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Definition 2.4. Let P denote the prover and V denote the verifier. An interactive proof
system 〈P, V 〉 (or interactive proof) for a relation R with completeness bound c and
soundness bound s is a pair of polynomial-time interactive Turing machine P and V ,
such that the following properties are satisfied.
• Completeness: If (x, ω) ∈ R then Pr[〈P (x, ω), V (x)〉 = 1] ≥ c(|x|), where the
probability is over the random tapes of P and V . (Intuitively, the honest prover
will succeed in proving a true statement with probability at least c(|x|), provided
it knows a witness.)
• Soundness: For any (possibly computationally unbounded) interactive machine
P ∗ (the cheating prover), and for any x /∈ LR, we have that Pr[〈P ∗, V (x)〉 =
1] ≤ s(|x|), where the probability is over the random tapes of P ∗ and V . (In-
tuitively, even a dishonest, unbounded prover will not succeed in convincing the
honest verifier of a wrong statement.)
Obviously, an interactive proof is better if c is close to 1 (it almost always succeeds),
and s is close to 0 (one almost never proves anything wrong). If c = 1, we say the proof
has perfect completeness. If the soundness property only holds against a polynomial-
time (in |x|) malicious prover, we say that the interactive proof is computationally
sound.
2.3.2 Zero-knowledge Proofs
In mathematics and in life, if we want to convince you that we know X is true, usually,
we commonly try to present all facts we know and the inferences from that facts that
imply X is true. For instance, if you want to prove a “big integer” is not prime, the
straight way is you expose the factorization, that is, the big integer is a product of two
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integers. This approach gives a typical byproduct that you gained some knowledge,
other than that you are convinced that the statement is true.
a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is an interactive method to address that issue. In
a zero-knowledge proof, when Alice prove to Bobs that a statement X is true, Bob
will completely convinced that X is true, but will learn nothing else as a result of this
process. That is, Bob will gain zero knowledge.
Firstly conceived by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [43] in the “GMR” paper in
FOCS ′85, zero-knowledge proofs turned out to be one of the most interesting and in-
fluential topics in computer science, with applications ranging from practical signature
schemes to complexity proofs for many NP-complete problems.
a zero-knowledge proof must satisfy three properties:
• Completeness: if the statement is true, the honest verifier will be convinced of
this fact with a non-negligible probability, by a honest prover who knows the
witness.
• Soundness: if the statement is false, even a dishonest prover will not succeed in
convincing the honest verifier of a wrong statement.
• Zero-knowledge: if the statement is true, no cheating verifier learns anything
other than this fact. This notion is formalised by showing that, for every cheat-
ing verifier, there always exists a simulator such that given only the statement
to be proved (and no access to the prover), can output a transcript that “indistin-
guishable” from the transcript of an interaction between the honest prover and
the cheating verifier.
Initially formalised in [43], we present a formal definition of zero-knowledge as fol-
lows. Suppose all the messages exchanged between a prover P and a verifier V in an
21
interactive proof form the transcript of the protocol. We denote by V iew(〈P, V 〉) the
transcript (random variable) of the interactive proof 〈P, V 〉.
Definition 2.5. (Zero-knowledge). We say that an interactive proof system 〈P, V 〉 for
the language LR (with corresponding relation R) is (perfect, statistical, or computa-
tional) zero-knowledge if for any probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machine V ∗
and any polynomial p, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm S called
the simulator, such that the ensembles:
{V iew(〈P (ω), V ∗(y)〉 (x))}(x,ω)∈R,y∈{0,1}p(|x|) and {S(x, y)}(x,ω)∈R,y∈{0,1}p(|x|)
are (perfectly, statistically, or computationally) indistinguishable, whereS(x, y) de-
notes the random variable of S’s output with the inputs x, y.
This definition of zero-knowledge with an auxiliary input to the verifier is an extension
of the classical definition, where the verifier is only given the common input x. The
auxiliary input can be some information known by the verifier before the beginning of
the interaction.
2.3.3 Proofs of Knowledge
Basically this is a stronger form of soundness of interactive proofs, which guarantee
that no statement x is accepted by the verifier such that there is no witness ω with
(x, ω) ∈ R. Such a proof can hence be interpreted as proving the statement of “there
is a witness ω for x”. In some scenarios, however, we require the prover to show
something stronger, namely, “I know a witness ω for x”.
In the following, when we say a machine K has oracle access with rewinding to an
interactive machine P , we mean that, K can interact with P in an arbitrary fashion and
at any point reset P ’s state to any state in the history of P ’s execution. In particular, the
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machine K may send inputs of the following forms to P :(msg,m) and (rewind, i).
Upon receiving input (msg,m), the code of P is executed on the current state of P to
compute the reaction to the message m. The message output by P is returned to K.
The new state of P is appended to a list H of states. Upon receiving input(rewind, i),
P ’s state is set to the i-th element of H .
The notion of a proof of knowledge is defined as below.
Definition 2.6. (A Proof of Knowledge). We call (P, V ) a proof of knowledge with
completeness bound c, soundness bound s, and knowledge error κ if the following
holds:
• (P, V )is a proof with completeness bound c, soundness bound s.
• Validity: There exists a constant d > 0 and a polynomial-time oracle machine
K with rewinding such that for any interactive machine P ∗ and any x ∈ LR, we
have the following:
Pr[〈P ∗, V (x)〉 = 1] ≥ κ(|x|)⇒ Pr[(x, ω) ∈ R : ω ← KP ∗(x)]
≥ (Pr[〈P ∗, V (x)〉 = 1]− κ(|x|))d.
2.4 Pairing-based Cryptography
Elliptic curves naturally occur in the study of congruent numbers and Diophantine
equations, which has been a research area for a long time already. At the beginning,
researchers found the study of curves over finite fields seem to forms rather boring
Abelian groups. However, in 1985, Miller [59] found an application of elliptic curves
over finite fields in cryptology. Two years later, Koblitz [52], alternatively figured, el-
liptic curves could provide a similar level of security while using shorter keys. There-
after a lot of research works [54, 56, 73, 75] have been put in elliptic curve cryptog-
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raphy (ECC) and many cryptosystems [35, 17, 46] have been proposed. Pairings are
cryptanalysis tools which were initially used for attacking the existing cryptosystems.
In this context, a pairing may be treated as a function that takes two points on an el-
liptic curve as input, and outputs an element of some multiplicative group. Basically,
a pairing meets some special properties, like bilinearity and non-degeneracy, and is
naturally hard to construct.
Weil pairing [84] and Tate pairing [76] are two well-studied symmetric pairings,
while some other pairings have been given more and more attentions, like Eta pairing
[2] and Ate Pairing [34]. Until 2000, pairings are found by Joux [51] that they can
be contributed to cryptographic building blocks as well, whose discovery spurred an
extensive research into pairings and their new applications.
Definition 2.7. (Bilinear Maps). Suppose that G and Gt be two multiplicative cyclic
groups of prime order q, while g is a generators of G. A bilinear pairing on (G,Gt) is
a map e : G×G→ Gt, which satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinearity: For all u, v ∈ G, and for all a, b ∈ Zq, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1, where 1 is the multiplicative identity of group Gt.
• Computability: e can be efficiently computed.
Considering the DL(discrete logarithm)-problem, if (P,Q) is an instance of the DL-
Problem in G where Q = P x, then e(P,Q) = e(P, P x) = [e(P, P )]x. Thus logPQ =
loggh, where g = e(P, P ) and h = e(P,Q) are elements of Gt. Hence, the DL-problem
in G can be efficiently reduced to the DL-problem in Gt.
Considering the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDHP), which is introduced by
Boneh and Franklin [12]: given P, P a, P b, P c, compute e(P, P )abc. The following
reasons state that the hardness of the BDHP implies the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman
Problem (DHP) [28] in both G and Gt . Firstly, if the DHP in G can be efficiently
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solved, then one could solve an instance of the BDHP by computing abP and then
e(P ab, P c) = e(P, P )abc. Also, if the DHP in Gt can be efficiently solved, then the
BDHP instance could be solved by computing g = e(P, P ), gab = e(P a, P b), gc =
e(P, P c) and then gabc.
2.5 Some Cryptographic Primitives
2.5.1 Public Key Encryption Schemes
The concept of public-key cryptography was firstly developed in the ground-breaking
article of Diffie and Hellman [28] without proposing a concrete public-key encryption
(PKE) scheme. And possibly the most famous PKE is RSA cryptosystem [71], which
was introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. In general, a public key encryption
scheme allows two parties to communicate in a confidential way with the help of an
authenticated channel, which is used to transmit the public key. Such a cryptographic
system requires two separate keys, one of which is secret and one of which is pub-
lic. This ensures any message encrypted with respect to the public key will only be
decrypted by the owner of the corresponding secret key (or called private key alterna-
tively).
We denote the message space byM and the ciphertext (encrypted message) space
by C. A public key encryption scheme is composed of three polynomial time algo-
rithms.
Setup: This PPT algorithm takes the security parameter λ, denoted by 1λ as input,
and outputs a pair of matching public and private key. We have (pk, sk)← Setup(1λ).
Enc: The encryption algorithm is a PPT algorithm that takes a message m ∈ M
and a public key pk as input, and outputs a ciphertext c. We have c← Enc(m, pk).
Dec: The decryption algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that takes a ciphertext
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c ∈ C and a private key sk as input, and outputs a message m ∈ M. We have
m← Dec(c, sk). In some cases, this algorithm returns a special symbol ⊥ to indicate
that the ciphertext was invalid.
We require that for all (pk, sk) which can be output by Setup(1λ), for all m ∈M,
and for all c that can be output by Enc(m, pk), we have that Dec(c, sk) = m. We also
require that Setup, Enc and Dec can be computed in polynomial time.
The classical goal of secure encryption is to protect the privacy of messages: an
adversary should not be able to learn from a ciphertext information about its plain-
text beyond the length of that plaintext, which is formalised as indistinguishability of
encryptions, due to Goldwasser and Micali [42].
Along the other axis, we consider three different attacks. These are chosen-plaintext
attack (CPA), non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA1), and adaptive chosen-
ciphertext attack (CCA2), in order of increasing strength. Under CPA the adversary
can obtain ciphertexts of plaintexts of its choice. In the public-key setting, giving the
adversary the public key suffices to capture these attacks. Under CCA1, formalised
by Naor and Yung [61], the adversary gets, in addition to the public key, access to an
oracle for the decryption function. Under CCA2, due to Racko and Simon [69], the
adversary again gets access to an oracle for the decryption function, but this time it
may use this decryption function even on ciphertexts chosen after obtaining the chal-
lenge ciphertext c, the only restriction being that the adversary may not ask for the
decryption of c itself.
One can “mix-and-match” the goal– IND and the attacks {CPA,CCA1,CCA2} in
three combinations, giving rise to three notions of security: IND-CPA, IND-CCA1,
and IND-CCA2. Below, we present these three security notions based on the definition
in [4] with minor changes.
Let the string atk be instantiated by any of the formal symbols cpa, cca1, cca2;
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while ATK is then the corresponding formal symbol from CPA, CCA1, CCA2. When
we say Oi = ε, where i ∈ {1, 2}, we mean Oi is the function which, on any input,
returns the empty string ε.
Definition 2.8. (IND-CPA, IND-CCA1, IND-CCA2). Let Π = (Setup, Enc,Dec)
be an encryption scheme and let A = (A1,A2) be an adversary. For atk ∈{cpa,
cca1,cca2} and λ ∈ N , let advind−atkA,Π (λ) denote the following probability:
2 · Pr[(pk, sk)← Setup(1λ); (m0,m1, s)← AO11 (pk);
b← {0, 1}; c← Enc(mb);AO22 (m0,m1, s, c) = b]− 1
where
if atk=cpa, then O1 = ε and O2 = ε;
if atk=cca1, then O1 = Dec(·) and O2 = ε;
if atk=cpa, then O1 = Dec(·) and O2 = Dec(·);
In the case of CCA2, we insist that A2 does not ask its oracle to decrypt c. We
say that Π is secure in the sense of IND-ATK if A being polynomial-time implies that
advind−atkA,Π (·) is negligible.
2.5.2 Digital Signatures
The main goal of digital signatures is to reproduce the electronic version of handwrit-
ten signatures, i.e., the signature on a message is a string which binds the message,
and public and secret data specific to the user; anyone can check the validity of the
signature by using public data only. Digital signatures become more and more crucial
since their invention [28], and are now used in numerous cryptographic protocols. In
1988, Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest became the first [44] to rigorously define the se-
curity requirements of digital signature schemes. We introduce the formal definition of
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signature schemes, with minor changes, following David Pointcheval’s proposal [68]
that formally presented the precise definition of digital signatures and of the possible
attacks against them.
A digital signature scheme usually consists of the following probabilistic polynomial-
time (PPT) algorithms. LetM and Σ denote the message space and the signature space
respectively. In general,M is the set of messages to which the signature algorithm may
be applied, and Σ is the set of signatures can be produced with an instance of the digital
signature scheme.
Setup: This PPT algorithm takes the security parameter λ, denoted by 1λ as input,
and outputs a key pair which is associated with the signer, (pk, sk)← Setup(1λ).
Sign: This PPT algorithm generates a signature σ on a given message m ∈ M,
σ ← Sign(m, sk).
Verify: This verification algorithm is usually deterministic and takes a message-
signature pair (m,σ) ∈ M× Σ and an associated public key pk as input, outputs a
bit 0 or 1. We have b ← V erify(m,σ, pk), where b ∈ {0, 1}. This algorithm tells
whether the pair (m,σ) is valid with respect to the key pair (pk, sk). The output bit 1
means that the signature is valid.
In practice, signer’s public key pk needs to be sent through an authenticated channel
so that the verifiers are ensured that pk really corresponds to the right signer. Once this
operation is performed, the signer can authenticate the messages to a verifier using
digital signatures even through via an insecure channel.
The security of the signature schemes usually depends on what kind of attack
results the adversary could achieve. A hierarchy of attack results are discussed in
[68, 44]. One might say that the enemy has "broken" a signer’s signature scheme if his
attack allows him to do any of the following with a non-negligible probability:
• Disclose the private key/data of the signer, which is the most serious attack, so-
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called total break.
• Construct an efficient algorithm to sign messages with good probability of suc-
cess, so called universal forgery.
• Forge a signature for a particular message chosen a prior by the enemy, so called
selective forgery.
• Provide a new message-signature pair. This is named as existential forgery.
Considering the security requirements, an adversary can have some access to the sig-
nature protocols with different power levels. For instance, there could be an attacker
which has the only access to public key of the signer while another attacker may have
the access to a list of valid message-signature pairs. The attacker in the latter scenario
is obviously much powerful, and is named as “adaptive chosen-message attack”. In
an adaptive attacking situation, the attacker can ask the signer to sign any message
of its choice and it can adjust its queries according to previous answers. Currently,
the strongest security notion is the security against existential forgery under an adap-
tive chosen-message attack. So when designing a signature scheme, one may want to
computationally prevent at least existential forgeries, under adaptive chosen-message
attacks, which is widely accepted as the standard definition. We give a formalisation
as below.
Definition 2.9. (Existential Unforgeability) Let O be a signing oracle that imple-
ments the algorithm Sign . We denote by L the list of all messages queried to O. A
signature scheme is secure against an existential forgery under an adaptive chosen-
message attack, if for any probabilistic polynomial time forger (algorithm) F , we have
Pr[1← V erify(m,σ, pk) ∧m /∈ L|(pk, sk)← Setup(1λ), (m,σ)← FO] = neg(λ)
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where the probability is taken over the random tapes of the involved algorithms.
Each invocation to the oracle O is counted in the complexity of F , and the number of
queries made to O must also be polynomially bounded in λ.
2.5.3 Undeniable Signatures
The conflict between authenticity (non-repudiation) and privacy (controlled verifiabil-
ity) always exists in the digital signature world. As mentioned in Chapter 1, undeniable
signature was firstly introduced to solve such a problem by letting the signer interac-
tively prove to any verifier it selected. Undeniable signature as an fundamental crypto-
graphic primitive, is the origin of designated confirmer signatures, and we present the
formal definition of this cryptographic primitive as below.
An undeniable signature scheme consists of two algorithms, namely Setup and
Sign, and two protocols, namely Confirm and Disavow. For every choice of the
security parameter λ there is a message space M and a signature space Σ. Also we
denote the signer by S, and the verifier by V .
Setup: This PPT algorithm takes the security parameter λ, denoted by 1λ as input,
and outputs a key pair which is associated with the signer, (pk, sk)← Setup(1λ).
Sign: This PPT algorithm generates a signature σ ∈ Σ on a given message m ∈
M, σ ← Sign(m, sk).
Confirm: This protocol is executed between a signer and a verifier interactively.
The common inputs are a message-signature pair (m,σ) ∈ M× Σ, and the signer’s
public key pk. The protocol outputs a bit b, and allows the signer to prove to a
verifier that the signature σ is valid for the message m and the key pk. We have
b← Confirm(S,V )(m,σ, pk), where b ∈ {0, 1}.
Disavow: This protocol is executed between a signer and a verifier interactively.
The common inputs are a message-signature pair (m,σ) ∈ M× Σ, and the signer’s
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public key pk. The protocol outputs a bit b, and allows the signer to prove to a
verifier that the signature σ is invalid for the message m and the key pk. We have
b← Disavow(S,V )(m,σ, pk), where b ∈ {0, 1}.
Chapter 3
An Overview on Designated
Confirmer Signatures
Designated confirmer signatures (DCS) are introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen
[21] as an extension of undeniable signature. More specifically, in a designated con-
firmer signature scheme, if the signer is unavailable, a semi-trusted third party called
the designated confirmer can confirm the (in)validity of an alleged signature by run-
ning some interactive protocols with a verifier. However, such a verifier cannot trans-
fer the signature’s (in)validity to other parties by convincing them of the same fact.
Furthermore, the designated confirmer can selectively convert a designated confirmer
signature into a standard signature so that it can be publicly verifiable. A number of re-
lated work have been presented in the last two decades, like [64, 58, 18, 45, 38, 78, 85],
though most of them are either insecure or inefficient. For example, [58] identifies at-
tacks against the two concrete DCS scheme proposed in [64], Camenisch and Michels
[18] shows the insecurity of [58], Wang et al. [78] points out security flaws in the
schemes proposed in [45, 38], while the solutions given in [18, 85] are not efficient as
they rely on general zero-knowledge protocols.
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Apart from unforgeability which is a common security requirement for variants of
digital signatures, the unique security property of a DCS scheme is called invisibility
[18], which requires that any probabilistic polynomial adversary cannot feasibly deter-
mine the (in)validity of an alleged signature against adaptive attacking environment. In
this chapter, we first introduce a traditional security model of DCS schemes; then dis-
cuss attacks against invisibility of two practical DCS schemes, and then fix the security
flaw in one of the two schemes [89] and [83], i.e., Wei et al’s scheme [83].
Related Works on DCS Schemes Since the introduction by Chaum and van Antwer-
pen [21], various generic DCS schemes have been produced from ordinary digital
signatures and other cryptographic primitives such as public key encryptions, commit-
ment schemes, and/or zero-knowledge protocols. We briefly review the most important
attempts in chronological order:
• Chaum and van Antwerpen (1994) [21]: The first proposition of designated con-
firmer signatures to solve the weakness of undeniable signatures, with an exam-
ple of DCS based on RSA scheme.
• Okamoto (1994) [64]: Okamoto give the first formal definition of designated
confirmer signatures in the sense of rigorous concept, and proposed a practical
construction by using digital signatures, public key encryptions, bit-commitment
schemes and pseudo-random functions. Also it rigorously proves that the exis-
tence of public-key encryption is the necessary and sufficient assumption for
constructing designated confirmer signatures.
• Michels and Stadler (1998) [58]: They pointed out a certain weakness of the
DCS schemes by Okamoto [64] that the confirmer can forge a valid signature
on behalf of the signer. Realizing this problem, they further proposed a new
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security model and introduced an efficient DCS scheme in that model by using
signatures with the Fiat-Shamir paradigm and commitment schemes.
• Camenisch and Michels (2000) [18]: The authors identified an attack against the
DCS schemes proposed in [21, 64, 58], where the validity of a DCS issued by a
signer S can be linked to that of a DCS issued by another signer S ′. As a result,
those schemes are insecure if multiple signers share the same confirmer, and
such multi-signer settings seem to be natural in e-commerce applications. Based
on that observation, they proposed a new security model to cover this variant of
attacks, and presented the “encryption of a signature” idea along with a security
analysis of the resulting generic DCS schemes. However, this construction is
provably secure but inefficient. Because in their confirmation/disavowal proto-
cols, to prove the correctness of such an encryption, actually relies on general
zero-knowledge proofs for NP statement.
• Goldwasser and Waisbard (2004) [45]: They introduced an interesting security
notion called “unimpersonation” in their security model, meanwhile, the new
model circumvent the requirement of “invisibility” and “non-transferability”. By
exploiting strong witness hiding proofs of knowledge, instead of zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge, Goldwasser and Waisbard proposed several secure DCS
schemes without appealing to random oracles in the weakened security model.
Moreover, the disavowal protocol of their construction has still recourse to gen-
eral concurrent ZK proofs of NP statements.
• Gentry et al. (2005) [38]: Gentry, Molnar and Ramzan presented a generic trans-
formation from any secure ordinary signature scheme into a DCS scheme. Their
basic idea is to add a middle layer in the “sign-and-encrypt” paradigm. In partic-
ular, they issue a DCS by generating an ordinary signature on the commitment
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of a message, while the randomness used for the commitment is encrypted un-
der the confirmer’s secret key separately. They also proved the result is secure
in their new model, which is an enhancement of the one introduced in [18]. The
authors give an interesting transformation because it gives rise to an efficient
generic DCS scheme without having resource to either the random oracles or the
general zero-knowledge proofs.
• Wang et al (2007) [78]: The authors first identified two flaws in the construction
of [38], and proposed an improved DCS scheme based on the insecure version.
Then they introduced a new way of designing efficient and generic DCS schemes
without any public key encryptions. 1 One limitation is their construction still
appeals to the random oracles.
In contrast, only a few concrete DCS schemes have been proposed. In 2008, Zhang et
al. proposed an efficient DCS scheme based on bilinear pairings [89]. In the same year,
Wei et al. presented a society-oriented DCS scheme [83], which is a new concept for
sharing the signer and confirmer’s capability among two groups of individuals respec-
tively. The construction is based on two threshold cryptosystems, namely a threshold
signature scheme[49] and a threshold encryption scheme[79]. Wei et al.’s scheme is
so called as it allows a threshold of possible signers to collectively issue a DCS and a
threshold of designated confirmers to collectively confirm the (in)validity of such an
alleged DCS. However, It is discovered that both Zhang et al’s DCS scheme and Wei
et al’s SDCS scheme fail to meet invisibility, and we will pay more attention to the two
schemes and show the related attacks later in this chapter.
1Note this construction does not contradict with the result in [64], as the later proves that designated
confirmer signatures exist if and only if public key encryptions exist. The reason is that, the scheme in
[78] uses a confirmer commitment scheme as the building block. As stated in [58], probabilistic public
key encryption schemes are actually a special case of confirmer commitments. This gives an intuition
about the relation between these two primitives, i.e., it might be possible to derive a secure probabilistic
public key encryption scheme from a secure confirmer commitment scheme. Though this still need to
be further investigated.
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3.1 Security Model
This section reviews the syntax (Section 1.1) and security requirements (Section 1.2) of
DCS schemes. In general, we follow the definitions given by Camenisch and Michels
[18], because their formalization is widely complied with by various schemes in the
last decade. To improve the readability, some changes are made. For instance, we
update the security model by introducing the existence of some efficient computable
relation R (see in Section 3.1.2), to make the expressions more accurate.
3.1.1 Definitions (Syntax)
Basically, a designated confirmer signature scheme consists of three parties, a signer,
a designated confirmer, and a verifier. Once the signer issues a DCS, the verifier can
interactively validate it with the help from either the signer or the confirmer. In par-
ticular, for any alleged DCS, the confirmer will first check its validity, and execute the
corresponding protocol, i.e., using confirm protocol (for a valid signature) or disavow
protocol (for an invalid signature).
In the formal definition given below, negl(λ) denotes any negligible function that
grows slower than λ−v for any positive integer v and for all sufficiently large integer λ.
{A(u)} denotes the set of all possible output values of a probabilistic algorithmAwith
input u. In addition, we use “X ← P (·)” and “Y = A(·)”to denote that a protocol P
outputs X , and an algorithm A outputs Y , respectively.
Definition 3.1. (Syntax) [18]: A correct designated confirmer signature scheme
involves three roles of parties, i.e., a signer S, a designated confirmer C, and a verifier
V , and consists of the following components:
• Key Generation (GS, GC): Given the security parameter λ, denoted by 1λ as in-
put, probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm GS outputs a pair of strings
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(skS, pkS) as the signer’s private key and public key. Similarly, PPT algorithm
GC that takes on input 1λ, outputs a pair of strings (skC , pkC) as the designated
confirmer’s private key and public key.
• Sign: Given a message m and a signer’s private key skS , algorithm Sign pro-
duces a (standard) signature σ for message m. Namely, σ = Sign(m, skS).
• Verify: Given a public key pkS , a message m, and an alleged signature σ, al-
gorithm Verify outputs a bit b, where b = 1 indicates “Accept”, and b = 0
indicates “Reject”. We require that for any key pair (skS, pkS), any message m,
V erify(m,Sign(m, skS), pkS) = 1.
• DCSSign: Given a message m, a signer’s private key skS and the confirmer’s
public key pkC , DCSSign is a probabilistic algorithm that generates a designated
confirmer signature on the input message. We have σ′ = DCSSign(m, skS, pkS, pkC).
• Extract: Given (m,σ′, skC , pkC , pkS) as input, algorithm Extract outputs a
string σ such that V erify(m,σ, pkS) = b, where b = 1 indicates “Accept”, and
b = 0 indicates “Reject”.
• Confirm: As an interactive protocol, the designated confirmer C with private
input skC can runConfirm protocol with a verifier V to confirm that an alleged
DCS σ′ for a message m is extractable. The common input for the protocol is
(m,σ′, pkS, pkC). Eventually, the verifier outputs a bit b,where b = 1 indicates
“Accept”, and b = 0 indicates “⊥”. We say σ′ is valid w.r.t. message m, if
the verifier’s output b = 1. Otherwise, the validity of σ′ is undetermined. The
Confirm protocol should be both complete and sound.
• Disavow: As an interactive protocol, the designated confirmer C with private
input skC can run Disavow protocol with a verifier V to convince that an alleged
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DCS σ′ is unextractable. The common input to the protocol is (m,σ′, pkS, pkC).
Eventually, the verifier outputs a bit b,where b = 1 indicates “Accept”, and b = 0
indicates “⊥”. If the verifier’s output b = 1, we say σ′ is invalid w.r.t. message
m. Otherwise, the invalidity of σ′ is undetermined. The Disavow protocol should
be complete and sound.
Remark 1. The algorithms and protocols above actually only allows the designated
confirmer to do the verification, by confirming any alleged valid DCS or disavowing
any alleged invalid one. A not-fully-extended definition is, as proposed in [45, 38, 78],
to allow the signer be able to (partly) verify the signatures, namely, a ConfirmedSign
protocol is prepared to let the signer confirm a DCS immediately it is honestly gener-
ated. Comparing to the previous syntax, we also introduce a fully-extended definition
in Chapter 5, where we allow the signer has the ability to disavow any invalid DCS.
3.1.2 Security Requirements
We follow the definitions in [18], and briefly illuminate the notions as below, namely
game-based formalizations of unforgeability and invisibility are presented to improve
the readability and the further discussion.
Definition 3.2. Completeness of Confirm/Disavow: If the confirmer and the veri-
fier are honest, then for all λ, all (skS, pkS) ∈ GS(1λ), all (skC , pkC) ∈ GC(1λ), all
m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and all σ′ ∈ {DCSSign(m, skS, pkS, pkC)}, we require that
Confirm(C,V )(m,σ
′, pkS, pkC)→

1 if σ′ ∈ {DCSSign(m, skS, pkS, pkC)}
0 otherwise
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and
Disavow(C,V )(m,σ
′, pkS, pkC)→

1 if σ′ /∈ {DCSSign(m, skS, pkS, pkC)}
0 otherwise
Definition 3.3. Soundness of Confirm/Disavow: For any cheating confirmer C∗,
for all sufficiently large λ, all (skS, pkS) ∈ GS(1λ), all (skC , pkC) ∈ GC(1λ), all
m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and all σ′ ∈ {DCSSign(m, skS, pkS, pkC)}, we require that
Pr[Confirm(C∗,V )(m,σ
′, pkS, pkC)→ 1] < negl(λ)
if σ′ /∈ {DCSSign(m, skS, pkS, pkC)} and
Pr[Disavow(C∗,V )(m,σ
′, pkS, pkC)→ 0] < negl(λ)
if σ′ ∈ {DCSSign(m, skS, pkS, pkC)}, The probability is taken over the coin
tosses of C and C∗ .
Definition 3.4. Correctness of Extract: for all sufficiently large λ, all (skS, pkS) ∈
GS(1
λ), all (skC , pkC) ∈ GC(1λ), all m ∈ {0, 1}∗, all σ′ ∈ {0, 1}∗, and all σ′ ∈
{DCSSign(m, skS, pkS, pkC)}, it holds that
V erify(m,Extract(m,σ′, skC , pkC , pkS), pkS) = 1
.
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Definition 3.5. Security for the signer (Unforgeability): Unforgeability requires
that no adaptive PPT adversary can forge a valid DCS on a fresh message, even it
compromises the confirmer’s secret key skC . Note this is also part of the security
requirement that holds against the confirmer, and thus we allow the secret key of the
confirmer as the input.
For any DCS scheme, we can specify an efficiently computable equivalence rela-
tion R (this concept first appears in Gentry et al’s work [38]), and say (m,σ′′) and
(m,σ′) are equivalent if and only if R(m,σ′, σ′′) = 1. Informally, such a binary re-
lation R is used to classify two valid signature pairs respect to the same message. For
example, if a DCS scheme is strongly existentially unforgeable, it requires the forger
cannot even produce a valid DCS on any previously signed message. In that case, it
may be appropriate to specify R(m,σ′, σ′′) = 1 if and only if σ′ = σ′′. However, R
needs not be that restrictive. It depends on the specific DCS scheme. We update the
original definition of unforgeability by introducing the existence of such a relation R,
an present a new definition as follows:
Game-UF: Key generation algorithms are run on input 1λ, and output (pkS,skS),
(pkC ,skC) as the public/private key-pairs of the signer and the confirmer respectively.
Given pkS , pkC , and skC , an PPT adversary A is allowed oracle access to the signer
(i.e., it may ask designated confirmer signatures of polynomially many messages {mi}
viaDCSSign), and to the confirmer (i.e,A can accessConfirm(C,A),Disavow(C,A),
and Extract oracles ). Let Lsig denote the list of all message-signature pairs (mi, σ′i)
output by DCSSign oracle and all (mi, σ′′i ) such that R(mi, σ
′
i, σ
′′
i ) = 1. Finally, A
outputs a message-signature pair (m,σ′) where (m,σ′) is a message-signature pair
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not in Lsig. Then, for any such A, we require that A’s output satisfies
Pr[V erify(m,Extract(m,σ′, skC , pkC , pkS), pkS) = 1] < negl(λ).
The probability is taken over the coin tosses of the signer S, the adversary A, and
the key generation algorithms GS and GC .
Definition 3.6. Security for the confirmer (Invisibility): Intuitively, this means
that no adaptive PPT adversary can distinguish between two designated confirmer sig-
natures (or between a valid DCS and an invalid DCS). Consider the following game
against a distinguisher D:
Game-INV: Firstly, Key Generation algorithms are run for the signer and the con-
firmer on input 1λ. D is given pkS and pkC , which are the public keys of the signer
and the confirmer, with the addition of signer’s secret key skS . As a training purpose,
D is allowed to create signature-key pairs (skD,pkD) (not necessarily via Key Gener-
ations) and to interact with the confirmer with respect to these keys. Furthermore, D
can make arbitrary queries to the following oracles: Confirm(C,D), Disavow(C,D),
and Extract. Then, the distinguisher has to present two messages m0 and m1. After
a fair coin b is flipped by the challenger, the distinguisher is given a corresponding
DCS σ′ = DCSSign(mb, skS, pkC), where b ∈ {0, 1}. Now D is again allowed to
access the above oracles except that it cannot enquire for (m0, σ′) or (m1, σ′) (and
their equivalent DCSs) via Confirm, Disavow, or Extract oracle. Finally, the dis-
tinguisher must output one bit information b′ to guess the value of b. The distinguisher
wins if and only if b = b′, and D’s advantage is defined as advD = Pr[D wins]. We
require:
advD < negl(λ).
The above probability is taken over the coin tosses of the signer S, the confirmer
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C, and key generation algorithms GS and GC .
Remark 2. This security property can be generalised in the multi-signer settings,
i.e. in the scenario of many signers sharing the same confirmer. That is, the adversary
cannot break invisibility w.r.t a specified signer, even if it knows secret keys of other
signers. To update the definition, one could simply add the secret keys of the other
n − 1 signers, say skSi where skSi 6= skS and 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, as the adversary’s
auxiliary input.
Definition 3.7. Security for the confirmer (Non-transferability of Confirm and
Disavow protocols): The evidence generated in Confirm or Disavow protocol
should be untransferable. Namely, although an adaptive PPT adversary A knows
whether a given DCS is valid or not through the interactive verification, it does not
gain any knowledge that can be used to convince a third party about the validity of
that DCS. In particular, this notion is formalised in the following games considering a
simulator A′:
Game-NTR: Firstly, the adversary A is given the public key pkS and pkC of the
signer and the confirmer. It is allowed to make arbitrary oracle queries to DCSSign,
Confirm(C,V ), Disavow(C,V ) and Extract. Again A is allowed to create signature-
key pairs (skA, pkA), and to run DCSSgin and then interact with the confirmer with
respect to these keys.
In some stage, the adversary must present two strings,m and σ′, for which it wishes
to carry out theConfirm (orDisavow) protocol with the confirmer. Next a fair coin b
is flipped. If b = 0, the real confirmer and A run the Confirm (orDisavow) protocol
with common input (m,σ′, pkS, pkC), while the confirmer’s secret input will be skC . If
b = 1, the simulator Sim is plugged in the place of the confirmer to run the Confirm
(or Disavow) protocol on (m,σ′). Sim is not given the confirmer’s secret key, but is
allowed to make a single call to an oracle which tells Sim whether the strings m and
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σ′ is a valid DCS w.r.t. pkS and pkC .
In parallel, the adversary is allowed to make arbitrary queries to the signer and
the confirmer. And in all other interactions except the confirmation (or disavowal) on
(m,σ′), the real signer or the real confirmer speaks with the adversary. Finally, A
must output one bit information b′ to guess the value of b. The adversaryA wins if and
only if b = b′, and A’s advantage is defined as advA = Pr[A wins]. We require for
any adversary A, there exists a simulator Sim such that for all sufficiently large λ, all
(skS, pkS) ∈ GS(1λ), and all (skC , pkC) ∈ GC(1λ) :
advA < negl(λ).
The above probability is taken over the coin tosses of the signer S, the confirmer
C, and key generation algorithms GS and GC .
Remark 3. A further discussion about the definitions and security notions of DCS
schemes is laid out in Chapter 4. In particular, we introduce two additional security
notions, namely “unimpersonation” and “transcript-simulatability”, and explore the
relations among those notions.
3.2 Invisibility of Zhang et al.’s DCS Scheme
Considering the construction for DCS schemes, Okamoto [64] proposed a straight-
forward way using standard cryptographic primitives, i.e., public key encryptions and
digital signature schemes. The signer firstly issues a standard signature on a target
message m, then encrypts the signature using the confirmer’s public key, and finally,
the resulting ciphertext is preserved as the designated confirmer signature on m. To
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prove the validity of such a DCS, the signer has to interact with the verifier (signature
recipient), i.e., the signer should prove that what the verifier obtained is indeed an en-
cryption of a standard signature on m. In fact, that NP statement requires general zero-
knowledge proofs. Zhang et al.’s scheme [89], as the first concrete implementation of
the above paradigm, outperforms the previous schemes [45, 38] on both signature size
and computational cost. However, we discover that their scheme has a vulnerability
with regard to invisibility.
3.2.1 Review of the Scheme
We briefly describe their scheme, and note that their scheme provides neither signer’s
confirm-ability nor signer’s disavow-ability.
Setup: Choose a bilinear map e : G × G→ Gt, where G is a multiplicative cyclic
group of prime order p and a generator g. Gt is another multiplicative cyclic group
such that |G| =|Gt| = p. The system parameters are (G,Gt,e,p,g).
Key Generation: Signer randomly selects x, y ∈R Z∗q , and computes u = gx,
v = gy, then sets its public key as (u, v), and its private key as (x, y). Confirmer
chooses a random number xc from Z∗q as its private key, and computes its public key
as α = gxc .
Sign: This is the same as the signing algorithm in ZCSM scheme [88]. Given a
message m ∈Zq , signer picks a random r ∈R Z∗q , and computes σ = g(x+my+r)
1
2 ∈ G.
Here (x + my + r)
1
2 is computed modulo q. The algorithm will try with different
random values for r until x + my + r is a quadratic residue modulo q. The signature
on message m is (σ, r).
Verification: Given public parameters, a message m ∈Zq , and a signature (σ, r),
anyone can verify that if the equation e(σ, σ) = e(uvmgr, g) holds or not.
DCSSign: Given confirmer’s public key α, a message m ∈Zq , signer picks a ran-
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dom r ∈R Z∗q , and computes σ′ = α(x+my+r)
1
2 ∈ G. The designated confirmer signa-
ture on message m is (σ′, r).
Confirm: confirmer first checks that (σ′, r) has been signed by the signer using
its secret key xc, i.e., it checks if the equation e(σ′, σ′) = e(uvmgr, α)xc holds or not.
If it holds, confirmer performs an interactive zero-knowledge proof with the verifier
for knowledge: loge(uvmgr,α) e(σ′, σ′) = loge(g,g) e(α, g). This is an interactive zero-
knowledge proof system for the equality of two discrete logarithms[22].
Disavow: To disavow a purported signature (σ′, r) on m, confirmer performs an
interactive zero-knowledge proof with the verifier for proving the discrete logarithm
loge(uvmgr,α) e(σ
′, σ′) and log e(α, g) are unequal.
Extract: For (m,σ′, r), confirmer can extract the ordinary ZCSM signature on m
using its secret key α: σ = σ′x
−1
c .
3.2.2 Mounting the Attack
In this Section, we mount an attack against the invisibility of Zhang et al.’s scheme. In
this attack, if a verifier has already obtained two valid designated confirmer signatures,
it will be able to verify the validity of any alleged designated confirmer signatures by
himself.
In Confirm protocol, a confirmer first validates the signature by the equation
e(σ′, σ′) = e(uvmgr, α)xc , of which the right half can be re-written into three parts:
e(σ′, σ′) = e(uxc , α) · e(vxc , α)m · e(αr, α). (∗)
For each distinct signature, e(uxc , α) and e(vxc , α) are constant, while e(αr, α) can
be calculated since α and r are public. Our target is to compute e(uxc , α) and e(vxc , α),
so that the verifier can check the equation (*) by himself and determines the signature’s
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validity. The technical details are described as follows.
1. Suppose the verifier already holds two valid designated confirmer signatures,
(σ′1, r1) on message m1 and (σ
′
2, r2) on message m2. Firstly, it computes A1 =
e(σ′1,σ
′
1)
e(αr1 ,α)
, and A2 =
e(σ′2,σ
′
2)
e(αr2 ,α)
.
2. According to equation (*), the equation e(σ
′,σ′)
e(αr,α)
= e(uxc , α) · e(vxc , α)m holds,
then the verifier computes e(v
xc ,α)m1
e(vxc ,α)m2
= A1
A2
. So, he can obtain e(vxc , α) =(A1
A2
)
1
m1−m2 ,
where 1
m1−m2 is the inverse of (m1 −m2) modulo q.
3. The verifier can compute e(uxc , α) = A1
e(vxc ,α)m1
after it gets the value of e(vxc , α).
4. Finally, as the verifier knows the values of e(uxc , α) and e(vxc , α), it can validate
any DCS signatures without the confirmer by checking equation (*).
According to Goldwasser and Waisbard’s security model [45] cited in [89], the defined
security requirement for designated confirmer only covers “unimpersonation” but ex-
cludes “invisibility” and “non-transferability”. Note that this attack breaks invisibility
consequently. We also found the security proof for Lemma 1 and proof for Theorem 3
in [89] are incomplete.
For Lemma 1, the proof is incomplete because there were no analysis of oracle
simulation by the challenger, since they only mentioned the forger F could access
qDCS times DCSSign, qC times Confirm and qD times Disavow oracle adaptively, and
output a forged message-signature pair, which could be imposed by another forger
F ′ that aims to break the unforgeability of underlying ZCSM signature scheme [88].
Nonetheless, we can simply make up the simulation as below:
if F requests a DCS from ConfirmedSign oracle, the challenger F ′ can send the
same query to its own Signing oracle which will issue a ZCSM signature (σ, r), then
F ′ responds to the F with a corresponding DCS (σ′, r) =(σxc , r). Note that F ′ knows
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confirmer’s secret key xc so that it can check any alleged DCS’s validity, because we
assume the confirmer could be corrupted.
if F requests a Confirmation (Disavowal) via Confirm (Disavow) oracle, F ′can
send a correct response by using xc.
if F requests a extraction for a DCS, F ′can send a correct ZCSM signature by
using xc.
For Theorem 3, They did not give the full oracle simulations to the adversary be-
fore the challenge, i.e. the algorithm B which is a challenger to solve the Computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman Problem, only provides ConfirmedSign oracle to the adver-
sary. Meanwhile, B should be able to simulate the other oracles including Confirm,
Disavow and Extract, to convince the adversary. We find the attack does not com-
ply with the not-complete proof, because according to “soundness” property of zero-
knowledge proofs, since B is not able to convince the adversary for the corresponding
zero-knowledge proofs without the secret, and it cannot run Confirm or Disavow
protocol in fact.
3.3 Invisibility of Wei et al.’s DCS Scheme
Wei, Zhang, and Chen proposed a new and interesting concept of society-oriented des-
ignated confirmer signature scheme (SDCS) [83] recently. They extends the standard
DCS into a “group-based” DCS via threshold cryptography. In their proposition, there
is a “signer group” consists of n individuals, and a “confirmer group” consists of l indi-
viduals. To issue a society-oriented designated confirmer signature , at least tmembers
of the signer group form a “signing group”, and cooperate to produce a SDCS for the
receiver. To validate the signature, at least k members of the confirmer group form a
legitimate “confirming group”, and cooperate to provide the validity proof. In partic-
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ular, there is a “signing combiner” whose task is to choose and encrypt some random
values, compute the commitments, and collect all partial results during the signing
phase. Analogically, a “confirming combiner” collects partial witnesses produced by
the k confirmers and outputs the final validity proof of the alleged signature.
However, we find their concrete scheme fails to meet invisibility (Note that, this
attack also applies to a similar paper [82] by Wei et al.’s ). Recall that, a secure DCS
scheme should meet invisibility informally requires that, if given a DCS σ′, no (adap-
tive) adversary can distinguish the signed source between message m0 and message
m1 with non-negligible advantage better than 1/2.
3.3.1 Review of the Scheme
To depict the attack, we give a brief introduction about Wei et al.’s scheme without
redundant maths.
System Parameters Generation: Given the security parameter λ, system param-
eters are produced as SP = (P,G, g, h, n, t, l, k,N,M,H, u, v; p, q). G is a cyclic
group with order P . g, h are two random generators of G. The signer group has n
members, while at least t out of which are required to sign a message. The confirmer
group has l members , while at least k out of which are required to confirm a signa-
ture’s validity. N is a typical RSA modulus, where it is the product of two 512-bit
secure primes: N = pq, p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1, and p′, q′ are also primes. M
is the product of p′ and q′. H is a collision-free hash function {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}1024. v
is a random generator in the quadratic residue group QRN and u is an element in Z∗N
whose Jacobi symbol with respect to N is −1.
Key Generations: Given system parameters SP , keys related to all players in the
scheme are generated as follows. n < e < min(p′, q′) is the public prime exponent
for the singer group while d is the private signing key. di = f(i)(n!)−1 mod M , (i =
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1, 2, ..., n) is the signing-key share (SKSi = di) for the i− th signer, where a random
polynomial f(x) =
∑t−1
i=0 aix
i ∈ ZP [x], a0 = d, and ai ∈R Z∗M(i = 1, 2, ..., t − 1).
vi = v
di mod N(i = 1, 2, ..., n) is the public verification value (PKSi = vi) associated
with di. (SKCi , PKCi)(i = 1, 2, ..., l) is the private/public key pairs of the i − th
confirmer, where SKCi ∈R Z∗P and PKCi = gSKCi .
SDCS Generation: For a message m ∈ Z∗P to be signed, the signing combiner
interacts with the members of the signing group and issues a SDCS σ∗ in the following
steps,
1. the signing combiner firstly computes a Pedersen commitment [67] ϕ = gmhr
by a random value r ∈R Z∗P ;
2. Then it computes the ciphertext c of the randomness r using the public keys
PKC1 , ..., PKCi of lmembers of the confirming group as c = EncPKC1,...PKCl (r) =
(R,ω1, ...ωl), where R = gr, ωj = F (PKrCj), Enc is an encryption function in
a (k, l) threshold encryption scheme [49]. Another random polynomial F (x) is
defined as F (x) =
∑k−1
i=0 bix
i ∈ ZP [x], where b0 = r and b1, ..., bk−1 ∈R Z∗P .
3. The signing combiner secretly sends a tuple (m,ϕ, c) to each member of the
signing group with a proof PK{(α) : ϕ = gmhα ∧R = gα ∧ω1 = PKαC1 ∧ ...∧
ωl = PK
α
CL
}.
4. Each member of the signing group validates the proof of (m,ϕ, c), and compute
m′ = H(ϕ ‖ c)u(1−J(H(ϕ‖c)N ))/2 where J(.) is the Jacobi symbol. A partial signa-
ture is also computed as σi = m′2di . Then they send them secretly back to the
signing combiner with the proofs PK{(β) : vi = vβ ∧ σi = m′2β}.
5. Given at least t valid partial signatures, the signing combiner computes σ =∏t
i=1 σ
2n!
∏
j∈{1,...,t},j 6=i
j
j−i
i mod N . The it publishes the SDCS on message m as
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σ∗ = (ϕ, c, σ). Note this step and step 4 are actually the generation of a (t, n)
threshold signature [79].
SDCS Confirmation/Disavowal: To validate a SDCS σ∗ on a message m, the
verifier interacts with the confirming group as follows,
1. The verifier checks σ is a valid signature on m′ by checking the equation σe =
m′4. Then it sends the SDCS σ∗ with the message m to k members of the con-
firming group that it trusts.
2. Each member of the confirming group, can compute c = RSKCj using their pri-
vate key SKCj , and sends it to the confirming combiner with a proof PKCj{(γ) :
cj = R
γ ∧ PKCj = gγ}.
3. The confirming combiner computes a value
r′ =
k∑
j=1
ωj
∏ ct
ct − cj
t∈{1,...,k},t 6=j
.
It checks the equation R = gr′ . If it does not hold, cj and PKCj{(γ) : cj =
Rγ ∧ PKCj = gγ} are sent to the verifier who will decrypt the ciphertext him-
self and be convinced that it has submitted an invalid ciphertext, the terminate
the procedure. Otherwise, the confirming combiner performs a bi-proof that in-
teracts with the verifier, to prove the equality loggR = logh ϕgm or the inequality
loggR 6= logh ϕgm .
4. The verifier will be convinced that (m,σ∗) is a valid message-SDCS pair if the
equality of loggR and logh ϕgm holds. Otherwise, it will know σ
∗ is not a valid
SDCS onm for the inequality of those two discrete logarithms. Here we omitted
the technical details of proving the equality or inequality of two discrete loga-
rithms, which is proposed in Section 3.2 [57].
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3.3.2 An Attack on Invisibility
The successful launch of the attack depends on a security flaw that the ciphertext c of
randomness r can be re-used in different signatures.
For instance, a SDCS σ∗ = (ϕ, c, σ) is signed on a message mb, where b = {0, 1},
ϕ = gmhr, c = Enc(r, PKC1 , ..., PKCl) and σ as described in the previous protocols.
An (adaptively chosen message) adversary A given σ∗, is to guess whether this sig-
nature is signed on m0 or m1, which are two messages selected by himself before the
challenge. In addition, A is also given the public/private key-pairs of the signer group,
and the public keys of the confirmer group according to the definition of security for
the confirmers in [83]. The attack can be launched as below:
1. The adversary picks a new message m that m 6= m0, and m 6= m1.
2. It calculates ϕ = ϕgmg−m0 , which again equals gm+mb−m0hr.
3. A generates a SDCS on m, i.e. σ∗ = (ϕ, c, σ). This procedure is reasonable be-
cause the adversary holds all private keys of members of the signing group, and it
can simulate the SDCS generation phase by himself. More specifically, the gen-
eration of threshold signature σ does not require the knowledge of randomness
r in [79].
4. After that, A inquires OV for message-signature pair (m,σ∗). Note the veri-
fication oracle OV is provided in the security model in[83], which on input a
message-signature outputs whether or not it is correct w.r.t. the private keys of
the signing group and the public keys of the confirming group.
5. Finally,A outputs b = 0 if the response fromOV is “correct”, i.e. gm+mb−m0hr =
gmhr. Otherwise, it outputs b = 1. It is clear thatA can distinguish the two mes-
sages with probability 1.
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It is straightforward to check the correctness of the above attacks.
3.3.3 A Repair
Now we consider how to fix the above security flaw in Wei et al.’s SDCS scheme. The
basic idea is that we should let the confirming combiner know the “context” of cipher-
text c, i.e., for which message and with respect to which users it is created. To this end,
we can use public encryption with “labels” by taking the context information as a label.
For example, we may use the Paillier based CCA2-secure encryption with labels intro-
duced by Camenisch and Shoup [19]. More specifically, to use this encryption scheme,
the signer group can define label L = m||PKS1|| · · · ||PKSn||PKC1|| · · · ||PKCl
when they issues a SDCS for message m w.r.t. the confirmer group with public keys
of PKC1 · · ·PKCl. Beside this modification, all the procedures are the same as in
the Wei et al.’s original SDCS scheme, though all zero-knowledge proof should be
given with the context of label L. So, this improvement is compatible with the original
SDCS construction, maintains its efficiency, and also overcomes the above security
flaw against invisibility.
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Chapter 4
A Theoretical Analysis of Security
Model
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the central security property of a designated
confirmer signature scheme is invisibility [18], which requires that any probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) adversary cannot feasibly determine the (in)validity of an al-
leged signature. That is, the (in)validity of an alleged signature is invisible to a verifier
so that the only way to check this is to interact with either the signer or the designated
confirmer. However, in the literature researchers have also proposed two other related
properties, namely unimpersonation [64, 45] and transcript simulatability [38, 78]. In-
tuitively, unimpersonation requires an attacker cannot impersonate either the signer or
the confirmer to run the given interactive protocols with a verifier to validate a signa-
ture. Transcript-simulatability requires that the transcripts (i.e. evidence) generated in
those interactive protocols should be simulatable. If such transcripts were forwarded,
rather than those generated via directly interacting with the real prover, i.e the signer
or the confirmer, they cannot convince the other party and show the (in)validity of the
alleged signature. Eventually, a notion named non-transferability is introduced in [18],
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which can be seen as a simplified version of transcript-simulatability that give some
restrictions about verification protocols, and it informally means that one cannot get
more information out of verification protocols than whether a signature is valid or not.
The relations between these four properties are not clear and have never been formally
discussed after they were proposed.
In cryptography, it is necessary to study the relations between different crypto-
graphic primitives or different definitions of the same or similar security properties.
The most famous example is probably the equivalence of two definitions on the secu-
rity of public key encryption against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2) [69],
i.e., the IND-CCA2 and the NM-CCA2 [4]. Namely, CCA2 can be equivalently for-
malised in the context of either indistinguishability (IND) or non-malleability (NM).
The importance of such a question is twofold. On the one hand, if the equivalence
of different notions is known, a designer is free to choose any of them to prove the
security for any given cryptosystem, according to the features of the scheme analysed
and/or his/her preference and familiarity. Namely, such a result increases the flexibility
of security analysis and scheme designs. On the other hand, if we know that some sim-
ilar notions are actually not the same, then we should try to construct cryptosystems
which are secure w.r.t. stronger or even the strongest security notion, as such a scheme
effectively satisfies all weaker properties as well. So, our productivity is improved.
In this chapter, we classify these different security notions under proper assump-
tions, associated with both intuitive discussions and formal security proofs. After an
introduction to the theoretical background, we first discuss the relations between in-
visibility and unimpersonation with a formal proof presented. Then, as a rather purely
theoretical interest, we examine the concept of transcript-simulatability, and try to find
if this new notion in Gentry et al’s model [38] is stronger than or equivalent to any
previous notions, namely invisibility or non-transferability in Camenisch and Michels’
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model [18]. The result seems interesting: On one hand, if any DCS scheme satisfies
both invisibility and non-transferability, it naturally satisfies transcript-simulatability.
On the other hand, however, the result slightly changes, that is, if any DCS scheme
satisfies transcript-simulatability, a weakened notion of non-transferability and invisi-
bility is guaranteed.
4.1 Different Security Notions
Unforgeability, as introduced in the previous chapter, is an essential notion to guarantee
the signer’s security. However, considering the confirmer’s security, we discover that
it contains more requirements like invisibility and non-transferability, as stated in the
previous chapter. In fact, there exist other dimensions to define the confirmer’s security,
and we introduce two of them in this chapter, namely unimpersonation and transcript-
simulatability, which were both appeared in the previous literature of DCS schemes.
4.1.1 A Weak Security Notion: Unimpersonation
Of course, for a DCS scheme to be secure, it should be infeasible for an adversary to
impersonate the confirmer. Okamoto’s model [64] firstly captures “unimpersonation”
in a formal way, and is later complied by Goldwasser and Waisbard’s transformation
[45]. However as pointed in Camenisch and Michels’s elucidation (the second para-
graph of subsection 2.2 in [18]), “his model defines a weaker notion of security of the
confirmer: the adversary knowing the signer’s secret key wins the game only if it is
able to behave like the confirmer, i.e., to confirm and disavowal signatures, but does
not win the game if it can distinguish between two confirmer signatures (or between
a valid and an invalid confirmer signature)”. We agree with their comments, and give
the grounds in a latter discussion by showing that invisibility actually implies unim-
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personation. We present the formal definition of “unimpersonation of the confirmer”
(also see in Figure 4.1, where the public parameter pi is shorthand for (1λ, pkS, pkC),
and KG is a abbreviation of the key generation algorithm) developed from [45] with
some changes (see the discussion in Remark 2).
Definition 4.1. Security for the confirmer (Unimpersonation) Let I be a PPT im-
personator. On given input the public keys pkS and pkC under the security parameters
1λ, I enters the learning phase that it can request the executions ofO oracle, including
DCSSign, Confirm(C,I), Disavow(C,I) and Extract for polynomially many times
on the inputs of its choice. At the end of learning phase, I must output a pair (m,σ′)
of its choice and an additional bit coin, where coin = 1 indicates that it is a valid
message-DCS pair, and coin = 0 indicates that it is an invalid one. In the imper-
sonation phase, I executes the Confirm(C,V ) protocol as the prover if coin = 1.
Otherwise, it executes the Disavow(C,V ) protocol as the prover. The impersonator I
wins if and only if:
Confirm(I,V )(m,σ′, pkS, pkC)→ 1 if coin = 1
or Disavow(I,V )(m,σ′, pkS, pkC)→ 1 if coin = 0
I’s advantage in this game is defined to be advI = Pr[I wins]. We say a DCS
scheme is secure for the confirmer iff advI is a negligible function after executing the
above game. The above probability is taken over all possible coins used by I, S, C,
V , and the key generation algorithms GS and GC . Also this requirement should hold
when many signers share the same confirmer. Namely, when I knows polynomially
many secret key skSj such that skSj 6= skS .
Remark 1. The given definition is different from the definitions in Okamoto’s
model[64]. In [64], the Disavow protocol is integrated in the verification process with
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the Confirm protocol, while our model separates the verification in two different pro-
tocols. Also our definition is weaker, since the definition in [64] allows the adversary
to have the signer’s secret key.
Remark 2. The given definition is also slightly different from the Goldwasser
and Waisbard’s definition [45]. In [45], the disavowal case is overlooked, namely the
adversary should not succeed in executing Disavow(C,V ) protocol when its chosen
challenging DCS is invalid. Also we replace t the adversary’s ConfirmedSign oracle
with a DCSSign oracle.
Remark 3. The previous DCS models ([64] and [45]) require the challenge message-
DCS pair not necessary to be fresh. In other words, the adversary can still use the same
pair as the one involved in previous oracle queries.
Remark 4. Note that in the above definition, to win the game the adversary has
to run the same Confirm protocol specified in the given DCS scheme. So, from
the viewpoint of a verifier, such an attacker is actually impersonating the role of the
confirmer. That is the reason why the security definition is called “unimpersonation”,
rather than “security for designated confirmers” [45].
Remark 5. A simultaneous notion is “unimpersonation of the signer” in confirm-
ing (disavowing) a designated confirmer signature. Note this is not equal to forge
a valid DCS. It is naturally involved when the scheme supports a full verification,
namely, even the signer can confirm and disavow any designated confirmer signa-
tures. The formal definition of “unimpersonation of the signer” is quite straightfor-
ward, as based on the definition 4.1, that one only needs to add the oracle access
with Confirm(S,A)and Disavow(S,A), and later A should impersonate as the signer
in Confirm(S,V ) or Disavow(S,V ) protocol as a challenge. However, most of the pre-
vious schemes are not consistent with the signers disavowal ability, and thus we only
refer to the confirmer’s security here.
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1. (pkS, skS, pkC , skC)← KG(1λ)
2. (m,σ′, coin)← IO(pi)
3. if coin = 1, b← Confirm(I,V )(pi,m, σ′)
else, b← Disavow(I,V )(pi,m, σ′)
4. I wins iff b = 1.
Figure 4.1: Impersonation Game GameUNIMP
Invisibility implies Unimpersonation. The soundness of the confirm and disavow
protocols intuitively captures the requirement that “a prover cannot cheat” when inter-
acting with a verifier in the Confirm or Disavow protocol i.e. it cannot convince a
verifier that a signature is both valid and invalid. However, it does not prevent a third
party from impersonating the prover.
Camenisch and Michels [18] claimed that as Okamoto’s model [64] only covers
unimpersonation for the confirmer’s security, a scheme secure in Okamoto’s model
may suffer from adaptive signature-transformation attack that violates invisibility. Such
a counter example is further given in Section 2.2 of [18]. Therefore, we can conclude
that Okamoto’s model [64] is weaker than Camenisch and Michels’ model [18] (CM
model), as it only captures “unimpersonation”, and excludes invisibility. Hence, any
DCS scheme which is secure in Okamoto’s model may suffer from “adaptive signature-
transformation attacks”. Intuitively, such an adaptive signature-transformation adver-
sary can transform a challenge DCS with respect to a given signing key into another
DCS with respect to another signing key such that the resulting signature is valid if
and only if the original signature is valid. In other words, this attack relates to invisi-
bility. Note that in CM model, the adversary is allowed at anytime to create additional
signature-key pairs, and to interact with the confirmer with respect to these keys. De-
tailed description of this attack can be acquired in [18], Section 2.3.
Though Camenisch and Michels have mentioned that unimpersonation is a weaker
notion than the security formalised in their model, it is still worthwhile to give fur-
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ther exploration for the implicity behind. Invisibility intuitively requires no adaptive
adversary can distinguish between a valid DCS and an invalid DCS if both are signed
on the same message. We observe that if the adversary can impersonate the confirmer
by successfully convincing any verifier of a DCS via any interactive protocol, it must
trivially know the signature’s validity. Hence, this means that an attacker can break
unimpersonation it can also break invisibility. We present a formal proof for the fol-
lowing theorem. In addition, Figure 4.2 is to demonstrate the invisibility game in Def.
6 in Chapter 3, where σ′ /∈ LO means (m0, σ′) or (m1, σ′) (and their equivalent DCSs)
should not be queried in O, including Confirm, Disavow, and Extract oracle.
Theorem 4.1. Let DCS be a designated confirmer signature scheme, if DCS sat-
isfies invisibility as defined in Def. 3.6 in Chapter 3, then the scheme satisfies
unimpersonation as specified in Def. 4.1, that is, no PPT algorithm A can im-
personate as the confirmer with a non-negligible probability, under the adaptive
chosen message attacks.
Proof: Considering a PPT algorithm A executes the unimpersonation game, if
A can break DCS by impersonating the confirmer in performing Confirm(A,V ) or
Disavow(A,V ) protocol as a prover, with a non-negligible probability ε and within a
polynomial number q of oracle queries, we shall construct another adversary B that
breaks invisibility of DCS by winning the invisibility game with a non-negligible
probability. In the security proof, B should simulate the environment for A about
its permitted oracle queries.
At the beginning of the executions, B receives the public keys of the signer and the
confirmer, pkS and pkC , which are generated via key generation algorithm. In addition,
B receives the signer’s secret key skS , and thus can simulate the DCSSign oracle by
himself. Then B forwards the signer and the confirmer’s public keys to A.
Next B runs A as a subroutine, and answers all A’s oracle queries as follows. Ac-
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cording to the definition 3.6 in Chapter 3, B is allowed to access Confirm, Disavow
and Extract oracles. Thus for Confirm(C,A), Disavow(C,A) and Extract oracle
queries, B relays A’s related queries and the corresponding responses between A and
B’s own challenger. For DCSSign oracle queries, since B possesses skS , it simulates
DCSSign oracle for A by himself.
Before the simulation, B tries to guess which message will be selected by A in its
DCSSign oracle and later to perform Confirm or Disavow protocol in A’s chal-
lenge with respect to that message. In particular, B should select a random index j
such that 1 ≤ j ≤ q in advance. This fixed index j is used to guess a message mj
which will be asked in DCSSign oracle queries and later used by A to break unim-
personation. Accordingly, once a message mj is asked in DCSSign oracle, B will
set mj as one challenging message for its own invisibility game and randomly select
another challenging message m′. After submitting these two messages, B will get a
DCS σ∗ from its challenger. Without loss of generality, we assume that after flipping
a fair coin b, B ’s challenger always signs on mj if b = 0, and it signs on m′ if b = 1.
Now B forwards σ∗ to A as the response to A’s DCSSign query on message mj .
Eventually, A outputs a fresh pair (mA, σA) for which it wants to carry out the
Confirm or Disavow protocol as the prover.
Without loss of generality, we assume B is plugged into the verifier’s place by
honestly executing the protocol Confirm(A,B) or Disavow(A,B) on the pair (mA, σA).
Now B tries to guess whether (mj, σ∗) or (m′, σ∗) is a valid message-DCS pair by
using the following strategy:
• Case 1: IfA successfully performs Confirm(A,B)(mA, σA), and (mA, σA) is an
equivalent DCS of (mj, σ∗) where mA = mj , B outputs 0 as its guess to the
value of b. This suggests that B made a correct guess, and thus it succeeds to
find (mj, σ∗) is valid, while (m′, σ∗) is invalid.
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1. (pkS, skS, pkC , skC)← KG(1λ)
2. (m0,m1)← AO(pi, skS)
3. b R← {0, 1}
4. if b = 0, σ′ ← DCSSign(pi,m0, skS)
else, σ′ ← DCSSign(pi,m1, skS)
4. b′ ← AO(m0,m1, σ′)
5. Return 1 iff b = b′ and σ′ /∈ LO.
Figure 4.2: Invisibility Game GameINV
• Case 2: If A successfully performs Disavow(A,B)(mA, σA), and (mA, σA) is an
equivalent DCS of (mj, σ∗) where mA = mj , B outputs 1 as its guess to the
value of b. This suggests that B made a correct guess, and thus it succeeds to
find (mj, σ∗) is invalid, while (m′, σ∗) is valid.
• Case 3: If A has never asked as many as j messages or did not use (mj, σ∗)
or its equivalent DCS to run Confirm or Disavow protocol by impersonating
confirmer’s role, which suggests B fails in its simulation, and it outputs a random
bit as its guess to the value of b′. Indeed, in this case, B has no hope to relate the
validity of its challenging signatures to (mA, σA).
Apparently, B wins the invisibility game with a non-negligible advantage if either Case
1 or Case 2 happens. One may note the probability that, (mA, σA) is an equivalent
DCS of (mj, σ∗) where mA = mj , is
1
q
. The reason is that, apart from the DCS pairs
acquired from B’s DCSSign oracle, A has negligible probability to solely construct
any valid DCS pair unless unforgeability cannot be satisfied. And thus under the as-
sumption that A’s probability ε in successfully performing Confirm(A,B)(mA, σA)
or Disavow(A,B)(mA, σA) is non-negligible, B wins the invisibility game with a non-
negligible advantage
ε
q
. 
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1. (pkS, skS, pkC , skC)← KG(1λ)
2. b R← {0, 1}
3. (m,σ′)← AO(pi)
4. if b = 0, b1 ← Confirm(C,A)(m,σ′),
b2 ← Disavow(C,A)(m,σ′);
else, b1 ← Confirm(SimV alidityO,A)(m,σ′),
b2 ← Disavow(SimV alidityO,A)(m,σ′)
5. b′ ← AO, and return 1 iff b = b′.
Figure 4.3: Non-transferability Game GameNTR−0
1. (pkS, skS, pkC , skC)← KG(1λ)
2. b R← {0, 1}
3. (m,σ′)← AO0 (pi)
4. if b = 0, b1 ← Confirm(C,A1)(m,σ′),
b2 ← Disavow(C,A1)(m,σ′),τ ← A1;
else, ,τ ← SimV alidityO(m,σ′);
5. b′ ← AO2 (m,σ′, τ), and return 1 iff b = b′.
Figure 4.4: Non-transferability Game GameNTR−1
1. (pkS, skS, pkC , skC)← KG(1λ)
2. (m0,m1, s)← AO0 (skS, pi)
3. b R← {0, 1}
4. σ′ ← DCSSign(pi,mb, skS)
5. if b = 0, τ ← AO1 (b,m0,m1, s, σ′, pi);
else, τ ← SimDCSSign(b,m0,m1, s, σ′, pi)
6. b′ = AOlim2 (τ,m0,m1, σ′, pi)
7. Return 1 iff b = b′ and σ′ /∈ Lext.
Figure 4.5: Transcript-simulatability Game: GameTS
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4.1.2 Another Notion: Transcript-simulatability
At Asiacrypt 2005, Gentry et al. [38] introduced another security notion in DCS cryp-
tosystems, namely “transcript-simulatability”. This notion informally requires that the
evidences of confirmation or disavowal of a DCS should be simulatable.
We present the formal definition of transcript-simulatability as below. The formu-
lation follows the way of [38] and [78] except we use DCSSign algorithm to replace
ConfirmedSign protocol, with related modified oracles .
Definition 4.2. Transcript-simulatability: We say a DCS scheme is transcript sim-
ulatable if for any PPT adversary A = (A0,A1,A2) involved in the following game
(see Figure 4.5), there exists a PPT algorithm Sim such thatA’s advantage w.r.t. Sim,
i.e., correctly guessing the value of bit b, is negligible:
advA = |Pr[GameTS returns 1]− 1/2| ≤ negl(λ).
The above probability is taken over all possible coins used by A0, A1, A2, Sim and
key generation algorithms.
GameTS: pi denotes the public parameters (1n, pkC , pkS). With access to all ora-
cles inO = {DCSSign, Confirm(C,A), Disavow(C,A), Extract}, algorithmA0 first
outputs two messages m0 and m1. Then, a DCS σ′ on mb is output randomly by DC-
SSign algorithm, where b is a random bit generated by flipping a fair coin. After that,
A1, Sim and A2 play the game in which Sim tries to make its output τ (when m1
is signed) indistinguishable from A1’s output τ (when m0 is signed); A2 with input
(pi,m0,m1, σ
′, τ) attempts to guess the value of bit b, i.e., distinguish whether m0 or
m1 has been signed. In the game,A1 has access to all oracles in setO, i.e., all oracles
in O under the restriction σ′ /∈ Lext that both (m0, σ′) and (m1, σ′), together with
their “equivalent” DCSs, should not be queried to the Extract oracle. Similarly, A2
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has access to oracles in Olim, i.e., all oracles in O with the restriction that A2 cannot
make any query on (m0, σ′), (m1, σ′), or their “equivalent” DCSs. In contrast, Sim is
given very limited oracle access set, i.e., it can make only q times of DCSSign queries
as long as A0 makes at most q times of DCSSign queries. Finally, A2 outputs one bit
b′ as its guess to the value of b, i.e., whether m0 or m1 is signed. Let advA denote the
advantage of the adversary A.
Intuitively, algorithms A1, A2 and Sim represent verifier V1, verifier V2 and a sim-
ulation algorithm respectively. In the viewpoint of A2, to guess σ′ is signed on which
message, the transcript from a real verifier A1 is no more convincing or informative
than the transcript from a simulation algorithm Sim.
Remark 6. One may note this security requirement is quite similar to “non-
transferability” which is proposed in Camenisch and Michels’ model (the definition
can be found in [18], and also in Def.3.7 in Chapter 3). However, the definition
of transcript-simulatability actually includes an implicit indistinguishability, namely
the adversary cannot identify which is the valid message-signature pair, (m0, σ′) or
(m1, σ
′)? This motivate us to explore the relations between transcript-simulatability,
non-transferability, and invisibility. A further detailed discussion for the relations be-
tween those three notions is carried out in the next section, and to make the comparison
compatible, we make some changes to the DCS model. In particular, we assume only
the confirmer can verify a DCS and interactively convince the verifier of the signature’s
validity. Hence, the “ConfirmedSign” protocol is replaced by the “DCSSign” al-
gorithm where the latter is an algorithm that outputs a valid DCS. In fact, our change is
just to disable the verifiability of the signer in GMR model [38] , and it does not affect
the correctness of the result, as non-transferability actually means non-transferable of
the confirmer’s interactive verification. Because the signer and the confirmer’s verifi-
ablity are symmetric, we believe the comparison based only on the separate confirmer’s
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verifiability is reasonable.
4.2 Is CM Model As Strong As GMR Model?
Two notions are introduced in CM model [18], i.e., invisibility and non-transferability.
Recall that invisibility informally requires no adversary can see the (in)validity of an
alleged signature, while non-transferability informally requires one cannot get more in-
formation out of the Confirm/Disavow protocol than whether a signature is valid or not.
Note that, Figure 4.3 is to demonstrate the non-transferability game in Camenisch and
Michels’ definition [18], where Sim denotes the simulator in the non-transferability
game, and V alidityO denotes the single oracle that outputs a DCS’s validity.
From the intuition, it seems the requirement of non-transferability may be cov-
ered by (or equivalent to) the requirement of transcript-simulatability. Meanwhile,
by investigating the definition of invisibility and transcript-simulatability, we find the
former can be derived from the later from the definitions, which means transcript-
simulatability implies invisibility. Hence, one may raise an assumption: “Under proper
conditions, transcript-simulatability is equivalent to invisibility plus non-transferability,
that is, GMR model is as strong as CM model in some way. To address this issue, we
tries to find a formal proof in two directions, i.e, one half about whether GMR model
covers CM model, and the other half about whether CM model covers GMR model.
However, we find it seems hard to deal with non-transferability in both directions, and
we introduce another type of non-transferability, and we explain the related reasons as
below.
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4.2.1 A New Definition of Non-transferability
Normally, non-transferability guarantees that a verifier who learns whether a given
DCS is valid or not by interacting with the confirmer in the confirm or disavow proto-
cols, should not be able to prove this fact to a third party. More specifically, the verifier
should be able to “fake” any evidence of the validity of a signature obtained by interact-
ing with the confirmer. However, non-transferability in [18] and in Def 3.7. in Chapter
3, is actually defined based on an interaction-based indistinguishability, which means
the adversary should not be able to tell whether it was interacting with a real confirmer
or a simulation algorithm. We agree with the comments by Wikström that (see the dis-
cussion after Definition 8 in [85]), this requirement seems too strong, which relies on
the existence of a straight-line zero knowledge simulator for an interactive proof with-
out set-up assumptions. Hence we propose a new definition but preserves the main
implications and applications of non-transferability as follows. For simplicity, we let
NTR-0 denote the definition of non-transferability in [18] and Def 3.7. in Chapter 3.
Consequently, we introduce the new definition of non-transferability.
Definition 4.3. Non-transferability of Confirm and Disavow protocols (NTR-1):
The evidence generated inConfirm andDisavow protocols should be untransferable.
Namely, although an adaptive PPT adversary A knows whether a given DCS is valid
or not through the interactive verification, it does not gain any knowledge that can be
used to convince a third party about the validity of that DCS. Because there always
exists an accompanying simulator of A, which is able to produce the evidence that is
indistinguishable from the true evidence. In particular, this notion is formalised in the
following game considering a PPT adversary A = (A0,A1,A2) and a PPT simulator
Sim:
Initially, the adversaryA = (A0,A1,A2) is given the public key pkS and pkC of the
signer and the confirmer. A0 is allowed to make arbitrary oracle queries toDCSSign,
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Confirm(C,V ), Disavow(C,V ) and Extract. Again A0 is allowed to create signature-
key pairs (skA, pkA), and to run DCSSgin and then interact with the confirmer with
respect to these keys. In some stage, A0 must present two strings, m and σ′, for which
it wishes to carry out Confirm (or Disavow) protocol with the confirmer. Then a fair
coin b is flipped.
If b = 0, the confirmer and A1 run the Confirm (orDisavow) protocol with com-
mon input (m,σ′, pkS, pkC), while the confirmer’s secret input will be skC . Eventually,
A1 stops with an output τ , where τ is the evidence shows that σ′ is a valid (invalid)
signature on m.
If b = 1, the PPT simulator Sim is involved in the game. Sim is not given the
confirmer’s secret key, but is allowed to make a single call to an oracle which tells
Sim whether the strings m and σ′ is a valid DCS w.r.t. pkS and pkC . Eventually,
Sim stops with an output τ , where τ is the evidence shows that σ′ is a valid (invalid)
signature on m.
On receiving (m,σ′, τ) with the public keys pkS and pkC , A2 outputs a bit b′ to
guess the value of b. In addition, A2 is allowed to make arbitrary oracle queries to
DCSSign, Confirm(C,V ), Disavow(C,V ) and Extract.
A’s advantage relative to Sim in this game is defined as advA,Sim = Pr[b′ = b]−1
2
.
We require for any PPT adversary A = (A0,A1,A2), there exists a simulator Sim
such that for all sufficiently large λ, all (skS, pkS) ∈ GS(1λ), and all (skC , pkC) ∈
GC(1
λ), advA,Sim ≤ negl(λ).
Remark 7. Note that, Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 demonstrate the non-transferability
games in the definitions of NTR-0 and NTR-1 respectively, where V alidityO denotes
the single oracle that outputs a DCS’s validity.
Remark 8. It seems one may not easily to identify the relation between NTR-0 and
NTR-1 for the following reasons. On one hand, it seems by reducing the requirement
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of distinguishing two interactions, to the requirement of distinguishing two pieces of
evidences, NTR-1 seems weaker than NTR-0, as the simulator in NTR-1 could usually
be a straight-line ZK simulator for an interactive proof without set-up assumptions,
which is much harder to construct than a rewindable simulator in NTR-1. On the other
hand, in NTR-1, the adversary A1 can append arbitrary information on the transcript
from Confirm(C,V )(m,σ′) if it wants, which requires the simulator to be more pow-
erful regarding to a revisable transcript. And hence it remains an open problem to find
the relations between these two security notions.
4.2.2 A Proof for One Side
For the first problem, i.e., whether GMR model covers CM model? We think the
answer is NOT SURE, since NTR-0 in CM model seems too strong to achieve the
computational security. However, if we replace NTR-0 with NTR-1 in CM model,
we think the answer is YES. The reason is quite straightforward. By the informal
above discussion, one could simply obtain the invisibility game by deleting algorithms
A1 and A′1 (i.e. Step 5), and deleting τ in the input of algorithm A2. On the other
hand, the challenge in the transcript-simulatability game essentially requiresA2 cannot
distinguish between a true transcript (shows that σ′ is signed on m0) from a simulated
one, even the later is on a false statement. Comparing against the similar challenge
in the non-transferability game, such a requirement is clearly stronger, and thus we
intuitively think transcript-simulatability also implies non-transferability. In fact, two
results can be proved within the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Let DCS be a designated confirmer signature scheme which has
transcript-simulatability, thenDCS has invisibility and non-transferability as spec-
ified in Def 4.3.
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Proof: We use the method of proof by contraposition, by proving the following
two lemmas, i.e., Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2. Let AINV , ANTR, ATS be three adver-
saries which aim to win the invisibility game, non-transferability game, and transcript-
simulatability game respectively. 
Lemma 4.1. If a PPT adversaryAINV breaks the schemeDCS on non-transferability
by executing GameINV in polynomial time tINV with a non-negligible advan-
tage advINV , a PPT adversary ATS can break the scheme DCS on transcript-
simulatability by executing GameTS in polynomial time tTS with a non-negligible
advantage advTS .
Proof: We remark that because GameINV can be derived from GameTS by delet-
ing algorithms A1 and A′1 (i.e. step 5 and 6), and deleting in the input τ of algorithm
A2. Hence, an adversary in GameTS with more resource, i.e., additional transcripts τ ,
should have an advantage which is larger than a similar adversary in GameINV when
guessing the random bit.
We build a PPT adversary ATS by using AINV as follows. The challenger of ATS
runs the key generation algorithm to generate the public parameters and the key pairs
of the signer and the confirmer. Th adversary ATS receives the public parameters
including pkS, pkC from its challenger, and relays a copy to AINV .
InAINV ’s training phase, all oracle queries and responses are relayed byA0, which
is a subalgorithm ofATS that has the full oracle access inO. AINV outputs two strings,
say m0 and m1, which will be alternatively signed by its challenger.
ATS uses m0 and m1 as its own challenging messages, and sends them to its chal-
lenger. At this point ATS’s challenger flips a coin to obtain a bit b and takes σ′ as the
DCS on mb. After AINV receives its challenge tuple (m0,m1, σ′) from ATS , the exe-
cutions follow GameTS in step 5. At the end of the procedure, either A1or A′1 outputs
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a transcript τ to convince A2 that σ′ is signed on m0.
AINV is again allowed to enquire O via A2’s oracles. Eventually, AINV outputs a
bit b′ as its guess on b, and ATS uses b′ as its own answer.
It is straightforwardly to find that if AINV makes a successful distinction with a
non-negligible advantage advINV , ATS’s advantage to break transcript-simulatability
is non-negligible, and we have advTS = advINV . In addition, the running time ofATS
is equal to the running time of AINV , i.e., tINV = tTS . 
Lemma 4.2. If there exists a PPT adversary BNTR = (B0,B1,B2) breaks the
scheme DCS on non-transferability by executing GameNTR in polynomial time
tNTR with a non-negligible advantage advNTR, then there exists a PPT adver-
sary ATS that breaks the scheme DCS on transcript-simulatability by executing
GameTS in polynomial time tTS with a non-negligible advantage advTS .
Proof: Essentially, we need to prove such a statement: if there exists an PPT
adversary BNTR = (B0,B1,B2), for arbitrary PPT simulator B′1, the output of B1
and the output of B′1 can be distinguished by B2, then there exists an PPT adversary
ATS = (A0,A1,A2), such that for arbitrary PPT simulator A′1, the output of A1 and
the output of A′1 can be distinguished by A2.
we shall construct a transcript-simulatability adversary ATS = (A0,A1,A2) by
using the successful non-transferability adversary BNTR = (B0,B1,B2) as a subrou-
tine. In particular, ATS should simulate all permitted oracles for BNTR in GameNTR
as follows.
Initially, the challenger of ATS runs the key generation algorithm to generate the
public parameters and the key pairs of the signer and the confirmer. Th adversaryATS
receives the public parameters including pkS, pkC from its challenger, and relays a
copy to BNTR.
Because A0 is a subalgorithm of ATS and has the full oracle access in O, A0
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relays all of B0’sDCSSign, Confirm,Disavow andExtract queries and responses.
Meanwhile, B0 is allowed to create its own key pairs (skB, pkB), and to run DCSSgin
and then interacts withA0 for the confirmation or disavowal with respect to these keys.
Again, A0 still relays all Confirm or Disavow queries and responses. We allow A0
to maintain a list LDCSSign0 that L
DCSSign
0 = {(mi, σ′i) | (mi, σ′i) ← DCSSign} as
B0’s all DCSSign queries, where i does not exceed the polynomial number of B0’s
oracle access in its training phase. Furthermore, LDCSSign0 will be added to the state
information s and further sent to A1 or A′1.
At some point, B0 outputs two strings, m and σ′, for which it wants to carry out
the verification protocols. Let τ denote the transcript of confirming or disavowing the
DCS-pair (m,σ′) in the following simulation. A0 outputs two strings m0 and m1,
where m0 = m, and m1 is randomly selected from the message space. In addition, A0
adds (m0, σ′) to its states s.
Then the challenger of ATS flips a fair coin b, and produces a DCS σ′ on mb. A1
or a PPT simulator A′1 executes as follows:
• Case 1 : If b = 0, A1 runs Confirm(C,A1) and Disavow(C,A1) protocols with C
on the pair (m0, σ′), and records the transcript τ . A1 outputs τ as the evidence
showing σ′ is signed on m0, thought τ is meaningless w.r.t. (m0, σ′).
• Case 2 : If b = 1, the executions are a little complex. Firstly, we assume any
PPT simulator A′1 involved in the following executions is always willing to is-
sue an indistinguishable output from the output in Case 1. The reason is that,
we can define two types of simulator. The first-type simulator always issues a
distinguishable output from the output in Case 1, while the second-type simula-
tor always tries to issue an indistinguishable output from the output in Case 1.
However, for the first-type simulator, A2 can always make a distinction and thus
the statement is true. So without loss of generality, we simply assume any PPT
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simulator A′1 is the second-type simulator. A′1 constructs the simulated tran-
script τ as follows. Since A′1 has access to DCSSign oracle, it maintains all
pairs {(m′j, σ′j)} previously generated by DCSSign as a list LDCSSign1 , where
j ∈ {1, .., q}. Also A′1 extracts LDCSSign0 from s.
– If (m,σ′) ∈ LDCSSign0 , which means (m,σ′) is previously generated by
A0’s DCSSign oracle. A′1 marks “valid” on (m,σ′).
– If (m,σ′) ∈ LDCSSign1 , which means the previously selected pair(m,σ′) is
also a valid DCS generated by A′1’s DCSSign oracle, and that is a rare
case for a randomized algorithm. A′1 marks “valid” on (m,σ′).
– If m = m′i and R(m,σ′i, σ) = 1, which means σ is an equivalent DCS of
some signature σ′i in L
DCSSign
0 . A′1 marks “valid” on (m,σ′).
– If m = m′j and R(m,σ′j, σ) = 1, which means σ is an equivalent DCS of
some signature σ′j in L
DCSSign
1 . A′1 marks “valid” on (m,σ′).
– In all other cases, A′1 marks “invalid” on (m,σ′).
On receiving the validity information of (m,σ′), A′1 simulates a proper confirma-
tion or disavowal transcript τ on (m,σ′) as the evidence showing σ′ is signed on m0.
Next, on receiving τ from either A1 or A′1, A2 invokes B2 with the input (m,σ′, τ).
In addition, A2 simulates B2’s oracle queries by using its own oracles. Eventually, B2
output a bit b′, and A2 uses b′ as its guess to the value of coin b.
We remark that, in Case 2, As long as A′1 is the second-type simulator, its simu-
lation for τ is indistinguishable from a real non-transferability simulator’s execution.
The reason is that, in the real non-transferability game, the simulator is equipped with
a validity oracle once to know (m,σ′)’s validity. In our settings, A′1 knows all valid
DCSs that were correctly generated by DCSSign oracle and recorded in LDCSSign0
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and LDCSSign1 . Thus, with a small probability that (m,σ′) is a valid message-DCS pair
if, either(m,σ′) or its equivalent DCSs appears in LDCSSign0 or L
DCSSign
1 , or ANTR
has the ability to “forge” such a DCS without the signer’s secret key skS . And hence
A′1 always ensures the validity of (m,σ′) before it simulates a proper confirmation or
disavowal transcript.
Note if ANTR outputs its guess in polynomial time tNTR, ATS outputs its guess in
polynomial time tTS , where tNTR = tTS .
Now we analyze ATS’s probability of breaking DCS on transcript-simulatability.
Let event Ei denote executions follow in Case i and the simulation in Case i succeeds.
If ATS wins the game with an advantage advTS , we have:
advTS = Pr[bTS = b]− 1
2
= Pr[bTS = b | E1 ∨ E2]× Pr[E1 ∨ E2]− 1
2
Analogously, in Case 2, the simulation succeeds with a probability of 1 − advUF
where adv∗UF denotes ANTR’s advantage to “forge” a valid message-DCS pair in the
above procedure. NoteANTR is not allowed to possess skC which differs from a typical
adversary in the unforgeability game (see in Def 2.2.4), and thus adv∗UF will be less
equal than the advantage of such a typical forger. So the simulation in Case 2 succeeds
with a overwhelming probability assuming adv∗UF is negligible. Thus the probability of
E2 that indicates the procedure falls in Case 2 and the simulation succeeds is Pr[E2] =
1
2
× (1− adv∗UF ) ≈
1
2
× (1− advUF ), and we have Pr[E1 ∨E2] = Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] =
1− 1
2
× advUF .
In both cases, ATS always succeeds in guessing b if ANTR can make a successful
guess on b′, so we have Pr[bTS = b | E1 ∨ E2] = 1
2
+ advNTR.
Therefore, we have:
advTS ≈ (1
2
+advNTR)×(1−1
2
×advUF )−1
2
= advNTR−1
4
×advUF−1
2
×advNTR×advUF
One could derive the following inequation by eliminating advUF :
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¬TS ¬INV ¬NTR NTR ¬TS → ¬INV ∨ ¬NTR ¬TS ∧NTR→ ¬INV
T T T F T T
T T F T T T
T F T F T T
T F F T F F
F T T F T T
F T F T T T
F F T F T T
F F F T T T
Table 4.1: A Truth Table
advTS ≈ advNTR
and hence the result follows. 
4.2.3 A Proof for the Other Side
On the other side, what we really care about is, “if a DCS scheme satisfies both invisi-
bility and non-transferability, transcript-simulatability is implicitly satisfied”. And the
contrapositive of the above statement is: “if a DCS scheme does not satisfy transcript-
simulatability, either non-transferability or invisibility does not hold”. Employing the
symbolic logic, using the symbol “¬P ” to denote the negation of the proposition P ,
one could derive the following result.
• Step1: Our goal is to prove: “¬TS → ¬INV ∨ ¬NTR”.
• Step 2: To prove: “¬TS → ¬INV ∨ ¬NTR”, is equivalent to prove such a
statement: “(¬TS → ¬INV ) ∨ (¬TS → ¬NTR)”.
• Step 3: Alternatively, to prove: “¬TS → ¬INV ∨ ¬NTR”, is equivalent to
prove such a statement: “¬TS ∧NTR→ ¬INV ”.
In fact, we find neither the left clause nor the right clause in Step 2 can be straight-
forwardly proved in such an OR-statement. The reason is that, the definition of transcript-
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simulatability could be treated as a combination of invisibility and non-transferability,
sinceA2 inGameTS can win the game if it can either make a distinction on (m0,m1, σ′)
which in fact looks like an invisibility challenge, or it can make a distinction on the
generator of the evidence which turns into a non-transferability challenge of NTR-1 in
that case. So either a successful invisibility attacker or a successful attacker for non-
transferability of NTR-1 can conduct to a successful transcript-simulatability attacker.
However, we cannot say the reverse holds, since one cannot explicitly figure out that
these two underlying challenges in a transcript-simulatability game are independent.
However, if one raises a reasonable assumption, one may get a weaker but still very
useful theoretical result. Indeed, what we achieved is by showing the truth of such an
statement in Step 3: “Under the assumption that non-transferability is satisfied, a suc-
cessful invisibility adversary exists if a successful transcript-simulatability adversary
exists”. And such a result is formally presented in the following theorem. Note the
correctness of the statement in step 3 is guaranteed by applying the truth table in Table
4.1.
One should note that non-transferability in the theorem below is specified as NTR-
0, since we are only able to construct a successful invisibility attacker linking a NTR-0
secure DCS scheme. And it remains an open problem if one replace NTR-0 with NTR-
1 in theorem 4.3., that is, the problem that how to prove that transcript-simulatability
implies invisibility plus non-transferability in Def 3.7., Chapter 3 (or the definition of
[18]).
Theorem 4.3. If the schemeDCS satisfies non-transferability (NTR-0) as specified
in Def 3.7., and if a PPT adversary ATS breaks the scheme DCS on transcript-
simulatability by executing GameTS in polynomial time tTS with a non-negligible
advantage advTS , there exists a PPT adversary AINV that can break the scheme
DCS on invisibility by executing GameINV in polynomial time tINV with a non-
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negligible advantage advINV .
Proof: The main idea of the proof is to construct an invisibility adversary AINV
by using a transcript-simulatability adversary ATS as a subroutine, where the former
simulates the environment for ATS = (A0,A1,A2) and A′1, which is the concomitant
simulator of A1 in the transcript-simulatability game. During the simulation, we let
the algorithm A1 violates with some constrains in a little way (The details of A1’s
innocuous behaviors will be given shortly).
For the assumption that the scheme DCS meets NTR-0, we require that, for every
non-transferability adversary say ANTR−0, there exists a simulator say SNTR−0 that
is able to simulate an interaction with ANTR−0, and such a simulated interaction is
indistinguishable from a interaction performed by the real confirmer. Let advNTR−0
denote the advantage of ANTR−0 to win the non-transferability game in the definition
of NTR-0, and we have advNTR−0 ≤ negl(λ) .
Initially, the challenger of AINV runs the key generation algorithm to generate
the public parameters and the key pairs of the signer and the confirmer. Th adversary
AINV receives the public parameters including pkS, pkC from its challenger, and relays
a copy to A0. In addition, AINV will hold the signer’s secret key skS as required.
AINV simulatesA0’s oracleO includingConfirm,Disavow andExtract queries
by relaying the requests and responses between AINV ’s challenger and A0. In partic-
ular, AINV can simulate A0’s DCSSign oracle using the signer’s secret key skS by
himself. At some point, A0 outputs two messages, say m0 and m1.
AINV uses m0 and m1 as its output at its challenge phase. After flipping a fair
coin bINV , AINV ’s challenger generates a DCS σ′ on message mb. Next AINV flips a
hidden coin bTS . If bTS = 0,AINV sends (m0,m1, σ′) toA1 as input; otherwise,AINV
sends (m0,m1, σ′) to A′1 as input. NowAINV simulates A1 or A′1’s oracle services by
using the following strategy:
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[Simulation for A′1] BecauseA′1 is only allowed to access to DCSSign oracle. By
using skS , AINV can simply answer all A′1’s DCSSign queries.
[Simulation forA1] For all queries NOT involving σ′,AINV can simply relay those
queries to its own challenger. However, for any query including σ′, it cannot repeat
that according to the limitation of such an invisibility adversary after receiving the
challenge. Without loss of generality, we assume A1 is always requesting the interac-
tions about a confirmation on (m0, σ′) and a disavowal on (m1, σ′). Since NTR-0 is
satisfied due to the assumption, to confirm (m0, σ′) or disavow (m1, σ′), we alterna-
tively require AINV invokes SNTR−0 while treating (m0, σ′) as a valid message-DCS
pair and (m1, σ′) as an invalid one. Note this instant guess is consistent with AINV ’s
previous choice, i.e., if bTS = 0, AINV sends (m0,m1, σ′) to A1 as input.
[A1’s innocuous behavior] We require A1 always performs the following innocu-
ous behavior during the simulation: For each confirmation on (m0, σ′) and each dis-
avowal on (m1, σ′), A1 tries to identify if it interacts with a real confirmer or a simu-
lator. Furthermore, if it “thinks” it interacts with a simulator, it rejects that verification
and terminates; otherwise, it accepts that verification.
At the end of the simulation, A1 or A′1 outputs a tuple (m0,m1, σ′, s, τ) and sends
it to A2, where s indicates the state information and τ denotes a transcript shows that
σ′ is signed on m0. Now AINV still relays all A2’s oracle queries that will not include
(m0, σ
′) or (m1, σ′) or their equivalent DCSs.
If A2 outputs a bit b, AINV outputs b as its guess for its game.
Now we analyze AINV ’s probability of breaking DCS on invisibility by using
(A0,A1,A′1,A2) as subroutines. Note AINV successfully simulates the environment
for (A0,A1,A′1,A2) except some failure events happen. We define the following fail
events during the AINV ’s simulation.
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• fail1: bTS 6= bINV . This indicates AINV falsely sent (m0,m1, σ′) to A1 or A′1.
• fail2: A1 rejects the confirmation transcript on (m0, σ′) or a disavowal transcript
on (m1, σ′), after its interaction with AINV . This suggests A1 is potentially
able to play as an non-transferability adversary, and distinguish the interaction
between a real confirmer and a simulator who knows the signature’s validity.
Obviously, we have Pr[fail1] =
1
2
since bTS and bINV are two independent fair coins.
For the second type of failures, we think that A1 will definitely request a verification
on (m0, σ′) or (m1, σ′), to output a piece of transcript which shall convince A2 that
σ′ is signed on m0. If A1 is aware that during interactions, at least one interaction is
controlled by the simulator, it would be potentially able to play as a non-transferability
adversary, and distinguish such an interaction, i.e., to verify (m0, σ′) or (m1, σ′), be-
tween a real confirmer and a simulator. Recall that advNTR−0 denotes the advantage
of a PPT adversary to win the non-transferability game in the definition of NTR-0.
Because A1 tries to subconsciously identify the transcript from AINV during each in-
teraction, A1’s probability to accept such a simulated transcript is  = 1
2
− advNTR−0.
And thus we have Pr[fail2] = 1− 2.
From the simulation specified above, if fail1 happens,AINV ’s probability to guess
bINV correctly is exactly
1
2
, and we refer to this event as “AINV wins”. Otherwise,
AINV ’s probability to guess bINV correctly is equal to ATS’s probability to guess bTS
correctly, and we refer to the later event as “ATS wins”.
we have:
Pr[AINV wins] = 1
2
× Pr[fail1] + Pr[ATS wins]× Pr[¬fail1]
1
2
+ advINV =
1
2
× 1
2
+ (Pr[ATS wins | ¬fail2]× Pr[¬fail2]
+ Pr[ATS wins | fail2]× Pr[fail2])× 1
2
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Note Pr[ATS wins | fail2] = 1
2
means ATS’s probability to win is exactly 1
2
if
fail2 happens. Thus we have:
1
2
+advINV =
1
2
×1
2
+((
1
2
+advTS)×2+1
2
×(1−2))×1
2
=
1
2
+
1
2
×advTS×(1
2
−advNTR−0)2
that is, advINV =
1
2
× advTS × (1
2
− advNTR−0)2
According to the assumption that advNTR−0 is a negligible probability, One could
derive the following inequation by eliminating advNTR−0:
advINV ≈ 1
8
× advTS
Hence if advTS is non-negligible, advINV is non-negligible.
Considering the running time of AINV : Because tNTR and tTS is polynomial, the
total running time of AINV is tTS plus A1’s additional executing time which is 2 ×
tNTR−0, where tNTR−0 denotes the polynomial time ofANTR−0 executing the game of
NTR-0, and thus AINV still succeeds in polynomial time. 
Since almost all the current practical or generic DCS schemes are constructed by
using (concurrent) ZK proofs or ZK proofs of knowledge as the underlying building
blocks. Furthermore, non-transferability follows in a straightforward manner from
zero-knowledge property of the proofs in the Confirm or Disavow protocol (Similar
argument can be found in the proof of Theorem 1 in [18]). One could get the following
more applicable corollary.
Corollary 4.1. Let DCS be a designated confirmer signature scheme with the
underlying verification protocols which are based on zero knowledge proofs. If
DCS satisfies invisibility, it satisfies transcript-simulatability.
(Proof omitted). One could applying the above proof of Theorem 4.3, by replacing
the assumption of NTR-0 into a stronger one such that the zero knowledge property
of the underlying Confirm and Disavow protocols is guaranteed. And the related
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INV −→ UNIMP (by Theorem 4.1)
TS −→ INV (by Lemma 4.1)
TS −→ NTR-1 (by Lemma 4.2)
TS −→ INV + NTR-1 (by Theorem 4.2)
INV + NTR-0 −→ TS (by Theorem 4.3)
INV + ZK −→ TS (by Corollary 4.1)
Figure 4.6: Relations among security notions in DCS Schemes
equation still holds: advINV ≈ 1
8
× advTS . 
4.3 Summary
We show that at least CM model is stronger than GMR model, namely the combination
of invisibility and non-transferability (NTR-0) implies transcript-simulatability. How-
ever, the converse only holds when assuming a new definition of non-transferability,
i.e., NTR-1 is satisfied. A more practical result is, if the underlying Confirm and
Disavow protocols are based on zero knowledge proofs, transcript-simulatability is
equivalent to invisibility. We show a more detailed result listed in Figure 4.6, where
the strings of “INV”, “UNIMP”, “TS”, represent the security notions of invisibility,
unimpersonation and transcript-simulatability, respectively.
For the future work, it would be very interesting to find a formal proof that figures
out the relations between the notion of NTR-0 and the notion of NTR-1. Although
due to the Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3, NTR-1 seems intuitively no stronger than
NTR-0.
Chapter 5
A Paring-based DCS Scheme with
Unified Verification
5.1 Introduction
There is one limit in most of the existing DCS schemes: A signer is not given the
ability to disavow invalid DCS signatures. Therefore, the current concept of DCS has
not yet fully extended that of undeniable signatures, as the latter does grant the signer
the ability of disavowal. Moreover, in many applications it seems more sensible to
enable the signer having the same ability as the confirmer to confirm any valid DCS
and deny any invalid DCS. In fact, this additional ability will not only alleviate the
burden of the confirmer, but effectively prevents the signer from viciously claiming:
“This alleged DCS is not valid, but I am not able to show this”. Galbraith and Mao
[32] first pointed out DCS schemes should allow a signer to be able to deny invalid
signatures but they did not present any construction with this property. Motivated by
this observation, in this thesis we propose the concept of DCS with unified verification,
together with a formal security model and a concrete construction. Simply speaking,
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in DCS scheme with unified verification both the signer and the designated confirmer
can run the same protocol to confirm valid signatures, and another same protocol to
disavow invalid signatures. Based on the security models in [18, 32], we first present a
new security model for DCS with unified verification to capture all desirable security
requirements (Section 3). We also point out that the proposed model can be easily
generalised to accommodate DCS with full verification, in which the signer and the
confirmer do not necessarily run the same protocols to confirm or disavow signatures.
Then, we consider how to construct a DCS with unified verification. This is a
challenge, as simply revising the existing constructions does not work. The reason
is that almost all previous DCS schemes [45, 38, 58, 64, 78] follow the approach of
encrypting the signer’s signature under the confirmer’s public key. So, without the
confirmer’s private key the signer is not able to show that a CCA2 ciphertext is not
a proper encryption of his/her signature for a given message. In fact, it seems that
even Wang et al.’s DCS [78] without using public encryption cannot be converted into
a scheme supporting the signer’s disavowal, since an alleged DCS may contain a non
Diffie-Hellman tuple, for which the signer does not know a witness to prove this fact
at all.
However, this does not mean that it is impossible to construct DCS schemes with
unified verification or with full verification. Due to the amazing property of bilinear
pairings, we constructed the first concrete DCS scheme which supports unified verifi-
cation in the preliminary version of this work [81], though that scheme only achieves
weak invisibility. By making a simple enhancement to our previous work [81], we
get a new and secure DCS scheme with unified verification in this thesis (Section 4)
and prove its security in the random oracle model (Section 5). Specifically, the new
scheme is constructed by encrypting the BLS pairing based short signature [14] un-
der the signed ElGamal encryption [72]. Note that directly exploiting plain ElGamal
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encryption [30] cannot guarantee the invisibility, due to ElGamal’s malleability (See
more discussion in Section 4). Moreover, compared to the existing DCS schemes
[45, 38, 78, 48], the proposed solution has a conceptual simpler structure and a short
signature size, though the computational overhead is a little higher due to pairing eval-
uation. Another interesting observation about our construction is that the underlying
signed ElGamal encryption is actually not CPA secure due to the fact that the DDH
(Decisional Diffie-Hellman) problem is easy in pairing setting, though signed ElGa-
mal encryption is proved to be CCA2-secure in the random oracle model and in the
generic group model by Schnorr and Jakobsson [72]. This is seemingly contradictory
to the result by Okamoto [64]. The likely reason for this is that our definitions on the
security of DCS are different from Okamoto’s, but we are not very sure at this moment.
So, here we would like to promote this issue as an open problem.
5.2 Bilinear Pairings and the BLS Signature
Basically, a pairing is a function that takes two points on an elliptic curve as input, and
outputs an element of some multiplicative group. Weil pairing and Tate pairing are
two known symmetric pairings, while some other pairings, e.g., Eta pairing and Ate
Pairing [34], have been given more and more attentions.
Definition 5.1. Suppose that G and Gt be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime
order q, while g is a generators of G. A bilinear pairing on (G,Gt) is a map e :
G×G→ Gt, which satisfies the following properties:
Bilinearity: For all u, v ∈ G, and for all a, b ∈ Zq, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1, where 1 is the multiplicative identity of group Gt.
Computability: e can be efficiently computed.
We now review the BLS short signature scheme of Boneh, Lynn and Shacham
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[14]. In general, the scheme has three algorithms, Key Generation, Sign, and Verify. In
addition, it needs a full-domain hash function H: {0, 1}∗ → G.
Key Generation: A user randomly selects x ∈ Z∗q as its private key, and computes
y = gx as the corresponding public key.
Sign: To sign a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, the signer with private key x computes
h = H(m) ∈ G, and the signature σ = hx ∈ G.
Verify: Given a public key y and a message-signature pair (m,σ), a verifier first
computes h = H(m), and then checks if e(g, σ) = e(y, h) holds or not. If it holds, it
accepts the validity of (m,σ).
Note that the BLS signature is only one single element of G, so it is very short
(for example, 171 bits) for some elliptic curves. In [14], it is proved that the security
of the BLS signature scheme follows the hardness of Computational Diffie-Hellman
(CDH) problem in the random oracle model. In fact, the original BLS signature [14] is
described in the setting of asymmetric pairing e, i.e., e is a bilinear map from G1×G2
to Gt, while G1, G2, and Gt are all multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q. Here,
for simplicity we just use symmetric pairing by letting G = G1 = G2. We note that to
extend our DCS scheme for the asymmetric pairing is straightforward.
5.3 Concurrent Zero-knowledge From Honest-Verifier
Zero-Knowledge
Zero-knowledge (ZK) protocols allow a prover to validate theorems to a verifier with-
out giving away any other knowledge other than the theorems being true (i.e., existing
witnesses) [43]. Traditional notion of ZK considers the security in a stand-alone (or
sequential) execution of the protocol. Motivated by the use of such protocols in an
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asynchronous network like the Internet where many protocols are run concurrently at
the same time, studying security properties of ZK protocols in such concurrent settings
has attracted extensive research efforts in recent years [29]. Informally, a ZK protocol
is called concurrent zero-knowledge (CZK) if the ZK related simulatability property
holds in the concurrent settings, namely, when a malicious verifier concurrently in-
teracts with a polynomial number of honest prover instances and schedules message
exchanges as it wishes. We note, in DCS schemes, we require CZK protocols, be-
cause an adversary in DCS schemes may act as arbitrary cheating verifiers during the
concurrent execution of protocols that confirm or deny all alleged DCS signatures.1
In this work, for presentation simplicity, we describe the Confirm and Disavow
protocols with Σ-protocols (i.e., 3-round public-coin special honest verifier interactive
zero-knowledge (SHVIZK) with special soundness) directly.
Definition 5.2.
A 3-round public-coin protocol 〈P, V 〉 is said to be a Σ-protocol for a relation R if
the following hold:
• Completeness. If P , V follow the protocol, the verifier always accepts.
• Special soundness. From any common input x of length n and any pair of ac-
cepting conversations on input x, (a, e, z) and (a, e′, z′) where e 6= e′, one can
efficiently computes w such that (x,w) ∈ R. Here a, e, z stand for the first,
the second and the third message respectively and e is assumed to be a string
of length t (that is polynomially related to n) selected uniformly at random in
{0, 1}t.
1We note that the CZK issue was not realised in [48], where only stand-alone 4-round ZK is men-
tioned.
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• Special honest verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK). There exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) simulator S, which on input x and a random challenge
string e, outputs an accepting conversation of the form (a, e, z), with the same
probability distribution as the real conversation between the honest P , V on
input x.
Σ-protocols have been proved to be a very powerful cryptographic tool and are
widely used. Transformation methodologies from Σ-protocols to CZK protocols, in
the common reference string (CRS) model, are known (e.g., [27, 36]), but usually
incurs much additional computational and communication complexity. Moreover, for
CZK transformation in the CRS model, the CRS should be included as a part in the
public-key of the confirmer, which additionally increases the public-key length of the
confirmer. The transformation methodology proposed in [27] is recalled in section
5.3.1, which is among the most efficient transformations.
As we aim for DCS in the RO model, in this work we develop a highly effi-
cient transformation from Σ-protocols to straight-line CZK in the unprogrammable
RO model, where straight-line CZK means that the CZK simulator works in a straight-
line way (without rewinding the underlying adversary). Given access to a random or-
acle O, we can transform a Σ-protocol into a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK)
protocol via the Fiat-Shamir heuristics. But, the NIZK got this way loses deniability
[63, 66], which is however required for DCS schemes. The deniability loss is due to
the programmability of RO in the security analysis [63, 66]. To overcome the denia-
bility loss of simulation with programmable RO, the works of [63, 66] proposed the
unprogrammable RO model, and showed that ZK with unprogrammable RO reserves
the deniability property. We briefly discuss the main difference between programmable
RO model and unprogrammable RO model. In the programmable RO model, the sim-
ulator can (1) see the queries parties make to the random oracle and (2) can choose the
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Common input. An element x ∈ L of length n, where L is an NP-language that admits Σ-
protocols.
P ’s private input. A witness w for x ∈ L.
Random oracle. An unprogrammable random oracle denoted O.
Round-1. The verifier V takes e ∈ {0, 1}k uniformly at random, and sends c = O(e) to P .
Round-2. The prover P sends a (i.e., the first-round of the underlying Σ-protocol by running the
underlying PL) to V .
Round-3. V sends e to P .
Round-4. After receiving e from V , P first checks whether c = O(e). If not, P simply aborts;
otherwise (i.e, c = O(e)), P sends z (i.e., the last-round of the underlying Σ-protocol by
running the underlying PL) to V .
V ’s decision. V checks, by running the underlying VL, whether (a, c, z) is an accepting conversa-
tion of the underlying Σ-protocol for showing x ∈ L.
Table 5.1: Straight-line CZK protocol with unprogrammable RO
answers to these queries. The second is what we refer to as programming the random
oracle. Suppose our goal is to simulate a transcript of the random oracle RO at some
value s. Our intuition about the random oracle as a truly random function indicates
that picking a truly random string should suffice, and indeed, even no computationally
unbounded distinguishers, can distinguish a truly random string from RO’s output of s,
provided the distinguisher does not get access to RO. However, in the unprogrammable
RO model, we give the distinguisher access to RO, then the only "good" simulation of
the transcript is RO’s output of s, and the simulation must query RO at s. In this setting,
the simulator is not allowed to choose the answers to oracle queries. We remark that,
in this work, unprogrammable RO is used only for achieving highly practical CZK,
other parts of security analysis still rely on regular (programmable) random oracle.
Roughly speaking, before running the Σ-protocol (a, e, z), we require the verifier
to first commit to its random challenge e by sending c = H(e) on the top, where H is
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a hash function that is modeled as an unprogrammable RO in the analysis. The pro-
tocol is depicted in Figure-1. Note that the additional computational complexity and
communication complexity, incurred by this approach of transformation with unpro-
grammable RO, is minimal: only a hash value is incurred.
5.3.1 CZK Transformation From Σ-Protocols
Zero-knowledge (ZK) protocols allow a prover to validate theorems to a verifier with-
out giving away any other knowledge other than the theorems being true (i.e., existing
witnesses). This notion was introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [43] and
its generality was demonstrated by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [41]. Since its
introduction ZK has found numerous and extremely useful applications, and by now
has been playing the central role in modern cryptography.
Traditional notion of ZK considers the security in a stand-alone (or sequential) ex-
ecution of the protocol. Motivated by the use of such protocols in an asynchronous
network like the Internet where many protocols are run concurrently at the same time,
studying security properties of ZK protocols in such concurrent settings has attracted
extensive research efforts in recent years, initiated by Dwork, Naor and Sahai [29]. In-
formally, a ZK protocol is called concurrent zero-knowledge (CZK) if the ZK related
simulatability property holds in the concurrent settings, namely, when a malicious ver-
ifier concurrently interacts with a polynomial number of honest prover instances and
schedules message exchanges as it wishes.
We note, in DCS schemes, we require CZK protocols, because an adversary in
DCS schemes may act as arbitrary cheating verifiers during the concurrent execution
of protocols that confirm or deny all alleged DCS signatures. In this work, for presenta-
tion simplicity, we describe the Confirm and Disavow protocols with Σ-protocols (i.e.,
3-round public-coin special honest verifier zero-knowledge with special soundness)
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directly. We then discuss transformation methodologies from Σ-protocols to CZK pro-
tocols in the common reference string (CRS) model or in the unprogrammable random
oracle model.
5.3.1.1 Transformation from Σ-Protocol into CZK in the CRS Model
There are several general methodologies that transform Σ-protocols into CZK argu-
ments in the CRS model (e.g., [27, 36]). To our knowledge, the approach proposed in
[27] is the most efficient and has conceptual simple structure, which is suggested to
use in this work.
For the transformation proposed in [27], the CRS consists of the public-key for
a trapdoor commitment scheme. In this work, we use the DL-based trapdoor com-
mitment, where the public-key is h = gx, and the commitment to a value v ∈ Zq
is c = grhv, where r is randomly taken from Zq and is served as the decommitment
information. Note that for this concrete implementation, to commit to a value in Zq,
the committer needs to perform about 1.5 exponentiations, and the receiver needs to
perform also about 1.5 exponentiations. The communication complexity, besides the
transmission of the committed value v (that is sent in the decommitment stage), is
about 2|q| (suppose the commitment c is of about |q| bits).
To transform a Σ-protocol (a, e, z) into CZK, the key idea of [27] is to send C(a),
rather then the plain a, at the first-round of the transformed protocol, where C denotes
the trapdoor commitment scheme; in the third-round, the prover opens the value a and
computes the third-round message z.
Moreover, for the general transformation in the CRS model, the CRS should be
included as a part in the public-key of the confirmer, which additionally increases the
public-key length of the confirmer.
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5.3.1.2 CZK from Σ-protocols with unprogrammable RO
Given access to a random oracle (RO) O, we can transform a Σ-protocol into a non-
interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) protocol via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. But, the
NIZK got this way loses deniability [63, 66], which is however required for DCS
schemes. The deniability loss is due to the programmability of RO in the security
analysis [63, 66]. To overcome the deniability loss of simulation with programmable
RO, the works of [63, 66] proposed the unprogrammable RO model where all parties
have access to an unprogrammable (fixed) RO, where ZK with unprogrammable RO
reserves the deniability property.
In this section, we give a general yet simple method of transforming Σ-protocols
into straight-line CZK with unprogrammable RO, where straight-line CZK means that
the CZK simulator works in a straight-line way (without rewinding the underlying
adversary).
Given a Σ-protocol 〈PL, VL〉(x) which consists of three rounds (a, e, z) for anNP-
language L, the transformed protocol, denoted 〈P, V 〉 is presented in Figure-1.
Roughly speaking, before running the Σ-protocol (a, e, z), we require the verifier
to first commit to its random challenge e by sending c = h(e) on the top, where h is a
hash function that is modeled as RO in the analysis.
Note that the additional computational complexity and communication complexity,
incurred by this approach of transformation with unprogrammable RO, is minimal:
only a hash value is incurred.
Theorem 5.1. The protocol depicted in Figure-1 is a straight-line CZK proof with
unprogrammable RO for any language admitting Σ-protocol.
Proof. The completeness of the protocol 〈P, V 〉 can be directly checked.
Perfect soundness. The perfect soundness of 〈P, V 〉 is from the observations:
the commitment c perfectly hides e in the RO model; Then, the perfect soundness of
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〈P, V 〉 is inherited from the special soundness of the underlying Σ-protocol 〈PL, VL〉.
That is, the transformed protocol 〈P, V 〉 is a proof rather than an argument (i.e., com-
putationally sound protocol).
Straight-line CZK with unprogrammable RO. For any concurrent malicious ver-
ifier V ∗, the simulator S runs V ∗ as a subroutine and works as follows, with oracle
access to a unprogrammable RO O:
• For any oracle query made by V ∗ on input e, S makes the same query to the
unprogrammable RO O. S returns back the answer, denoted c, from O to V ∗,
and records (c, r) into a list LO.
• Whenever V ∗ starts a new concurrent session, on a common input x ∈ L, by
sending c (as the first-round message) to S, S works as follows:
– S firstly checks whether c ∈ LO. If not, S simply aborts the simulation, and
outputs “failure". This failure is called “Case-1 failure" for presentation
simplicity.
– If c ∈ LO, S retrieves the record (c, e) in LO and works as follows: S
runs the underlying SHVZK simulator SL (guaranteed for the underlying
Σ-protocol 〈PL, VL〉) on the input (x, e), denoted SL(x, e), to get a simulate
transcript (a, e, z) of the underlying Σ-protocol 〈PL, VL〉. Then S sends a
to V ∗ as the second-round message of the current session. If V ∗ returns
back e to S in the third-round, S returns back z in the fourth-round and
successfully completes the simulation of the current session; If V ∗ returns
back e′ 6= e in the third-round, S simply aborts the simulation, and outputs
“failure". This failure is called “Case-2 failure" for presentation simplicity.
It is easy to check that S outputs “failure" (either Case-1 failure or Case-2 fail-
ure) with negligible probability in the RO model. Specifically, for Case-1 fail-
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ure, with overwhelming probability V ∗ cannot guess the correct value c without
querying the RO O with e; For Case-2 failure, with overwhelming probability
V ∗ cannot get two different values e, e′ such that c = O(e) = O(e′).
Conditioned on S does not output “failure", the simulation of S is identical to the
real view of V ∗, which establishes the CZK property. Furthermore, S works in
the unprogrammable RO model, as S never programs the ROO by itself. Specif-
ically, S only accesses the unprogrammable ROO to see the queries made by the
underlying V ∗. Moreover, the simulation of S with restricted RO is straight-line,
as S never rewinds the underlying V ∗. 
5.4 Security Model
We update the DCS model following the security model in section 2, Chapter 3. In ad-
dition, we shall briefly mention how this new model can be modified to accommodate
DCS with full verification.
Definition 5.3. (Syntax). A correct designated confirmer signature scheme with
unified verification involves three roles of parties, i.e., a signer S, a designated con-
firmer C, and a verifier V, and consists of the following components:
Key Generation (Gs, Gc): Given the security parameter λ, denoted by 1λ, as input,
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm Gs outputs a pair of strings (skS , pkS)
as the signer’s private key and public key, respectively. Similarly, PPT algorithm Gc
that takes on input 1λ, outputs a pair of strings (skC , pkC) as the designated con-
firmer’s private key and public key, respectively.
Sign: Given a message m and a signer’s private key skS , algorithm Sign produces
a (standard) signature σ for message m. Namely, σ = Sign(m, skS).
Verify: Given a public key pkS , a message m, and a signature σ, algorithm Verify
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outputs Accept or Reject. For any key pair (skS, pkS), any message m, we have
V erify(m,Sign(m, skS), pkS) =Accept.
DCSSign: Given a message m, a signer’s private key skS and the confirmer’s
public key pkC , algorithm DCSSign outputs σ′ as a designated confirmer signature on
message m. Namely, σ′ = DCSSign(m, skS, pkC).
Extract: Given (m,σ′, skC , pkC , pkS) as input, algorithm Extract outputs a string
σ such that Verify(m, σ, pkS) = Accept or ⊥. In the case Extract can successfully ex-
tract a valid standard signature σ from σ′, we say that σ′ is extractable w.r.t. message
m. Otherwise, σ′ is unextractable.
Confirm: As an interactive protocol, either the signer S with private input skS
or the designated confirmer C with private input skC can run Confirm protocol with
a verifier V to confirm that an alleged DCS σ′ for a message m is extractable. The
common input for the protocol is (m, σ′, pkS , pkC). After the protocol is run, the
verifier outputs b ∈ {Accept, ⊥}. We say σ′ is valid w.r.t. message m, if the verifier’s
output is Accept. Otherwise, the validity of σ′ is undetermined. The Confirm protocol
should be complete and sound.
a) Completeness: For all honest C, S, and V , if Verify(m, Extract(m, σ′,
skC , pkC , pkS), pkS) =Accept, then Confirm(C,V )(m, σ′, pkS ,pkC) =Accept, and
Confirm(S,V )(m, σ′, pkS , pkC)=Accept.
b) Soundness: For any potentially cheating confirmerC ′, any potentially cheat-
ing signer S ′, and any honest verifier V, if Verify(m, Extract(m,σ′, skC , pkC , pkS), pkS)
=⊥, then
Pr[Confirm(C′,V )(m,σ
′, pkS, pkC) = Accept] < negl(λ), and
Pr[Confirm(S′,V )(m,σ
′, pkS, pkC) = Accept] < negl(λ).
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The probability is taken over all possible coins tossed by C ′, S ′, V , Gs, Gc, and
Extract. This means, neither a cheating confirmer C ′ nor a cheating signer S ′ can
convince an honest verifier V that an un-extractable designated confirmer signature σ′
is valid. In other words, all valid DCS signatures are extractable.
Disavow: As an interactive protocol, either the signer S with private input skS
or the designated confirmer C with private input skC can run Disavow protocol with
a verifier V to convince that an alleged DCS σ′ is unextractable. The common input
to the protocol is (m, σ′, pkS , pkC), while the verifier output is b ∈ {Accept, ⊥}. If
the verifier’s output is Accept, we say σ′ is invalid w.r.t. message m. Otherwise, the
invalidity of σ′ is undetermined. The Disavow protocol should be complete and sound.
a) Completeness: For all honest C, S, and V , if Verify(m, Extract(m, σ′, skC ,
pkC , pkS), pkS) =⊥, thenDisavow(C,V )(m, σ′, pkS , pkC) =Accept, andDisavow(S,V )(m,
σ′, pkS , pkC) =Accept.
b) Soundness: For any potentially cheating confirmerC ′, any potentially cheat-
ing signer S ′, and any honest verifier V, if Verify(m, Extract(m, σ′, skC , pkC , pkS),
pkS) =Accept, then
Pr [Disavow(C′,V )(m,σ
′, pkS, pkC) = Accept] < negl(λ), and
Pr [Disavow(S′,V )(m,σ
′, pkS, pkC) = Accept] < negl(λ).
The probability is taken over all possible coins tossed by C ′, S ′, V , Gs, Gc, and
Extract. This means, neither a cheating confirmer C ′ nor a cheating signer S ′ can
convince an honest verifier V that an extractable designated confirmer signature σ′ is
invalid. In other words, all invalid DCS must be unextractable.
Remark 1. In contrast to the models given in [18, 45, 38, 78], there are three main
differences in the above syntax definition. Firstly, we include the basic signature gen-
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eration and verification algorithms to make the syntax more complete. Secondly, an
algorithm DCSSign is now used to produce a DCS instead of an interactive protocol
ConfirmedSign in [45, 38, 78] to allow the signer generating a valid DCS and confirm-
ing it when it is just generated. The reason for this is that the signer will use the same
Confirm protocol to show the validity of a DCS as does by the confirmer. Finally, in
our model the signer is also able to use the Disavow protocol to show the invalidity
of an alleged DCS. This is definitely necessary, as our DCS model targets to support
unified verification.
Remark 2. Due to the above changes in syntax, we accordingly update the se-
curity definitions by including all necessary oracle accesses. Security for the signer
or unforgeability requires that no adaptive PPT adversary can forge a valid DCS on
a fresh message on behalf of a specific signer, even it compromises the secret keys
of the confirmer and other signers. This means that unforgeability should be satisfied
in multi-signer settings, i.e., in the scenario of multiple signers sharing the same con-
firmer. In our definition of unforgeability given below, the forging algorithm is not
given oracle accesses for which the confirmer is the prover, since it already holds the
confirmer’s private key skC . Due to a similar reason, the Sign oracle for underlying
signatures is not provided as the attacker can simulate this oracle by asking DCSSign
queries and then running Extract to get basic signatures for any messages.
Definition 5.4. Security for the signer (Unforgeability): Let F be a PPT forg-
ing algorithm, which on input 1n, pkS , pkC and skC , can request oracle access in
OF={DCSSign,Confirm(S,F),Disavow(S,F)} for polynomially many times for adap-
tively chosen inputs of its choice; and then outputs a DCS message-signature pair (m,
σ′) in which message m is not previously asked in DCSSign queries. We say a DCS
scheme is secure for the signer or existentially unforgeable, if for any PPT forging
algorithm F ,
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Pr[V erify(m,Extract(m,σ′, skC , pkC , pkS), pkS) = Accept] < negl(λ).
The probability is taken over all possible coins used by F , S, and key generation
algorithm Gs, Gc.
Intuitively, security for the confirmer or invisibility means that no adaptive PPT
adversary D can distinguish between a valid DCS and an invalid DCS for a given
message (or two designated confirmer signatures).
Definition 5.5. Security for the confirmer (Invisibility): Firstly, Key Generation al-
gorithms are run for the signer and the confirmer on input 1λ. D is given pkS and pkC ,
which are the public keys of the signer and the confirmer. As a training purpose, D is
allowed to create signature-key pairs (skD, pkD) (not necessarily via Key Generations)
and to interact with the confirmer with respect to these keys. Furthermore,D can make
arbitrary oracle queries in OD = {Sign, DCSSign, Confirm(S,D), Confirm(C,D),
Disavow(S,D), Disavow(C,D), Extract}. Then, the distinguisher has to present one
fresh message m. After a fair coin is flipped, the adversary is given a corresponding
DCS σ′ = DCSSign(m, skS, pkC), where b = 0, or a fake DCS signature chosen uni-
formly at random from the signature space where b = 1. Here the signature space has
a finite size that depends only on the security parameter n. Now D is again allowed to
access the above oracles except that it cannot enquire for σ′ via any of these oracles.
Finally, the distinguisher must output one bit information b′ to guess the value of b. We
say a DCS scheme with unified verification is invisible, if for any PPT distinguisher
D:
|Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2| ≤ negl(λ).
The above probability is taken over the coin tosses of the signer, the confirmer, key
generation algorithms and the oracles.
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Remark 3. Note we adopt the definition of invisibility by Galbraith and Mao
[32], which is slightly stronger than the definition proposed by Camenisch and Michels
[18]. What we defined here is actually to require that the adversary cannot decide the
validity of a given DCS with respect to its chosen message, without the help of the
signer or the confirmer. However, the security requirement in [18], requires that the
adversary should be unable to relate a chosen message with a valid DCS from a face
DCS. Galbraith and Mao have proved that these two types of invisibility are actually
equivalent satisfying some particular properties in the standard model of computation.
In addition, we disallow the adversary to have skS . Otherwise, it will be trivial for him
to distinguish signatures via unified verification protocols.
Definition 5.6. Security for the confirmer (Non-transferability): This is an ex-
tended version of the non-transferability definition in Chapter 3. Intuitively, we require
the evidence generated in Confirm or Disavow protocols should be untransferable.
Namely, although an adaptive PPT adversary A knows whether a given DCS is valid
or not through the interactive verification, it does not gain any knowledge that can be
used to convince a third party about the validity of that DCS. In particular, this notion
is formalised in the following games considering a PPT simulator A′:
Game-NTR: Firstly, the adversaryA is given the public key pkS and pkC of the signer
and the confirmer. It is allowed to make arbitrary oracle queries toDCSSign,Confirm(S,V ),
Disavow(S,V ), Confirm(C,V ), Disavow(C,V ), and Extract. AgainA is allowed to
create signature-key pairs (skA, pkA), and to runDCSSgin and then interact with the
confirmer with respect to these keys. Let a string P denote the prover which could be
either the signer S or the confirmer C in any interactive protocols, where P ∈ {C, V }.
In some stage, the adversary must present two strings,m and σ′, for which it wishes
to carry out the Confirm(P,V ) (or Disavow(P,V )) protocol with the prover. Next a
fair coin b is flipped. If b = 0, the real prover and A run the Confirm(P,V ) (or
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Disavow(P,V )) protocol with common input (m,σ′, pkS, pkC), while the prover’s secret
input will be skP . If b = 1, the simulator Sim is plugged in the place of the real prover
to run theConfirm(P,V ) (or Disavow(P,V )) protocol on (m,σ′). Sim is not given
either the confirmer’s secret key or the signer’s secret key, but is allowed to make a
single call to an oracle which tells Sim whether the strings m and σ′ is a valid DCS
w.r.t. pkS and pkC .
In parallel, the adversary is allowed to make arbitrary queries to the signer and
the confirmer. And in all other interactions except the confirmation (or disavowal)
on (m,σ′), the real signer or the real confirmer speaks with the adversary. Finally,
A must output one bit information b′ to guess the value of b. The adversary A wins
if and only if b = b′, and A’s advantage is defined as advA = Pr[A wins]. We say a
DCS scheme with unified verification is non-transferable if for any adversaryA, there
exists a simulator Sim such that for all sufficiently large λ, all (skS, pkS) ∈ GS(1λ),
and all (skC , pkC) ∈ GC(1λ):
advA < negl(λ).
The above probability is taken over the coin tosses of the signer S, the confirmer
C, and key generation algorithms GS and GC .
Applying the result in Chapter 4, we know another security notion, i.e., transcript
simulatability proposed in GMR model [38], is implied by invisibility and NTR-0.
So we omit a proof about transcript-simulatability in our security analysis. In fact,
the main obstacle to prove transcript-simulatability in our scheme is that the signed
ElGamal, our underlying encryption scheme, is even not CPA-secure. However, the
generic DCS proposed in [38, 78] both rely on CCA2-secure public key encryption.
Definition 5.6. (Security). We say a correct designated confirmer signature scheme
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is secure, if it satisfies security for the signer and for the confirmer. Namely, it is
existentially unforgeable, non-transferable, and invisible.
In fact, [38, 78] also studies security for verifier or unfoolability, which requires
that any DCS confirmed by running Confirm protocol must be extractable, and that
every alleged DCS confirmed by running Disavow protocol must be unextractable. As
this property follows the soundness of Confirm and Disavow protocols [38, 78], we do
not separately specify it here.
Finally, from the above description we can see that by introducing additional Con-
firm and Disavow protocols for the signer, the formal model for DCS with unified
verification can be directly generalised to accommodate DCS with full verification, in
which the signer can also confirm and disavow a signature, but not necessarily runs the
same protocols as the confirmer.
5.5 The Proposed Scheme
Based on BLS signature scheme [14], which has been reviewed in Section 2.1, we now
present a designated confirmer signature scheme with unified verification. Basically,
a DCS in our scheme is just the signed ElGamal encryption [72] of a BLS signature.
After the scheme description, we shall give more explanations on the construction.
We use a symmetric bilinear map e : G × G → Gt, where G is a multiplicative
cyclic group of prime order q and g is a generator of G. In addition, two cryptographic
hash functions H and H ′ are used. In particular, H : {0, 1}∗ → G is a full-domain
hash function, and H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q is a standard cryptographic hash function.
Key Generation: The signer picks xs ∈R Z∗q as its private key, and computes
ys = gxs as its public key. Similarly, the confirmer sets its private/public key pair as
(xc, yc = g
xc), where xc ∈R Z∗q .
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Sign: Given a signer’s private key xs and a message m, output the signature σ=
hxs ∈ G, where h= H(m) ∈ G.
Verify: Given (m,σ), check whether e(g, σ) = e(ys, h) holds, where h = H(m) ∈
G.
DCSSign: After generating a basic signature σ= H(m)xs for message m by us-
ing the signer’s private key xs, output DCS for message m as σ′ = (σ1, σ2, s, t) by
computing:
σ1 = y
r
c , σ2 = σg
r, where r ∈R Z∗q; and
s = H ′(ykc , σ1, σ2), t = k + sr mod q, where k ∈R Z∗q.
It is easy to see that σ′ is exactly the signed ElGamal encryption [72] under the
private/public key pair (x−1c , g = y
x−1c
c ), which is equivalent to the confirmer’s key pair
(xc, yc = g
xc). Namely, (σ1, σ2) is the naive ElGamal ciphertext of basic signature
σ = H(m)xs under the key pair (x−1c , g = y
x−1c
c ), while (s, t) is a Schnorr signature on
message (σ1, σ2) under the temporary private/public key pair (r, σ1 = yrc).
Extract: Given a message m and an alleged DCS σ′ = (σ1, σ2, s, t), which satis-
fies s ≡ H ′(ytcσ−s1 , σ1, σ2), the confirmer extracts the basic signature σ = σ2/σx
−1
c
1 if
e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) = e(h, ys)
xc , where h = H(m). Otherwise, ⊥ is output.
Confirm: Given common input (m,σ′, ys, yc), where σ′ = (σ1, σ2, s, t) is an al-
leged DCS, the confirmer C with the private key xc can check the validity of the DCS
by verifying whether e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) = e(h, ys)xc holds or not, where h = H(m).
As e(h, ys)xc ≡ e(h, yc)xs , the signer S with the private key xs can similarly know the
validity of σ′ by checking e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) = e(h, yc)xs . If σ′ is valid, either the con-
firmer C or the signer S can convince a verifier V of that fact by running the following
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interactive zero knowledge protocol:
PK{(xc ∨ xs) : [e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) = e(h, ys)xc ∧ yc = gxc ]
∨[e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) = e(h, yc)xs ∧ ys = gxs ]}.
Disavow: On input (m,σ′, ys, yc), where σ′ = (σ1, σ2, s, t) is an alleged DCS, if
e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) 6= e(h, ys)xc or e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) 6= e(h, yc)xs , where h = H(m),
this means that σ′ is an invalid DCS for message m. Then, either the confirmer C or
the signer S can run the following interactive zero knowledge protocol with a verifier
V to convince this fact:
PK{(xc ∨ xs) : [e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) 6= e(h, ys)xc ∧ yc = gxc ]
∨[e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) 6= e(h, yc)xs ∧ ys = gxs ]}.
Note that the above PKs are for “the (in)equality of two discrete logarithms” ∨ “the
(in)equality of another two discrete logarithms”, and each part can be proved easily by
using the standard techniques [22, 16, 53]. The implementation details of these zero
knowledge proofs are given in Appendix B.
Remark 4. First, note that the idea of building a DCS here is inspired by the Boneh
et al’s verifiably encrypted signature (VES) scheme [13], which encrypts a basic BLS
signature using ElGamal encryption with the adjudicator’s key (xc, yc = gxc). The
adjudicator in VES plays a similar role as the confirmer in DCS. Here, we exploit the
same idea but change the format of the ciphertext via effectively setting the confirmer’s
key pair (x−1c , g = y
x−1c
c ). The result is very interesting, as we get a DCS scheme in
which the validity of a hidden signature (i.e. DCS) is not publicly visible any more,
compared to Boneh et al.’s hidden but publicly verifiable VES.
However, the above resulting scheme is actually not a secure DCS, as it fails to
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meet invisibility, due to the malleability of naive ElGamal encryption. That is, given
a target DCS (σ1 = yrc , σ2 = σg
r) for a message m, an adaptive attacker can simply
derive the validity of (σ1, σ2) by inquiring the validity of (σ′1 = σ1y
r′
c , σ
′
2 = σ2g
r′)
w.r.t. the same messagem by selecting a random number r′. Note that such an attack is
allowed in the security definition of invisibility. To address this issue, signed ElGamal
encryption [72] is exploited to add one Schnorr signature (s, t) showing that the creator
of ciphertext (σ1, σ2) indeed knows the secret value of r which is used for encryption.
Equivalently, this implies that in the proposed scheme the issuer of a DCS (σ1, σ2, s, t)
knows the corresponding basic signature σ, as σ = σ2/gr. Hence, the above attack
does not work any more, since such a DCS has a fixed format and is not malleable.
Remark 5. Note that the proposed DCS scheme is not strongly unforgeable (but
is existentially unforgeable) for an attacker who has comprised the confirmer’s pri-
vate key xc as explained below. Since a valid DCS for a message m has the form of
σ′ = (σ1, σ2, s, t) = (yrc , σg
r, s, t) satisfying s ≡ H ′(ytcσ−s1 , σ1, σ2), the attacker with
xc can first extract the basic signature by computing σ = σ2/σ1x
−1
c . Then, the attacker
can trivially forge another valid DCS σ¯′ = (σ¯1, σ¯2, s¯, t¯) for the same message m. Nev-
ertheless, this does not violate our definition of unforgeability specified in Definition
3, as a successful forger is required to produce a valid DCS on a new message, not a
previously signed message.
Remark 6. According to Remark 2, both the signer and the confirmer can check
a designated confirmer signature’s validity or invalidity of an alleged DCS by using
their own private keys. Then, either of them can run the same Confirm or Disavow
interactive zero knowledge protocol with a verifier to show whether σ′ is valid or not.
Hence, to check the validity of a signature the verifier can interact with either the
signer or the designated confirmer. Due to this reason, we call our scheme a DCS with
unified verification. In particular, in our scheme the signer is granted the ability to
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disavow any invalid designated confirmer signature. This new feature is interesting, as
our scheme serves a better extension of undeniable signatures [21], in which there is
a disavow protocol for the signer; nevertheless no current DCS schemes except [48],
which inspired by our prototype in [81] of this scheme, offer Disavow protocol for the
signer.
A Generalised Version As discussed in Section 1, our unified verification DCS
can be simply generalised to a full verification version. The idea is to get rid of the
“OR” relation in the interactive zero-knowledge (IZK) protocols. For Confirm(S,V ),
the signer initially checks the validity of a given DCS, then runs a zero-knowledge
protocol PK{xs : e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) = e(h, yc)xs ∧ ys = gxs}. For Confirm(C,V ), the
ZK protocol will be PK{xc : e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) = e(h, ys)xc ∧ yc = gxc}. To disavow
an invalid signature, either the signer or the verifier firstly checks the invalidity of a
given DCS using their own secret key, and then runs PK{xs : e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) 6=
e(h, yc)
xs ∧ ys = gxs} or PK{xc : e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) 6= e(h, ys)xc ∧ yc = gxc},
respectively. Hence, the above extension accommodates the generalised DCS model,
where the signer and the confirmer can confirm (or disavow) signatures via different
protocols.
5.5.1 HVIZKs on Confirm and Disavow Protocols
In this section, we show how to run honest verifier interactive zero-knowledge proof
(HVIZK), actually Σ-protocols, to complete the Confirm and Disavow protocols. To
this end, we directly adapt the protocols given in [53], and depict the implementation
details as below.
In the Confirm protocol, the knowledge statement is PK{(xc∨xs)) : [e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) =
e(h, ys)
xc ∧ yc = gxc ] ∨ [e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) = e(h, yc)xs ∧ ys = gxs ]}. So, once the
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prover (either the signer or the confirmer) and a verifier pre-compute A1 = A2 =
e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g), B1 = e(h, ys), B2 = e(h, yc), C1 = yc, C2 = ys, andD1 = D2 = g,
they can run the Confirm protocol as shown in Figures 5.1 and Figure 5.2 to prove
“(A1 = Bxc1 ∧ C1 = Dxc1 ) ∨ A2 = Bxs2 ∧C2 = Dxs2 )”.
In the Disavow protocol, the knowledge statement is PK{(xc∨xs)) : [e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) 6=
e(h, ys)
xc ∧ yc = gxc ] ∨ [e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g) 6= e(h, yc)xs ∧ ys = gxs ]}. So, once the
prover (either the signer or the confirmer) and a verifier pre-compute A1 = A2 =
e(σ2, yc)/e(σ1, g), B1 = e(h, ys), B2 = e(h, yc), C1 = yc, C2 = ys, andD1 = D2 = g,
they can run the Disavow protocol as shown in Figures 5.3 and Figure 5.4 to prove
“(A1 6= Bxc1 ∧ C1 = Dxc1 ) ∨ A2 6= Bxs2 ∧ C2 = Dxs2 )”.
As mentioned before, both the above Confirm and Disavow HVIZK protocols
should be converted into CZK so that they can be executed with multiple verifiers
concurrently.
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Common Input:
A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2, D1, D2
Signer S Verifier V
(with private input xs)
a, b1, c1 ∈R Zq,
z1 = B1b1 · A1c1 ,
z2 = D1b1 · C1c1 ,
z3 = B2a, z4 = D2a; (1)
(z1, z2, z3, z4)−−−−−−−−−→ c ∈R Zq
c2= c - c1 mod q, (2)
c←−−−−−−−−−
b2 = a - c2xs mod q. (3)
(b1, b2, c1, c2)−−−−−−−−−→ Output Accept iff
c1+ c2≡ c mod q,
z1 = B1b1·A1c1 , z2 = D1b1·C1c1 ,
z3 = B2b2·A2c2 , z4 = D2b2·C2c2 .
Figure 5.1: The Confirm(S,V ) Protocol in the concrete DCS-UV scheme
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Common Input:
A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2, D1, D2
Confirmer C Verifier V
(with private input xc)
a, b2, c2 ∈R Zq,
z1 = B1a, z2 = D1a,
z3 = B2b2 · A2c2 ,
z4 = D2b2 · C2c2; (1)
(z1, z2, z3, z4)−−−−−−−−−→ c ∈R Zq
c1= c - c2 mod q, (2)
c←−−−−−−−−−
b1 = a - c1xc mod q; (3)
(b1, b2, c1, c2)−−−−−−−−−→ Output Accept iff
c1+ c2≡ c mod q,
z1 = B1b1·A1c1 , z2 = D1b1·C1c1 ,
z3 = B2b2·A2c2 , z4 = D2b2·C2c2 .
Figure 5.2: The Confirm(C,V ) Protocol in the concrete DCS-UV scheme
Common Input:
A1, A2, B1, B2,
C1, C2, D1, D2.
Signer S Verifier V
(with private input xs)
a, b1, b2, c1, e, e
′, β ∈R Zq/{1},
β′ = (D2xs/C2)a,
z′1 = D2
e/C2
e′ , z′2 = B2
e/A2
e′ ,
z1 = β
c1D1
b1/C1
b2 ,
z2 = B1b1/A1b2; (1)
(β, β′, z1, z2, z′1, z
′
2)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Iff β 6= 1 and β′ 6= 1,
(2) c←−−−−−−−−−−−− c ∈R Zq
c2= c - c1 mod q,
b′1 = e - c2xsa mod q, (3)
(b1, b2, b
′
1, b
′
2, c1, c2)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Output Accept iff
b′2 = e
′ - c2a mod q; c1+ c2≡ c mod q,
z1 = βc1D1b1/C1b2 , z2 = B1b1/A1b2 ,
z′1 = β
′c2D2b
′
1/C2
b′2 , z′2 = B2
b′1/A2
b′2 .
Figure 5.3: The Disavow(S,V ) Protocol in the concrete DCS-UV scheme
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Common Input:
A1, A2, B1, B2,
C1, C2, D1, D2
Confirmer C Verifier V
(with private input xc)
a, b′1, b
′
2, c2, e, e
′, β′ ∈R Zq/{1},
β = (D1xc/C1)a,
z1 = D1e/C1e
′ , z2 = B1e/A1e
′ ,
z′1 = β
′c2D2b
′
1/C2
b′2 ,
z′2 = B2
b′1/A2
b′2; (1)
(β, β′, z1, z2, z′1, z
′
2)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Iff β 6= 1 and β′ 6= 1,
(2) c←−−−−−−−−−−−− c ∈R Zq
c1= c - c2 mod q,
b1 = e - c1xca mod q, (3)
(b1, b2, b
′
1, b
′
2, c1, c2)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Output Accept iff
b2 = e′ - c1a mod q; c1+ c2≡ c mod q,
z1 = βc1D1b1/C1b2 , z2 = B1b1/A1b2 ,
z′1 = β
′c2D2b
′
1/C2
b′2 , z′2 = B2
b′1/A2
b′2 .
Figure 5.4: The Disavow(C,V ) Protocol in the concrete DCS-UV scheme
5.6 Security Analysis
5.6.1 Complexity Assumptions
We introduce some complexity assumptions required in our proposal as below. Let
negl(n) denote any negligible function that grows slower than n−v for any positive
integer v and for all sufficiently large integer n. x ∈R X denotes an random element
x is picked from set X uniformly, and x1, x2, ..., xn
R
← X denotes x1, x2, ..., xn are
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random elements picked from set X uniformly. All the other alphabets and symbols
follow the previous meanings.
Definition 5.6. Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDH). Given g, ga, gb ∈
G, no probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm can output gab ∈ G with non-
negligible probability, where a, b ∈R Z∗q .
Now we propose a new assumption, called “Decisional-coefficient-Linear (D-co-L,
in short) assumption”, to serve our security analysis in Theorem 3. We shall provide
more confidence towards the D-co-L assumption in the generic bilinear groups.
Definition 5.7. Decisional-coefficient-Linear Assumption (D-co-L): With g ∈ G
and a pairing e described as above,given a tuple (g, ga, gb, gw, gby, gwa+y, gz), where
a, b, w, y, z
R← Z∗q , no PPT algorithm A can distinguish between gwa+y and a random
element gz in G. Formally, for any PPT algorithm A, for (g, ga, gb, gw, gby, gwa+y, gz),
where a, b, y, w, z R← Z∗q , we define the advantage of A:
AdvD−co−LA (n) =| Pr[A(t, ga, gb, gw, gby, gwa+y) = 1]−Pr[A(t, ga, gb, gw, gby, gz) = 1] |
The probability is over the uniform random choice of the parameters to A, and over
the coin tosses of A. We say the decisional-coefficient-linear assumption (T, )-holds,
if there is no such A, which runs in time at most T and AdvD−co−LA (n) is at least .
We prove a lower bound on the computational complexity of the D-co-L problem
in the generic group model following the proof techniques in [8], [11], [10] and [47],
to give more confidence towards the D-co-L assumption. In this model, the adversary
can only perform equality tests, because group elements of G and Gt are encoded
as unique random strings. Three oracles are assumed to perform operations between
group elements, including computing the group action in G and Gt, as well as the
bilinear pairing e : G × G → Gt. Two injective functions are used to model this
opaque encodings, ξ : Zq → {0, 1}∗ for group G, where a group element gt ∈ G is
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represented as a string ξ(t), and an analogous function ξ′ : Zq → {0, 1}∗ for group Gt.
Theorem 5.2. Let A be an algorithm that solves D-co-L problem in the generic
group model, making at most l queries to the oracles which compute the group
action inG andGt, and the oracle which computes the bilinear pairing e. Suppose
a, b, w, y, z
R← Zq, d R← {0, 1}, and ξ, ξ′ are two random encoding functions as
defined above for G and Gt respectively. Let td = wa + y and t1−d = z. Then
about A’s advantage, we have:
 :=| Pr[A(q, ξ(1), ξ(a), ξ(b), ξ(w), ξ(by), ξ(t0), ξ(t1), ξ′(1)) = d]− 1
2
|≤ 4(l+8)2/q.
Proof: We construct a simulation algorithm S that simulates the generic group oracles
for A without committing to values for a, b, w, y, t0, t1. S keeps track of the group
elements by their discrete logarithms (group exponents) to the generators g ∈ G and
e(g, g) ∈ Gt. Since the variables a, b, w, y, t0, t1 are undetermined, these discrete
logarithms are polynomials in Zq[a, b, w, y, t0, t1] with coefficients in Zq, which we
denote by ρi for exponents in G and ρ′i for exponents in Gt. S then maps these group
exponents to arbitrary distinct strings it gives to A, i.e., ξi = ξ(ρi) for ρi in G and ξ′i =
ξ′(ρ′i) for ρ
′
i in Gt. S maintains two lists of pairs, i.e., L = {(ρi, ξi) : i = 0, 1, ..., τ}
and L′ = {(ρ′i, ξ′i) : i = 0, 1, ..., τ ′}, under the condition that at step κ in the game,
τ + τ ′ = κ + 8. These lists are initialised at step κ = 0: ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4, ξ5, ξ6 and ξ′0
are set to arbitrary distinct strings in {0, 1}∗, which binds to ρ0 = 1, ρ1 = a, ρ2 = b,
ρ3 = w, ρ4 = by, ρ5 = t0, ρ6 = t1 and ρ′0 = 1 respectively, where two counters are
initialised τ = 7 and τ ′ = 1.
Initially, S gives all the strings created above to A, and then simulates the ora-
cles for A as below. Without loss of generality, we assume that A only queries S on
legitimate strings that were previously revealed.
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Group Actions. To compute the product/division of two operands inG represented
as ξi and ξj , where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ τ , S computes ρτ = ρi± ρj . If ρτ = ρk for some k < τ ,
set ξτ = ξk; otherwise, it set ξτ to a string in {0, 1}∗ distinct from ξ0, ..., ξτ−1. S then
increases τ by one, adds the new pair (ρτ , ξτ ) to the list L and give ξτ to A. Group
action queries in Gt are treated similarly, this time by working with the list L′ and the
counter τ ′.
Pairings. To compute the product of two operands in G represented as ξi and ξj ,
where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ τ , S computes ρ′τ ′ = ρiρj . If ρ′τ ′ = ρ′k for some k < τ ′, set ξ′τ ′ = ξ′k;
otherwise, it set ξ′τ ′ to a string in {0, 1}∗ distinct from ξ′0, ..., ξ′τ ′−1. S then increases τ ′
by one, adds the new pair (ρ′τ ′ , ξ
′
τ ′) to the list L’ and give ξ
′
τ ′ to A.
Note that at any time in the game, the total degree of any polynomial to represent
an element in G is at most 2, and the total degree of any polynomial to represent an
element in Gt is at most 4.
After at most l queries, A terminates and returns a guess dˆ ∈ {0, 1}. At this point,
S chooses random aˆ, bˆ, wˆ, yˆ, zˆ R← Zq. Consider td = wˆaˆ + yˆ and t1−d = zˆ for both
choices of d ∈ {0, 1}. The simulation provided by S is perfect and reveals nothing
to A about d unless the chosen random values for the variables a, b, w, by, z, t0, t1
leads to an equality relation between these intermediate values that is not an equality
of polynomials. This happens if either of the following events happens::
1. ρi(a, b, w, y, wa + y, z) − ρj(a, b, w, y, wa + y, z) = 0 but ρi 6= ρj for some
0 ≤ i, j ≤ τ .
2. ρ′i(a, b, w, y, wa + y, z) − ρ′j(a, b, w, y, wa + y, z) = 0 but ρ′i 6= ρ′j for some
0 ≤ i, j ≤ τ ′.
3. any relation similar to the above in which wa+ y and z have been exchanged;
Because the group operations inG andGt are implemented by the addition/subtraction
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between polynomials in L and L′ respectively, and the pairing operations are imple-
mented by the multiplication of polynomials in L, it is unable for the adversary to
trivially obtain the knowledge of a multiple of the polynomial wa+ y via these opera-
tions.
When any of the above events occurs, S’s responses to A’s queries deviate from
the real oracles’ responses. Furthermore, in this case d is independent from algorithm
A’s view and A’s probability of making a correct guess is exactly 1/2. Since ρi − ρj
for fixed i and j is of degree at most 2, it equals zero for a random assignment of
the variables in Zq with probability at most 2/q. Similarly, for fixed i and j, ρ′i − ρ′j
becomes zero with probability 4/q. The same probabilities can be found in the third
case. Therefore, we have that A makes a correct guess with advantage bounded by
 ≤ 2 · (( τ
2
)2
q
+ ( τ
′
2
)4
q
). Since τ + τ ′ ≤ l + 8, we have  ≤ 4(l + 8)2/q. 
5.6.2 Security Proofs
Under the standard CDH assumption, the BLS signature scheme [14] is provably se-
cure in the random oracle model. The unforgeability of our DCS relies upon the secu-
rity of BLS scheme, without direct use of random oracles. The new D-co-L assump-
tion, proposed in this work, gives rise to the invisibility of our DCS scheme in the
random oracle model.
Because our Confirm andDisavow protocols are based on special honest verifier
zero knowledge proofs (SHVZK) and can be converted to CZK protocols according to
the transformation methodologies in section 3, the notion of non-transferability in Def
5.6 follows in a straightforward manner from the concurrent zero-knowledge property
of the proofs, and we omit a proof on non-transferability.
Theorem 5.3. If the BLS signature scheme is (t′,q′H ,q′S ,ε′)-secure against existential
forgery, then the proposed DCS scheme is (t,qH ,qS ,ε)-secure against existential
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forgery w.r.t. Definition 4, where q′H = qH , q′S = qS , ε′ = ε, t′ ≤ t+6c·(qS+qC+qD),
where c is a constant, denoting the time to compute one pairing evaluation, one
exponentiation in G, and one exponentiation in Gt.
Proof. Given a forgery algorithm F for the proposed DCS scheme, we shall construct
a forgery algorithm F ′ for the underlying BLS signature scheme. For presentation
simplicity, we assume F behaves well in the random oracle model, i.e., F always
requests the hash of a message m before requesting a designated confirmer signature.
The BLS forger F ′ is given the signer’s public key ys for which the private key is
unknown to F ′ and has access to the Sign and hash oracles. As the challenger for F ,
F ′ simulates and runs interactions with F as follows.
Setup. F ′ generates a key-pair (xc, yc) randomly by running Gc, which serves as
the confirmer’s key pair. Then F ′ runs F , providing it as input the public keys ys and
yc, and also the confirmer’s private key xc.
Hash Queries. When F requests a hash on m, F ′ makes a query for m to its own
hash oracle, and receives some value h ∈ G, then it responds h to F .
DCSSign Queries. When F requests a DCS on some m (it would have already
queried the hash oracle on m), F ′ queries its own Sign oracle on message m, obtaining
σ ∈ G. Then F ′ selects two random numbers r, k ∈ Z∗q , generates a DCS σ′ =
(σ1, σ2, s, t) according to Eq. (5) and returns it to F .
Confirm and Disavow Queries. Whenever F asks to run either Confirm(S,F )
or Disavow(S,F ) protocol w.r.t. a DCS message-signature pair (m,σ′), F ′ can first
checks the validity of σ′ by using the secret xc and then convinces F by running
Confirm(C,F ), Disavow(C,F ) respectively in the role of the confirmer C. Note that
in the view of point of algorithm F , such interactions are indistinguishable from those
running in the role of the signer S. Note that for the proof of unforgeability, we actu-
ally need the witness indistinguishability property of Confirm and Disavow protocols,
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which does hold for the HVIZK protocols presented in Appendix B (without the need
of transforming them into CZK with unprogrammable RO).
Output. Finally, if F halts declaring failure, F ′ declares failure too. Otherwise,
F provides a valid and nontrivial DCS σ′∗ = (σ∗1, σ
∗
2, s
∗, t∗) to F ′ on a message m∗.
Then, F ′ computes σ∗ = σ∗2/(σ
∗
1)
x−1c , which is a valid BLS signature on m∗ under
signer’s public key ys. A nontrivial forgery means that F did not query the DCSSign
oracle on m∗, for which F ′ did not query its Sign oracle on m∗. Hence, (m∗, σ∗) forms
a nontrivial BLS forgery.
Now we analyze the success probability and the running time of F ′. Algorithm F ′
succeeds whenever F does, so the success probability of F equals to that of F ′, i.e.,
ε = ε′. The running time of F ′ is the running time of F plus the time it takes to respond
qH hash queries and qS DCSSign queries, to run qC Confirm queries and qD Disavow
queries, together the time to transform the final forged DCS into a BLS signature. Hash
queries impose no overhead. Each DCSSign query requires F ′ to perform three expo-
nentiations in G. For each Confirm query, F ′ will evaluate four paring computations
and five exponentiations in Gt, while each Disavow query requires five paring com-
putations and six exponentiations in Gt. The final signature transformation needs one
exponentiation in G. Denote the time for pairing computation by pr, the time for ex-
ponentiation in G by exG, and the time for exponentiation in Gt by ex. We get that the
total running time t′ for F ′ is at most t+(3qS+1)·exG+5(qC+qD)·pr+(5qC+6qD)·ex.
In a summary, if F can (t, qH , qS, qC , qD, ε)-forges a DCS in the proposed DCS
scheme, then F ′ can (t′, q′H , q
′
S, ε
′)-forges a BLS signature, where q′H = qH , q
′
S = qS ,
ε′ = ε, and t′ ≤ t+ 6c · (qS + qC + qD), where c = pr + exG + ex is a constant. 
Theorem 5.4. Under the D-co-L assumption, the proposed DCS scheme is invisible
in the RO model.
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Proof: Suppose a challenger algorithm C is given the D-co-LA challenge, i.e., to dis-
tinguish two tuples, (g, ga, gb, gw, gby, gwa+y) and (g, ga, gb, gw, gby, gz) where g is a
generator in a multiplicative cyclic group G with prime order q. A pairing is con-
structed as e : G × G → Gt where Gt is another multiplicative cyclic group with
the same order q. Consider the invisibility game modeled in Definition 5, C needs to
simulate a DCS environment for some PPT distinguisher D, in which D tries to dis-
tinguish two pairs: (m, sig) and (m, sigR), where sig = DCSSign(m, skS, pkC) and
sigR is chosen uniformly at random from the signature space. D can access the hash
oracle, Sign, DCSSign, Confirm, Disavow oracles before and after the challenge
request phase. So, C can setup a DCS scheme instance and simulate the game for D
as below.
First, C sets pkC = gb, and pkS = gw. Then, C simulates all the oracles for D as
follows:
Hash query by D: Upon receiving D’s queried message m, C picks u randomly
and sets H(m) = gu. Then, add (m,u) to a H list, which is initially empty.
Sign query by D: For a queried message m, C first checks if (m,u) ∈ H for
some u. If yes, outputs basic signature σ = gwu. Otherwise, selects u randomly, adds
(m,u) to the H list, and outputs σ = gwu.
DCSSign query by D: For a queried message m, similarly C can get a unique
tuple (m,u) ∈ H for some u. Then, C computes basic signature σ = gwu. By picking
a random r, C computes σ1 = pkrC = g
br and σ2 = σ · gr = gwu+r. Since r as ‘the
signing key’, C can simply produce a Schnorr signature (s, t) for message (σ1, σ2).
Finally, C outputs (σ1, σ2, s, t) to D.
Extract query by D: For given an alleged DCS (σ1, σ2, s, t) for message m, C
outputs ⊥ if it cannot find m in the H list. Otherwise, retrieves (m,u) from the H
list and computes σ = gwu. Then, if e(σ2, gb) 6= e(σ1, g) · e(σ, gb), C outputs ⊥.
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Otherwise, C knows that the queried DCS signature-message pair is valid, so it outputs
the basic signature σ = gwu.
Confirm/Disavow query by D: Similar with the Extract oracle, C can check
the queried DCS’s validity easily. To convince D the validity of queried DCS, C just
needs to straightforwardly run the underlying CZK simulator.
For the challenge message m′ submitted by D, C computes the DCS signature sig,
in case the coin toss is head, as follows. Let H(m′) = ga, which implicitly sets the
underlying BLS signature for m′ as H(m′)skS = gwa. Then, C sets σ1 = gby, where y
is treated as the randomness used in the original DCSSign phase, and σ2 = gwa+y. For
the Schnorr signature part, i.e., constructing (s, t), we assume C also controls H ′(·)
oracle. Thus it can simply selects s, t randomly, and let gbk = gbtg−brsmod q. Note
that here the public key for the internal Schnorr signature is gbr, the secret key is r and
the base of logarithm is gb. Finally, C outputs the challenge DCS for message m as
sig = (σ1, σ2, s, t), which is a valid DCS on message m.
In case the coin toss is tail, C outputs a fake DCS sigR = (σ1, σ2, s, t) for message
m′, where σ1 = gby, σ2 = gz, and (s, t) is a simulated Schnorr signature showing that
(σ1 = g
by, σ2 = g
z) is a well formed ElGamal encryption.
After that, C can continuously answer D’s oracle queries as simulated above. Fi-
nally, if D can distinguish the two signatures sig and sigR by outputting a correct
guess bit b′, w.r.t. m′ with a non-negligible advantage, it is straightforward to see that
C can output the same bit b′ to solve the given challenge also with a non-negligible
advantage. 
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GW [45] GMR [38] WBWB [78] HWS [48] Our Scheme
Random Oracle No No Yes No Yes
Underlying Signatures [26, 44, 37] Any Any Not known BLS [14]
Confirm(C,V ) 320ex 25ex 15ex 17ex+14pr 12ex+8pr
Disavow(C,V ) generic ZK 60 ex 16ex 23.5ex+14pr 14.5ex+8pr
Signature Size (bits) 81,920 8,192 1,984 513 682
Table 5.2: Comparison of The Concrete DCS-UV with Some Existing DCS Schemes
5.7 A Comparison
We give a brief comparison between our DCS proposal and other knowing efficient
schemes. Here, we compare these DCS schemes according to four categories, i.e.,
whether the scheme relies on the random oracle model [5], which kinds of underlying
basic signatures are used, how about the communication efficiency, and what the sig-
nature size is. For signature size, we estimate all schemes with equivalent 1024-bits
RSA security. We use pr and ex to denote the time for computing a pairing and an
exponentiation in G and Gt, respectively. Note that the communication costs are esti-
mated on the running time of Confirm(C,V ) for consistency, and already include the
overheads introduced by the transformation from HVIZK to CZK. According to Table
1, our scheme has a smaller signature size over WBWB scheme [78], which is also
provably secure in the random oracle model. Comparing to Huang et al’s scheme [48],
we have higher communication efficiency, since their HVIZK requires more computa-
tional costs when transformed into CZK version, and our scheme is conceptual simpler.
5.8 Summary
Based on BLS short signature [14] we presented a new efficient designated confirmer
signature (DCS) scheme that additionally enables the signer to disavow any invalid
signatures. We call such a scheme as a DCS with full verification. As DCS has been
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considered for the extension of undeniable signatures, we believe this new feature is
attracting in potential applications of DCS, like fair exchange [1] of digital commit-
ments between two users over the Internet. Moreover, our scheme achieves the unified
verification, as both the signer and confirmer just use the same Confirm or Disavow
protocol to convince a verifier that an alleged DCS is valid or invalid, respectively.
Based on security models given in [18, 32], we have proposed a new security model
to accommodate a DCS with unified verification, and showed the security of the pro-
posed scheme in the random oracle model under a newly introduced computational
assumption, which is independent of interest. In addition, we have proposed a very
efficient way that transforms Σ-protocols into concurrent zero knowledge protocols.
As the future work, it would be very interesting to build new efficient DCS schemes
with unified or full verification.
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Chapter 6
A Generic DCS Construction with Full
Verification
6.1 Introduction
At Aisacrypt ’05, Gentry, Molnar, and Ramzan[38] proposed a generic DCS scheme
(the GMR scheme for short) that involves the use of a signature on a commitment and
a separate encryption of the randomness used for commitment. By adding this “layer
of indirection”, the underlying protocols in the GMR scheme have efficient instan-
tiations that can avoid to use general zero-knowledge proofs for NP statements, and
furthermore the performance of these protocols is not tied to the selection of underly-
ing signature scheme, as the signature itself is publicly verifiable.
However, as pointed by Wang et al [78], the GMR scheme is flawed and does not
meet the security requirement of invisibility. In particular, they discovered a reason-
able attack based on the observation that in the GMR scheme, the ciphertext c of the
randomness r could be re-used in different signatures. The technique of such an attack
can be found in the section 4.2 of [78], and we omitted the details.
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After we built the concrete designated confirmer signatures scheme in chapter 5,
it seems quite natural to explore a generic construction that still retains the feature of
full verification, i.e., either the signer or the confirmer can interactively verify arbitrary
signatures, provide a convincing proof when confirming a valid signature or when
disavowing an invalid signature. The main task of this chapter is to contribute to a
generic DCS scheme with full verification.
Our Contributions Inspired by the interesting GMR scheme [38] and the im-
proved GMR scheme in [78], we propose the first generic DCS scheme that supports
full verification. The main idea of our construction is, to issue a DCS, the targeted
message is initially sealed in a commitment ϕ. Then the randomness r used to open
the commitment is doubly encrypted, that is, two ciphertexts say c1 and c2 will be gen-
erated as part of the DCS which are the encryptions on the randomness with regard
to the signer or the confirmer’s public key. The final output DCS is a combination of
ϕ, c1, c2 and σ, where σ′ is an ordinary signature on ϕ by using the signing key. To
confirm or disavow such a DCS, either the signer or the confirmer can simply decrypt
one of the ciphertexts using its private key to get the witness, i.e., the randomness. By
checking the correctness of the commitment, the prover can later provides a ZK proof
of knowledge for the equality of the randomness existed in the commitment and in the
ciphertext.
Since our construction is a straight inheritance of the GMR transformation, our
scheme enjoys the similar benefits of the former, i.e., the proposed generic scheme
gives rise to an efficient and generic DCS construction without appealing to both ran-
dom oracles and general zero-knowledge proofs. To avoid the re-used randomness by
any adaptive adversary, we draw on the solution introduced by [78], i.e., let the un-
derlying IND-CCA2 secure encryption scheme support the use of labels. In particular,
we should let the confirmer be aware of the “context” of the ciphertext c meaning that
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c is created with respect to which message m and which verification key. This is the
reason that we introduce such a kind of specific encryption schemes in section 2.2.
Organizations After the background information of DCS schemes in this section,
we present two cryptographic primitives in section 2, that is, the commitment scheme
which is used as a “layer of indirection”, to achieve efficient instantiations, as well as
the public key encryption scheme that supports the use of labels to enhance the security.
In section 3, we propose a generic transformation to convert any digital signatures
into designated confirmer signatures. And we give the related security analysis of our
scheme in section 4. We show how to efficiently instantiate the proposed scheme by
choosing specific building blocks in section 5. Section 6 concludes our work of this
chapter.
6.2 Cryptographic Primitives
6.2.1 Commitment Schemes
Commitment schemes play an important role in cryptography and their use is of par-
ticular importance within cryptographic protocols. A commitment can be viewed as
the “digital” analog of a safe or a sealed envelope. During the so-called commit phase,
a player (the sender) wants to commit on a value (or a bitstring) to a receiver such that
the latter cannot deduce information about the committed value (hiding property). A
second phase is revealing the commitment by disclosing some extra information al-
lowing the receiver to learn and check the committed value. The value chosen during
the commit phase must be the only one that the sender can compute and that validates
during the revealing phase (binding property). In fact, the binding property ensures
that between the two phases, the sender is not able to change its mind so that it should
be impossible for him to open the commitment on a different value from the committed
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one.
An obvious application of commitment schemes are sealed-bid auctions. Each
participant with a key puts his bid into his lockable box, and submits the box to the
auctioneer. On receiving all bids, the auctioneer also requests the keys from those par-
ticipants, unlock the boxes publicly and announces the winner. The important aspects
of commitment schemes, the hiding property and the binding property, are reflected
in this example: the actual bid should be kept secret until the bidding phase is over,
and also no bidder should be able to change his bid after seeing a previously disclosed
opponent’s bid.
Perdesen Commitment Scheme An example of an information-theoretically hid-
ing commitment scheme is the Perdesen commitment scheme [67], which is binding
under the discrete logarithm (DL) assumption. We introduce the scheme with minor
changes.
Let p and q be two large primes such that q divides p− 1. Gq is a unique subgroup
of Z∗p of order q , and g is a generator of Gq. Let h be an element of Gq such that no
body knows logg h.
The committer commits himself to a value m ∈ Zq by choosing t ∈ Zq at random,
and computing
E(m, t) = gmht
Such a commitment can be simply opened by revealing the value of m and t. The
scheme has been proved to be statistically hiding and computationally binding under
DL assumption. In particular, the commitment E(m, t) reveals no information about
m, and the committer cannot open a commitment to m′ such that m′ 6= m unless it can
compute logg h.
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6.2.2 Secure Encryption Scheme with Labels
An interesting attack on the invisibility of DCSs, is to link the validity of the challenge
signature to a reconstructed new signature, where the new signature has re-used the
same randomness or the same key values existed in producing the challenge signature.
Note such kind of attacks has been identified in chapter 3 and in [78].
To enhance the security of the scheme and to resist this attack, we should let the
confirmer know the “context” of the ciphertext c meaning that c is created with respect
to which message and which verification key. In particular, we introduce an adaptation
of Paillier-based encryption scheme [65] that proposed by Camenisch and Shoup [19].
This so-called “CS-Paillier cryptosystem” encryption scheme supporting the use of
labels, is an ideal solution for offering the resistance to the above attack.
We first introduce the notation system that is used to describe the scheme below.
For a real number a, bac denotes the largest integer b ≤ a, and dae the smallest integer
b ≥ a. For positive real numbers a and b, [a] denotes the set {0, ..., bac − 1}.
The Scheme Description The IND-CCA2 security of this scheme relies on the
decisional composite residuosity assumption (DCRA) in Z∗n2 , where n = pq is the
product of two Sophie-Germain primes p and q (i.e., there exist two primes p0 and
q0 such that p = 2p0 + 1 and q = 2q0 + 1). Informally, the DCRA states that it is
intractable to distinguish random elements from Z∗n2 and random elements from the
subgroup consisting of all n-th powers of elements in Z∗n2 . We give the brief review of
this encryption scheme as below.
The user generates a composite modulus n = pq as above. The user’s public key
includes a collision-resistant hash function H , h = 1 + n, a random g′ ∈ Z∗n2 , and
values g = g′2n, y1 = gx1 , y2 = gx2 , and y3 = gx3 , where x1, x2, x3 ∈R [n2/4]
constitute the private key. Define a function abs(·): Zn2 → Zn2 as abs(a) = a if
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0 ≤ a ≤ n2/2, or abs(a) = n2 − a mod n2 if n2/2 < a ≤ n2.
To encrypt a value r ∈ [n] with a label L ∈ {0, 1}∗, the sender picks t ∈R [n/4]
and computes a triple (u, e, v) by u = gt, e = yt1h
r, and v = abs((y2y
H(u,e,L)
3 )
t). The
resulting ciphertext (u, e, v) with label L can be decrypted as follows. First, the user
checks whetherabs(v) ≡ v and u2(x2+H(u,e,L)·x3) ≡ v2. If any check fails, output ⊥.
Otherwise, the user computes rˆ = (e/ux1)2k for k = 2−1 mod n. If rˆ is of form hr for
some r ∈ [n] (i.e., rˆ−1 is divisible by n), then output r = (rˆ−1)/n ∈ [n]. Otherwise,
output ⊥.
6.3 A Generic Construction of DCS with Full Verifica-
tion
Intuition Behind One may find that, if using the paradigm of “sign-and-encrypt”
method, it is not so easy to let the signer prove a DCS is invalid. Because without
the decryption key, the signer has to prove the encrypted value is not a valid basic sig-
nature on the required message. Usually, to prove such a statement, the signer has to
present a general zero-knowledge proofs, while such kinds of proofs always involve
a reduction step to an NP-complete language (e.g., the language representing graphs
that are three colorable), and cannot really be used in practice. Our main idea is, the
targeted message is initially sealed in a commitment. The randomness used to open the
commitment is then repeatedly encrypted, that is, two ciphertexts will be generated as
part of the DCS which are the encryptions on the randomness with regard to the signer
and the confirmer’s public key. To confirm or disavow any DCS, either the signer or
the confirmer can simply decrypts one of the ciphertexts using its private key to get
the witness, i.e., the randomness. By checking the correctness of the commitment, the
prover can later provide a ZK proof of knowledge for the equality of the randomness
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existed in the commitment and in the ciphertext.
The Scheme Description
To setup the scheme, the following building blocks of cryptographic primitives
are adopted: a statistically hiding and computationally binding commitment scheme
Comm = (Com,CheckReveal); an IND-CCA2 secure public key encryption scheme
which supports the use of “labels”: PKE = (PKE_Gen,Enc,Dec); and an EUF-
CMA digital signature scheme DS = (DS_Gen, Sig, V er). The following algo-
rithms/protocols describe the details of our scheme.
KGen: The signer S generates a signing key-pair (skS, vkS)← DS_Gen(1λ) for
any EUF-CMA digital signature scheme DS; Both the signer and the confirmer gen-
erate public and private keys for any IND-CCA2 secure public key encryption scheme
supporting the use of labels: (xS, yS)← PKE_Gen(1λ), (xC , yC)← PKE_Gen(1λ).
Sign: To issue an ordinary signature on a message m, the signer S computes a
statistically hiding and computationally binding commitment ψ = Com(m, r) with
the randomness r, and creates σ = Sig(skS, ψ); The basic signature is σ∗ = (σ, r).
V erify: On input an basic DCS signature σ∗ = (σ, r) for a message m, this
algorithm returns the output of V er(ψ, σ, vkS), where ψ = Com(m, r).
DCSSign: To issue a DCS on a message m, the signer S computes a statistically
hiding and computationally binding commitment ψ = Com(m, r) with the random-
ness r, and creates σ = Sig(skS, ψ); In addition, S also computes two encryptions, i.e.,
c1 = Enc(yS, r) and c2 = Enc(yC , r), and prepares a zero-knowledge proof pi0 shows
that c1 and c2 are properly prepared. In particular, pi0 should be a non-interactive zero
knowledge (NIZK) protocol shows that both c1 and c2 encrypt the same randomness
that is used to compute the commitment ψ. The output DCS is σ′ = (ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0).
Confirm(S,V ): On receiving a message-DCS pair (m,σ′) = (m, (ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0)),
signer S first checks whether σ is signed on ψ. S aborts if this check fails. Also S
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aborts if pi0 is invalid. Otherwise, S decrypts c1 to get a value r, and then checks if
ψ ≡ Com(m, r). If any step of this procedure fails, S executesDisavow(S,V ) protocol.
Otherwise, using its private key xS S runs the interactive protocol pi1 with the verifier.
In particular, pi1 is a ZK proof of knowledge of a value r such that c1 = Enc(yS, r)
and ψ = Com(m, r).
Disavow(S,V ): On receiving a purported message-DCS pair (m,σ′) = (m, (ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0)),
signer S checks if c1 is a valid encryption of some r which can be decrypted by using
its private key xS . If not, it performs a ZK proof of knowledge showing that c1 is not
well-formed. Otherwise, S computes r′ = Dec(c1, xS). If ψ 6= Com(m, r′), S pro-
vides a ZK proof of knowledge that there is a value r′ such that ψ 6= Com(m, r′) and
c1 = Enc(yS, r
′).
Confirm(C,V ): On receiving a message-DCS pair (m,σ′) = (m, (ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0)),
confirmer C first checks whether σ is signed on ψ. C aborts if this check fails. Also C
aborts if pi0 is invalid. Otherwise, C decrypts c2 to get a value r by using its private key
xC , and then checks the equation ψ ≡ Com(m, r). If any step of this procedure fails,
C executes Disavow(C,V ) protocol. Otherwise, using its private key xC C runs the
interactive protocol pi2 with the verifier. In particular, pi2 is a ZK proof of knowledge
of a value r such that c2 = Enc(yC , r) and ψ = Com(m, r).
Disavow(C,V ): On receiving a purported message-DCS pair (m,σ′) = (m, (ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0)),
confirmer C checks if both c2 is a valid encryption of some r. If not, it performs
a ZK proof of knowledge such that c2 is not well-formed. Otherwise, C computes
r′ = Dec(c2, xC). If ψ 6= Com(m, r′), C provides a ZK proof of knowledge showing
that there is a value r′ such that ψ 6= Com(m, r′) and c2 = Enc(yC , r′).
Extract: On input m and σ′ = (ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0), the confirmer C first checks
whether σ is signed on ψ, then decrypts c2 to get a value r by using its private key xC ,
and checks if ψ ≡ Com(m, r) . If any of the procedure fails, C outputs ⊥. Otherwise,
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C outputs the basic signature σ∗ = (σ, r).
Remark 1: In multi-signer settings, to enhance the invisibility of the GMR scheme,
we should let the prover (the confirmer or one of the signers) know the “context” of
the ciphertexts c1 and c2, meaning that they are created with respect to which message
m and which verification keys. Namely, we can define a label L = m||yS||yC so that
the prover is aware of the context of the ciphertext. That is also the reason we use
the labels in our construction, though we do not explicitly disclose the labels in the
above proposition. Detailed descriptions of how to use public key encryption scheme
supporting the use of labels, are demonstrated in the next section.
Remark 2: Gentry et al. pointed out that, all the statements involving zero-
knowledge proofs can be expressed as NP statements (and have a short witness).
Therefore, it’s feasible, in theory, to instantiate the above scheme in polynomial time
for any suitably secure encryption scheme, commitment scheme, and signature scheme.
Remark 3: In our DCSSign algorithm, pi0 shall be a NIZK proof that could be
validated publicly. However, sometimes to conform to reality, one may also retain the
interaction between the signature issuer, i.e., signer S, and the signature recipient, by
replacing pi0 with a interactive ZK protocol pi′0 that proves the equality of the encrypted
message in c1 and c2.
Remark 4: We do not include the checks on σ′ and pi0 in Disavow protocols,
since σ′ is a publicly verifiable signature on ψ, and pi0 is a NIZK proof in general.
Consequently, the verifier can verify these two elements by himself before performing
the Disavow protocol.
Remark 5: It is notable that the DCS σ′ signs on the commitment ψ rather than
the rare message m. The statistically hiding property of the underlying commitment
scheme ensures the inability of discovering the relations between the messages and the
DCSs. However, Our construction allows that the DCS σ′ may convince any verifier
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that the signer indeed signed some message m, as the ordinary signature pair (ψ, σ)
is publicly verifiable. Because (ψ, σ) is always a valid signature pair if the DCS σ′
is valid, the distribution on the signature space corresponding to the random variable
σ′ for any fixed key and varying messages is not computationally indistinguishable
from a uniform distribution. Based on this observation, our construction does not meet
the requirement of the addition property in Galbraith and Mao’s proposal [33] (see in
section 2, Property A). Accordingly, our construction satisfies (weak) invisibility, while
is not covered by the security of invisibility defined by Galbraith and Mao in [33], and
a formal analysis will be provided in the next section. We emphasis that invisibility
in [33] is a little stronger than the "weak invisibility" in Def 3.6, section 2, Chapter
3 (originally introduced by Camenisch and Michels [18]. A detailed discussion and
proofs for identifying the relations of these two definitions can be seen in section 3 in
[33]). In fact, for many real life applications, we think (weak) invisibility is enough to
meet the security requirements.
6.4 Security Analysis
Let DS = (DS_Gen, Sig, V er) be any signature scheme secure against chosen mes-
sage attack, and let PKE = (PKE_Gen,Enc,Dec) be any IND-CCA2 secure
encryption scheme and Comm = (Com,DeCom) be any statistically hiding and
computationally binding commitment scheme with perfect zero-knowledge proofs of
knowledge for committed values secure against cheating verifiers. We use DCS to
denote a DCS scheme with full verification following the construction in section 1.
According to the security model given in section 4, Chapter 5, we demonstrate the
security of the above generic construction in the following two theorems. We remark
that, theorem 2 is about the invisibility analysis in the standard model, and we follow
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an alternative definition given in Def 3.6, section 2, Chapter 3 (and also by Camenisch
and Michels [18]). In fact, Galbraith and Mao [32] have proved that these two types of
invisibility are actually equivalent in the standard model of computation.
Theorem 6.1. If the underlying signature scheme DS = (DS_Gen, Sig, V er)
is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks and the commitment
scheme is computationally binding, the scheme DCS is existentially unforgeable
against chosen message attacks.
Proof: The main idea is, after the training phase, the adversary A has a non-
negligible probability of successfully outputting a fresh DCS (m,σ′) for which
V erify(m,Extract(m,σ′, xC , vkS), vkS) = Accept. From A, we can construct an
algorithm B that is able to either construct an existential forgery of the underlying sig-
nature scheme, or violate the binding property of the commitment scheme. We denote
C as an instance of the underlying signature scheme. In the simulation, C will cre-
ate related key-pairs and answer all B ’s signing queries except the challenging query.
Now we describe the simulations as follows.
Initially, C generates the signing-verification key-pair (skS, vkS) via the algorithm
KGen. B runs the algorithm PKE_Gen and generates the signer and the confirmer’s
encryption key-pairs, i.e., (xS, yS) and (xC , yC) respectively. B sends xS and xC to A.
B simulates all needed DCS oracles for A as follows:
DCSSign query: For any queried message m, B picks a randomness r, computes
a commitment ψ = Com(m, r) with the randomness r. Then B uses its own oracle
access to C, to obtain a signature on ψ, i.e., σ = Sig(skS, (ψ, vkS)). B also gen-
erates appropriate ciphertexts c1 and c2 that encrypts r, and produces a ZK proof of
knowledge pi0 shows c1 and c2 encrypts the same randomness r. The output DCS is
σ′ = (ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0). Meanwhile, B maintains a DCS-List when generating any new
DCS.
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For Confirm(S,V ), Disavow(S,V ), Confirm(C,V ), Disavow(C,V ) and Extract
queries, A can simulate and achieve correct results using xS or xC .
Suppose thatA outputs a pair (mˆ, σˆ′) where σˆ′ = (ψˆ, σˆ, cˆ1, cˆ2, pi0), and mˆ is a fresh
message. B uses xC to extract the underlying basic signature of (mˆ, σˆ′), say (σˆ, rˆ). B
checks its DCS-List , if σ is found for some m, and σ = σˆ, this suggests B must have
responded to A’s DCSSign query on m by generating a randomness r, for which
ψ = Com(mˆ, rˆ) = Com(m, r). Since mˆ 6= m, this violates the binding property of
the commitment scheme. Otherwise, B outputs σ as an existential forgery on message
(ψ, vkS). 
Theorem 6.2. If the underlying encryption scheme PKE is IND-CCA2 secure,
then the scheme DCS is invisible w.r.t. the definition of Def 3.6 in section 2, Chap-
ter 3.
Proof: The main idea is, in the invisibility game, when receiving a challenge DCS
σ′ = (ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0) on two messages m0 and m1, the adversary is to distinguish the
validities of the DCSs adaptively. Since the commitment scheme is computationally
binding, which means ψ is a valid commitment on either m0 or m1. But due to the
perfect hiding property, the DCS adversary cannot succeed via ψ.
In the following simulation process, we use A as a subroutine to construct a PPT
adversary B which will successfully break the underlying encryption scheme. We
denote C as an instance of the underlying encryption scheme. In the simulation, C will
create related key-pairs and answer all B’s decryption queries except the challenging
query.
Initially, two key-pairs (xS, yS) and (xC , yC) generated via PKE_Gen by C , are
set as the public encryption keys of the signer and the confirmer. B runs KGen for
generating a signing-verification key-pair (skS, vkS). We denote A and B as A and
B’s advantage for breaking the scheme DCS and the underlying encryption scheme
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PKE respectively.
B simulates all DCS oracles for A as follows:
DCSSign query: For any queried message m, B picks a randomness r, computes
a commitment ψ = Com(m, r) with the randomness r, and creates σ = Sig(skS, ψ);
B also computes two encryptions, i.e., c1 = Enc(yS, r), c2 = Enc(yC , r), and pro-
duces a ZK proof of knowledge pi0 shows c1 and c2 encrypts the same randomness r..
EventuallyB returns the DCS σ′ = (ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0) toA. In addition,B also maintains
a (m, r)-List . Whenever a new DCS σ′ created and returned to A, the corresponding
message-randomness pair (m, r) is added to (m, r)-List .
Confirm(S,V ) query: For any queried message-DCS pair (m,σ′), where σ′ =
(ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0), B looks up the (m, r)-List with input m. If a saved (m, rˆ) is found,
B checks the DCS’s validity with the value rˆ. Namely, B checks the equation ψ =
Com(m, rˆ). B terminates if the check fails. Otherwise, B performs a zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge of the value rˆ such that ψ = Com(m, rˆ), c1 = Enc(yS, rˆ).
Disavow(S,V ) query: For any queried message-DCS pair (m,σ′), where σ′ =
(ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0), B first enquires C’s decryption oracle with input c1. Once B re-
ceives the decrypted value rˆ, it checks if both c1 and c2 are valid encryptions of some
randomness. If not, it performs a ZK proof of knowledge such that either c1 or c2 is
not well-formed. Otherwise, if ψ 6= Com(m, rˆ), B provides a ZK proof of knowledge
that there is a value rˆ such that ψ 6= Com(m, rˆ) and c1 = Enc(yS, rˆ).
Confirm(C,V ) query: For any queried message-DCS pair (m,σ′), where σ′ =
(ψ, σ, c1, , c2, pi0), B looks up the (m, r)-List with input m. If a saved (m, rˆ) is found,
B checks the DCS’s validity with the value rˆ. Namely, B checks the equation ψ =
Com(m, rˆ), if it fails, B terminates. Otherwise, B performs a zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge of the value rˆ such that ψ = Com(m, rˆ), and c2 = Enc(yC , rˆ).
Disavow(S,V ) query: For any queried message-DCS pair (m,σ′), where σ′ =
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(ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0), B first enquires C’s decryption oracle with input c2. Once B re-
ceives the decrypted value rˆ, it checks if both c1 and c2 are valid encryption of some
randomness. If not, it performs a ZK proof of knowledge such that either c1 or c2 is
not well-formed. Otherwise, if ψ 6= Com(m, rˆ), B provides a ZK proof of knowledge
that there is a value rˆ such that ψ 6= Com(m, rˆ) and c2 = Enc(yC , rˆ).
Extract query: For any queried message-DCS pair (m,σ′), where σ′ = (ψ, σ, c1, c2),
B looks up the (m, r)-List with inputm. If a saved (m, rˆ) is found,B checks the DCS’s
validity with the value rˆ. Otherwise, B terminates. Namely, B checks three equation
ψ = Com(m, rˆ), if it fails, B terminates. Otherwise, B outputs (σ, rˆ).
In the challenge phase, After q adaptive oracle queries by A, it presents two mes-
sages m0 and m1, and sends them to B.
B picks two randomnesses respectively, i.e., r0 for committing m0, and r1 for
committing m1. B computes a “possible” commitment by flipping a fair coin b′, i.e.,
ψb′ = Com(mb′ , rb′), and further computes σb′ = Sig(skS, ψb′). B uses r0 and r1
as the equal length messages in its “find stage”, and sends them to C. By flipping
a fair coin b, C returns a tuple (c1−b, c2−b), where c1−b = Enc(yS, rb) and c2−b =
Enc(yC , rb), together with a ZK proof of knowledge pi0−b shows c1−b and c2−b encrypts
the same message. B returns the challenge as σb = (ψb′ , σb′ , c1−b, c2−b, pi0−b).
At the end of the simulation, A outputs its guess on b′, denote as b′′, B straightly
uses b′′ as its own guess on b and outputs b′′.
In fact, A and B are A and B’s advantage for guessing each coin value re-
spectively. The “failure” cases are when b′ 6= b, that is the challenge DCS σb =
(ψb′ , σb′ , c1−b, c2−b) is invalid, which means B’s responses to A’s queries deviate from
the real oracles’ responses. In that case, B’s advantage is no better than a random
guessing. Note in B’s view, flipping the coin b′ is independent from flipping the coin
b. Thus the “failure” probability is exactly 1/2.
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Hence we have 1
2
+B =
1
2
×(1
2
+A)+
1
2
× 1
2
, i.e., 2·B = A. If B is non-negligible,
A is non-negligible as desired. 
6.5 Implementation and Evaluation of the DCS Scheme
We show how to efficiently instantiate the above scheme. To fulfill the building blocks,
we select the scheme by Camenisch and Shoup which was discussed in sub-section
2.2, as the underlying encryption scheme PKE. The commitment scheme will be a
Pedersen-type commitment scheme as described in sub-section 2.1. We choose BLS
short signature [14] as the underlying digital signature scheme. The reason we do not
choose the very interesting Boneh-Boyen signature [8, 9] (BB signature) which also
has short signature size, is that the underlying computational problem seems a little
ornate and contrived. In fact, Boneh and Boyen give a reductionist security argument
showing that a chosen message attacker cannot forge a signature provided that the so-
called Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) problem is hard. This problem is parametrised by
an integer l (which is a bound on the number of signature queries the attacker is allowed
to make) and is denoted l-SDH. In particular, recently Jao and Yoshida[50] showed by
using the techniques in [24], one can forge signatures in roughly p2/5 operations (with
roughly p1/5signature queries) under certain conditions., where p represents the order
of the underlying cyclic groups.
6.5.1 The instantiation
Considering a symmetric bilinear map e : G × G → Gt, where G is a multiplicative
cyclic group of prime order q and g is a generator of G. H : {0, 1}∗ → G is a full-
domain hash function. H ′ is a collision-resistant hash function. Let n = p′q′ be the
product of two Sophie-Germain primes p′ and q′ (i.e., there exist two primes p0 and q0
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such that p′ = 2p0 + 1 and q′ = 2q0 + 1). Similar to the subsection 2.2, we define a
function abs(·): Zn2 → Zn2 as abs(a) = a if 0 ≤ a ≤ n2/2, or abs(a) = n2 − a mod
n2 if n2/2 < a ≤ n2. To obtain a verifiable encryption scheme from the CS-Paillier
cryptosystem, we assume there is an additional composite modulus n2 = p2q2, where
p2 = 2p
′
2 + 1 and q2 = 2q
′
2 + 1 are two safe primes, along with elements g2, h2 ∈ Z∗n2
of order p′2q
′
2.
In addition, we select a third group Γ of prime order ρ, with two generators δ and
γ , and the discrete logarithm problem is assumed to be hard in Γ. In our scheme,
a message m shall be committed by Com(m, r) = δmγr, where r ∈R [ρ]. We re-
quire n2 6= n, ρ =| Γ |< n · 2−k−k′−3, and 2k < min{p′, q′, p′2, q′2} for two further
security parameters k and k′. Actually, {0, 1}k defines the “challenge space” of the
verifier, while k′ controls the quality of the ZK property. In addition, it is required
that the prover does not know the factorization of n2. For simplicity, we suppose that
(n2, g2, h2,Γ, δ, γ) are generated by a trusted party and viewed as a common reference
string. Note implementation details of the ZK protocols in DCSSign, Confirm(S,V ),
Disavow(S,V ), Confirm(C,V ), and Disavow(C,V ) can be seen in Appendix A.
KGen: The signer S picks a random value x ∈R Z∗q as its private key of the
signing key-pair, and computes gx as its public key of the signing key-pair. The signer
generates its encryption/decryption keys as follows: it picks xS1 , xS2 , xS3 ∈R [n2/4],
wherexS = (n, xS1 , xS2 , xS3) constitute the decryption key. The signer computes h =
1 + n, picks a random value g′S ∈ Z∗n2 , and computes gS = g′2nS , yS1 = gxS1 , yS2 =
gxS2 , and yS3 = g
xS3 where yS = (h, n, gS, yS1 , yS2 , yS3) constitute the encryption
key. The confirmer computes its encryption/decryption key similarly, and denotes as
xC = (h, n, xC1 , xC2 , xC3), and yC = (h, n, gC , yC1 , yC2 , yC3).
Sign: To issue an ordinary signature on a message m, the signer S computes
a statistically hiding and computationally binding commitmentψ = δmγr with the
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randomness r, and creates σ = H(ψ)x; The basic signature is σ∗ = (σ, r).
V erify: On input an basic DCS signature σ∗ = (σ, r) for a message m, this
algorithm returns Accept if e(σ, g) = e(H(ψ), gx), where ψ = δmγr.
DCSSign: To issue a DCS on a message m, the signer S computes a commitment
ψ = δmγr with the randomness r, and creates σ = H(ψ)x; In addition, S also com-
putes two encryptions, i.e., c1 = (u1, e1, v1) = Enc(yS,m) and c2 = (u2, e2, v2) =
Enc(yC ,m). In particular, to compute c1, the signer should choose a random value
tem ∈R [n/4], and computes u1 = gtemS , e1 = ytemS1 hr, v1 = abs((yS2yH(u1,e1,L1)S3 )tem)
with a label L1 = m ‖ yS . Similarly, to compute c2, the signer should choose an-
other randomness tem′ ∈R [n/4], and computes u2 = gtem′C , e2 = ytem′C1 hr, v2 =
abs((yC2y
H(u2,e2,L2)
C3
)tem
′
) with the label L2 = m ‖ yC . S also provides a zero knowl-
edge proof pi0 shows that both c1 and c2 encrypt the same randomness that is used
to compute the commitment ψ. Finally, the output designated confirmer signature is
σ′ = (ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0) on the message m,
pi0 = PK{(tem, tem′, r, s) : e1 = ytemS1 hr ∧ e2 = ytem
′
C1
hr}
Note in the CS-Paillier encryption scheme, the randomness r is hidden in the value
ewhich is actually a “commitment”, to prove the equality of the randomness encrypted
by c1 and c2, is equivalent to prove that two commitments, e1 and e2, hide the same
secret r. we use the NIZK protocol proposed by Boudot [15] which in fact is derived
from proofs of equality of two discrete logarithms combined with a proof of knowledge
of a discrete logarithm modulo n.
Confirm(S,V ): On receiving a message-DCS pair (m,σ′) = (m, (ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0)),
signer S first checks if e(σ, g) ≡ e(H(ψ), gx). S aborts if this check fails. Otherwise,
S decrypts c1 to get a value r′, and then checks if ψ ≡ δmγr′ . Specifically, to decrypt
c1, the signer first checks if abs(v1) ≡ v1 and u2(xS2+H(u1,e1,L1)·xS3 )1 ≡ v21; If this does
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not hold, then output⊥ and halt, otherwise the signer computes rˆ = (e1/uxS11 )2k where
k = 2−1 mod n. If rˆ is of form hd for some d ∈ [n] (i.e., rˆ − 1 is divisible by n), then
output r′ = (rˆ − 1)/n ∈ [n]; otherwise, output ⊥. If any of this procedure fails, S
executesDisavow(S,V ) protocol. Otherwise, S runs a ZK proof of knowledge of values
(xS1 , xS2 , xS3 , r, s) with the verifier, where s ∈ [n2/4]:
pi1 = PK{(xS1 , xS2 , xS3 , r, s) : yS1 = gxS1 ∧ yS2 = gxS2 ∧ yS3 = gxS3
∧e21 = u2xS11 h2r ∧ v21 = u2xS21 u2H(u1,e1,L1)xS31
∧ψδ−m = γr ∧ l = gr2hs2 ∧ −n/2 < r < n/2}
Disavow(S,V ): On receiving a message-DCS pair (m,σ′) = (m, (ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0)),
signer S checks if c1 is a valid encryption of some r with respect to label L1. If not,
it performs a ZK proof of knowledge such that c1 is not well-formed. Otherwise, S
computes r′ = Dec(c1, xS). If ψ 6= δmγr′ , S provides a ZK proof of knowledge r′
such that ψ 6= δmγr and c1 = Enc(yS, r′). In general, S will provides a ZK proof for
the following statement:
[c1 is invalid w.r.t. L1 = m ‖ yS] OR [∃ r′ s.t. r′ = Dec(c1, xS) AND ψ 6= δmγr′]
Confirm(C,V ): On receiving a message-DCS pair (m,σ′) = (m, (ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0)),
the confirmer C first checks whether σ is signed on ψ by checking if e(σ, g) =
e(H(ψ), gx). C aborts if this check fails. Otherwise, C decrypts c2 to get a value
r by using xC , and then checks if ψ ≡ δmγr. If any of this procedure fails, C exe-
cutes Disavow(C,V ) protocol. Otherwise, C runs the interactive protocols pi2 with the
verifier. Specially, pi2 is a ZK proof of knowledge of values (xC1 , xC2 , xC3 , r, s), where
s ∈ [n2/4].
137
pi2 = PK{(xC1 , xC2 , xC3 , r, s) : yC1 = gxC1 ∧ yC2 = gxC2 ∧ yC3 = gxSC
∧e22 = u2xC12 h2r ∧ v22 = u2xC22 u2H(u2,e2,L2)xC32
∧ψδ−m = γr ∧ l = gr2hs2 ∧ −n/2 < r < n/2}
Disavow(C,V ):On receiving a message-DCS pair (m,σ′) = (m, (ψ, σ, c1, c2, pi0)),
confirmer C checks if c2 is a valid encryption of some r with respect to label L2. If
not, it performs a ZK proof of knowledge such c2 is not well-formed. Otherwise, C
computes r′ = Dec(c2, xC). If ψ 6= δmγr, C provides a ZK proof of knowledge that
there is a value r′ such that ψ 6= δmγr and c2 = Enc(yC , r′). In general, C will
provides a ZK proof for the following statement:
[c2 is invalid w.r.t. L2 = m ‖ yC] OR [∃ r′ s.t. r′ = Dec(c2, xC) AND ψ 6= δmγr′]
Extract: On input m and σ′ = (ψ, σ, c1, c2), the confirmer C first checks whether
σ is signed on ψ, then decrypts c2 to get a value r by using xC , and checks if ψ = δmγr
. If any of the procedure fails, C outputs ⊥. Otherwise, C outputs the basic signature
σ∗ = (σ, r).
we remark that the above DCS scheme is actually proposed for a message digest
m ∈ [ρ] . That means, to sign a message M with arbitrary length, we should first
compress M to a short digest m using a collision-resistant hash function.
6.5.2 Implementation Details
We describe how to implement pi0, pi1, pi2, and Disaow protocols as follows.
pi0 in DCSSign Algorithm. The details of this ZK protocol, which should be trans-
formed into a CZK protocol in our DCS scheme, are illuminated as follows.
pi0 = PK{(tem, tem′, r, s) : e1 = ytemS1 hr ∧ e2 = ytem
′
C1
hr}
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1. The signer S randomly picks η1, η2 ∈R [−n2k+k′−2, n2k+k′−2], and
ω ∈R [−ρ2k+k′ , ρ2k+k′ ], and computes W1 = yη1S1hω, W2 = yη2C1hω.
2. S computes c = H(W1 ‖ W2) where H is a hash function that outputs 2k-bit
strings.
3. S computes D = ω + c · r, D1 = η1 + c · tem, D2 = η2 + c · tem′, and sends
(c,D,D1, D2) to the verifier. Note D, D1, D2 are all computed in Z.
4. The verifier checks whether c = H(yD1S1 hDe−c1 ‖ yD2C1 hDe−c2 ).
pi1 in Confirm(S,V ) Protocol. At the end of Confirm(S,V ) protocol, S shall run a ZK
proof of knowledge of values (xS1 , xS2 , xS3 , r, s) with the verifier, where s ∈ [n2/4]:
pi1 = PK{(xS1 , xS2 , xS3 , r, s) : yS1 = gxS1 ∧ yS2 = gxS2 ∧ yS3 = gxS3
∧e21 = u2xS11 h2r ∧ v21 = u2xS21 u2H(u1,e1,L1)xS31
∧ψδ−m = γr ∧ l = grhs ∧ −n/2 < r < n/2}
Let α = ψδ−m. For three integers a, b and c with c > 0, a = b rem c denotes the
balanced remainder of b modulo c. Namely, a = b+kc ∈ [−c/2, c/2) for some integer
k. The details of this ZK protocol, which should be transformed into a CZK protocol
in DCS setting, are described as follows.
S first selects a random s ∈R [n2/4], and computes l = gr2hs2. Then S randomly
selects x′S1 , x
′
S2
, x′S3 ∈R [−n2k+k
′−2, n2k+k
′−2], r′ ∈R [−ρ2k+k′ , ρ2k+k′ ] , and s′ ∈R
[−n2k+k′−2, n2k+k′−2], and computes (y′S1 , y′S2 , y′S3 , e′1, v′1, α′, l′) as follows:
y′S1 = g
x′S1 , y′S2 = g
x′S2 , y′S3 = g
x′S3
e′1 = u
x′S1
1 h
r′ , v′1 = u
x′S2
1 u
H(u1,e1,L1)x′S3
1
α′ = γr
′
, l′ = gr
′
2 h
s′
2
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After that, S sends (l, y′S1 , y
′
S2
, y′S3 , e
′
1, v
′
1, α
′, l′) to the verifier.
The verifier selects a random challenge c ∈R {0, 1}k and sends c to the signer S.
S responds with (x˜S1 , x˜S2 , x˜S3 , r˜, s˜) by computing
x˜S1 = x
′
S1
− cxS1 , x˜S2 = x′S2 − cxS2 , x˜S3 = x′S3 − cxS3
r˜ = r′ − cr, s˜ = s′ − cs
The verifier outputsAccept or⊥, according to whether all the following equations/conditions
hold or not respectively:
y′S1 = y
c
S1
gx˜S1 , y′S2 = y
c
S2
gx˜S2 , y′S3 = y
c
S3
gx˜S3 , e′21 = e
2c
1 u
2x˜S1
1 h
2r˜,
v′21 = v
2c
1 u
2x˜S2
1 u
2H(u1,e1,L1)x˜S3
1 , α
′ = αcγ r˜, l′ = lcgr˜2h
s˜
2
,−n/4 < r˜ < n/4.
The Disavow(S,V ) Protocol. The signer needs to provide an ZK proof showing
that: [c1 is invalid w.r.t. L1 = m ‖ yS] OR [∃ r′ s.t. r′ = Dec(c1, xS) AND
ψ 6= δmγr′] holds. According to the analysis given in section 7.3 [19] , this means
that the confirmer needs to prove that at least one of the following equations does not
hold: u
2(xS2+H(u1,e1,L1)xS3 )
1 = 1, (e1/u
xS1
1 )
2n = 1, α = γ[logh2 (e1/u
xS1
1 )
2 remn]
where label L1 = m ‖ yS and α = ψδ−m. We can directly adopt the ZK protocol
specified in section 7.3 of the full paper [19], which is the same as our Disavow(P,V )
protocol and is used to prove verifiable decryption of a discrete logarithm. Note
one should replace the notations, i.e., change the variables x1, x2, x3, u, e, v, L, δ into
xS1 , xS2 , xS3 , u1, e1, v1, L1, α respectively.
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pi2 in Confirm(C,V ) Protocol. Analogically, one could derive the detailed steps of
running pi2 by replacing the related notations, i.e., changing
xS1 , xS2 , xS3 , u1, e1, v1, L1, x
′
S1
, x′S2 , x
′
S3
, y′S1 , y
′
S2
, y′S3 , e
′
1, v
′
1, x˜S1 , x˜S2 , x˜S3
in the procedure of running pi1 into
xC1 , xC2 , xC3 , u2, e2, v2, L2, x
′
C1
, x′C2 , x
′
C3
, y′C1 , y
′
C2
, y′C3 , e
′
2, v
′
2, x˜C1 , x˜C2 , x˜C3 ,
respectively.
The Disavow(C,V ) Protocol. The confirmer needs to provide an ZK proof show-
ing that: [c2 is invalid w.r.t. L2 = m ‖ yC] OR [∃ r′ s.t. r′ = Dec(c2, xC) AND
ψ 6= δmγr′] holds. Let α = ψδ−m. Similar to Disavow(C,V )protocol above, one
could directly use the ZK protocol in section 7.3 of [19], by replacing the notations of
x1, x2, x3, u, e, v, L, δ with xC1 , xC2 , xC3 , u2, e2, v2, L2, α, respectively.
6.5.3 Efficiency Analysis
We give a brief comparison between our instantiation in subsection 5.1 and two schemes,
i.e., the GMR scheme [38], and the WBWB scheme introduced by Wang et al. in
section 6 in [78]. Similar to the comparison made in [38], we also compare these
DCS schemes in three categories, i.e., whether the scheme relies on the random oracle
model, which kinds of the underlying ordinary signatures are adopted, and how about
the computational efficiency. We also list the estimated numbers of exponentiations
needed in each interactive protocol. Recall λ is a security parameter, let exG and exGT
denote the time for computing an exponentiation in cyclic group G and Gt respec-
tively. In fact, no exponentiation in group Gt is required to execute in our practical
implementation. Not surprisingly, from Table 6.1, our scheme has the similar effi-
ciency with the original GMR scheme, since our construction is a straight inheritance
from the GMR scheme. And without using random oracles, we achieve Confirm and
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GMR [38] WBWB [78] Our Scheme
Random Oracle No Yes No
Underlying Signatures Any Any Any
Confirm(C,V ) 25 exG 15 exG 25 exG
Disavow(C,V ) 60 exG 16 exG 60 exG
Table 6.1: Comparison of The Generic DCS-FV with Two Similar Schemes
Disavow protocols with an acceptable efficiency.
6.6 Summary
We have shown that by extending the constructions of the improved GMR scheme in
[78], a new generic DCS scheme could be derived which supports the signer’s disavow-
ability. Since both the signer and the confirmer can do confirmation and disavowal on
any alleged signature, our proposed scheme is so-called “DCS with full verification”.
Also with the security analysis in section 4, we can use any digital signature scheme
that is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA) and any
commitment scheme that is computationally binding, together with a public encryption
scheme that is IND-CCA2 secure, to build a specific secure instantiation of our DCS
cryptosystem.
we explicitly specify how to use labels in the DCS scheme by implementing an in-
stantiation which uses Pedersen commitments and CS-Paillier cryptosystem. For our
Confirm(P,V ) protocol (P = {S,C}), it requires proving the verifiable encryption
of a discrete logarithm as described in subsection 5.2 of [19], and our Disavow(P,V )
protocol requires proving the verifiable decryption of a discrete logarithm as described
in subsection 7.3 of [19]. Meanwhile, to make the underlying zero-knowledge proofs
efficient, we should use the Gennaro’s approach [36] or CDM techniques [25] to trans-
form SHVZK protocols to CZK protocols.
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Going further, we may look for commitment schemes and efficient protocols based
on different assumptions. For example, can we find some new technique to obtain an
even more efficient instantiation based on bilinear mappings?
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Works
In this thesis, we have mainly investigated how to design and analyse designated con-
firmer signature schemes, as well as clarifying the relations of different security no-
tions. By investigating the existing DCS schemes, we discovered that the security no-
tion called “invisibility” is an essential property of DCS schemes, and some adaptive
attacks that break invisibility, have been identified in different schemes. We explored
previous DCS models, and found several security notions including invisibility are not
very clear which bring confusions to future studies of DCS schemes. To address this
issue, we made further analysis on related security notions in a more thorough way.
More specifically, we reconciled the DCS model by comparing four properties, i.e.,
unimpersonation, invisibility, non-transferability and transcript-simulatability, and we
provided formal proofs about the implications/equivalences between these properties.
A important result is, we found that transcript-simulatability in GMR model [38] is
covered by the combination of invisibility and non-transferability in CM model [18];
on the other hand, transcript-simulatability actually implies invisibility, and a different
type of non-transferability.
Apart from the contributions of DCS modeling aspect, this thesis also improves the
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design of DCS schemes by proposing new constructions. As far as we know, none of
the previously published DCS cryptosystems support the signer’s disavow-ability, that
is, the signer cannot convince a verifier that an alleged designated confirmer signature
is invalid. From this observation, we proposed a new efficient pairing based DCS
scheme that both the signer and the designated confirmer can run the same protocols to
confirm a valid DCS or disavow an invalid signature, which we called DCS with unified
verification. To achieve this, we introduced a new computational assumption, called
Decisional Co-efficient Linear (D-co-L) assumption, whose intractability in pairing
settings was analyzed in generic group model. The proposed scheme is composed
by encrypting Boneh, Lynn and Shacham’s pairing based short signatures [14] with
signed ElGamal encryption [72]. The resulting solution is efficient in both aspects
of computation and communication. Since the proposed scheme can be generalised by
allowing the signer to run different protocols for confirming and disavowing signatures,
which leads to a more practical version called DCS with full verification, for which we
do not necessarily require the signer and the confirmer run the same confirm/disavow
protocol.
We also introduced a new technique that gives the possibility of constructing generic
DCS schemes with full verification. Our proposal is inspired by GMR scheme [38] and
the improved GMR scheme in [78], where both use a commitment scheme as a “layer
of indirection”. The generic scheme is a straight inheritance of the GMR transforma-
tion, and it enjoys the similar benefits of the former, i.e., the proposed scheme gives rise
to an efficient generic DCS construction without appealing to both random oracles and
general zero-knowledge proofs. Furthermore, to avoid the re-used randomness by any
adaptive adversary, we draw on the solution introduced by [78], i.e., let the underlying
IND-CCA2 secure encryption scheme support the use of “labels”. By implementing
an instantiation which uses Pedersen commitments and CS-Paillier cryptosystem, we
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explicitly specify how to use labels in the DCS scheme.
Besides the above contributions, this work gives rise to some new open problems.
Firstly, it is worthwhile to clarify the relations between the original version of non-
transferability defined in Chapter 3 (also in [18]) and our proposed new definition
as specified in Chapter 4, because if either an implication or an equivalence relation
between the two types of non-transferability is found, the relations among transcript-
simulatability, invisibility and non-transferability will be more complete and accurate.
Secondly, we believe by finding some new techniques, one could construct a more
efficient concrete DCS scheme with full verification (or even unified verification) in
the standard model, comparing to the proposed scheme in Chapter 5. Furthermore,
we could investigate the strong witness hiding proofs of knowledge approach of Gold-
wasser and Waisbard [45] with an eye towards weakening the assumptions required for
an efficient instantiation.
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